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# ForgeFIRM install, update & recovery system — implementation plan
Phased plan for moving ForgeFIRM from the legacy carve-out-a-partition
install to the factory's own A/B slot scheme, with signed `.fw`
packaging, a GUI update manager, factory restore, and a refreshed
recovery image. The measured ground truth this builds on (eMMC layout,
boot0/boot1 maps, saved-env location, factory `.fw`/updater internals)
is in `BRINGUP.md` → "eMMC boot & recovery architecture".
## Settled decisions
- **Factory partition scheme, unmodified**: ForgeFIRM lives in the two
200 MiB rootfs slots (`mmcblk2p1`/`p2`); `/data` (p3) keeps its full
factory size. No repartitioning at install, ever.
- **Single-OS, not dual-boot**: a machine runs ForgeFIRM *or* factory
firmware, with a clean migration each way. The factory updater's
behavior toward foreign slot contents is irrelevant because we never
operate both long-term.
- **fwup is the universal package/apply format** (the factory's own
mechanism): ForgeFIRM upgrades, factory restore, and provisioning all
use signed `.fw` archives applied to the inactive slot, followed by a
U-Boot env flip — exactly the factory update flow.
- **Factory firmware is archived to `/data` before any factory slot is
overwritten.** Restore-to-factory never depends on Glowforge's
servers; the cloud path (`GET /update/current`, already implemented
in gfutilities) is the optional "restore to *latest*" upgrade.
- **Release artifacts are built and signed locally**, uploaded as
GitHub releases. The Ed25519 private key never leaves the build
host, so GitHub is untrusted hosting: machines verify signatures
before applying. CI does compile checks only, never artifacts.
- **Reinstalling ForgeFIRM from factory = run the installer again**,
until the recovery refresh (Phase 5) subsumes it.
- **Recovery refresh is squashfs-only in v1**: factory U-Boot, DTB and
the 3.14.28 recovery kernel stay in place; only the recovery
userspace is replaced.
## Invariants (every flash path, every phase)
1. Never write the active (running) slot.
2. Machine idle; one flash operation at a time (lock file); no
flash/reboot while a job runs.
3. Archive factory content before the write that would destroy the
last copy of it (rootfs slots; boot0/boot1 before a recovery
refresh).
4. Env flips are atomic: one `fw_setenv -s` transaction setting all
four of `mmcdev`/`mmchwpart`/`mmcpart`/`mmcroot`.
5. Automatic paths (release updater, cloud restore) require a valid
signature — ours or Glowforge's respectively. Manual uploads may be
unsigned behind an explicit "unsigned dev image" warning.
6. The image must fit the 200 MiB slot; the build fails past the size
gate rather than producing an unflashable release.
7. Boot selection refuses targets that fail the content probe (no
kernel / no recognizable rootfs).
8. Verify a written slot (fwup on-the-fly hashes, or an explicit
readback/mount check for raw writes) before flipping boot to it.
## Phase 0 — enablers (no eMMC flashing)
- **0.1 Slot-agnostic images.** Goal: one image boots unmodified from
p1, p2, or SD, steered only by the saved env (U-Boot's `mmcargs`
already takes `root=${mmcroot}` from the env). Audit what our
`/boot/uEnv.txt` currently sets; strip it to entries that are not
per-location (`fdt_file` etc.); bench-verify by flipping env alone.
This removes the mount-and-sed step from every flash path.
*Exit: the same built image boots from two locations with no
per-slot edit.*
- **0.2 fwup toolchain + keys.** Yocto recipe for fwup (target) and a
host-side pack step. Generate the ForgeFIRM Ed25519 keypair
(custody: offline on the build host, passphrase-protected, backed
up). Compatibility gates, both directions: (a) a `.fw` we pack must
apply with the **factory's** fwup 0.14.2 (the installer runs on
factory firmware; fall back to shipping a static armv7 fwup with the
installer if archive-format drift bites), and (b) our shipped fwup
must apply a **factory** `.fw` verified against the GF pubkeys
(carried from the factory image) for cloud restore.
- **0.3 Build outputs.** `forgefirm-image` additionally emits the raw
ext4 rootfs and a packed+signed `forgefirm-<ver>.fw` with
`upgrade.a` / `upgrade.b` tasks in the factory pattern
(partition-relative raw writes, unmounted-destination +
on-the-fly-verify options); size gate enforced here. A `complete`
full-provisioning task joins with the Phase 5 recovery work. The wic
stays for SD/dev burns.
## Phase 1 — ffboot v2 + slot probe
- Atomic env flip (invariant 4) — fixes the existing gaps: three
separate `fw_setenv` calls today, and `mmchwpart` never set (relies
on the saved 0).
- `ffboot -l` (or a sibling tool): inventory every candidate — eMMC
p1/p2, legacy p4, SD — by read-only mount: factory `/etc/version` or
`/etc/forgefirm-version`, kernel presence; plus the current env
selection. Machine-parsable output; this is the probe the GUI and
the installer both reuse.
- *Exit: bench-verified flips SD ↔ eMMC slots; inventory correct for
factory / ForgeFIRM / empty slots.*
## Phase 2 — slot installer (factory → ForgeFIRM)
Rewrite `install-forgefirm.sh` as a **single-stage** script run from
factory firmware:
1. Sanity: factory 3-partition layout, both slots 200 MiB, active slot
detected (`rdev`), enough `/data` space.
2. Archive: **every factory slot version** not already archived —
`dd | gzip` to `/data/forgefirm/archive/factory-rootfs-<ver>.img.gz`
with a manifest line (slot, version, date, md5); also dump
boot0/boot1 (32 MiB) into the archive now, ahead of Phase 5. With
both slots archived, any later overwrite needs no second archive
step.
3. Fetch `forgefirm.fw` from GitHub releases (fixed asset name — the
`releases/latest/download/` URL needs one; the version lives in the
fwup metadata and the release tag), or take a local file argument
for offline/dev installs. Verify the signature against the
ForgeFIRM pubkey embedded in the installer (raw 32-byte form for
the factory's fwup; a dev key until the production ceremony).
4. Apply to the **inactive** slot (fwup + our pubkey). The booted
factory install stays bootable in the other slot.
5. Atomic env flip (embed the flip logic — the factory rootfs has no
ffboot v2), reboot.
No repartitioning, no `/data` backup/restore dance, no stage 2.
Rewrite `INSTALL.md` accordingly (serial console procedure stays).
*Exit: a factory machine converts in one pass; `ffboot` returns it to
the intact factory slot; `/data` (calibration, credentials, logs)
demonstrably untouched.*
## Phase 2b — legacy p4 migration
- Boot-time init script (before `/data` mounts), gated on: booted from
`mmcblk2p1`/`p2` (never SD, never p4) AND legacy geometry present
(p4 exists, or p3 ends short of the disk). Actions: delete p4,
extend p3's end to the disk (starts unchanged), `resize2fs`.
Idempotent and power-safe: every step keyed off actual disk state,
re-runnable after interruption.
- Existing p4 users reach the new scheme by running the new installer
from their running ForgeFIRM (same flow as Phase 2; both factory
slots intact → archive newer, overwrite older), then the boot-time
check reclaims p4/p3 on first slot boot.
- *Exit: a legacy-layout machine migrates with `/data` contents intact
and grown to full size; re-boot is a no-op.*
## Phase 3 — release pipeline
- `scripts/release.sh` (build host): gates → kas build → pack `.fw` →
sign → `sha256sums.txt` → staged assets + `gh release create`
command (`--publish` runs it where gh is authenticated). Gates:
clean tree, version single-source, rootfs-vs-slot size
(warn ≥ 170 MiB / fail ≥ 195 MiB, under bitbake's own hard cap),
**installer-embedded pubkey must match the signing key**, and
factory-era fwup (0.14.2) verification of the packed archive.
- One version source: `FORGEFIRM_RELEASE` = git tag =
`/etc/forgefirm-version` = `.fw` meta-version; the script enforces
agreement.
- `release.sh --dev` packs a **dev-key-signed** `forgefirm-dev.fw`
from the release rootfs for the GUI upload path (decides open
question 4: dev archives are signed with the dev key, never
unsigned — the GUI exercises the same verification path either
way).
- GitHub Actions: per-push compile checks for grblHAL-glowforge and
forgectrl (minutes, no Yocto); optional `workflow_dispatch`
cold-Yocto reproducibility build whose only product is a checksum.
## Phase 4 — forgectrl update manager (GUI) — IMPLEMENTED
Endpoints in `forgectrl/src/update.c`, driven from the panel's System
tab; trust anchors in `/etc/forgefirm/keys` (`forgefirm-keys` recipe:
the release pubkey + the Glowforge keyring). Release version resolves
from the fixed-name asset redirect (`.../releases/latest/download/forgefirm.fw`
→ `.../download/v<ver>/...`), so no GitHub API / rate limits. All slot
writes run on one background job (polled `/update/status`), take the
installer's `/data/forgefirm/update.lock`, require idle + no diagnostic,
refuse the booted root slot, verify signature before writing, and
re-verify the written filesystem. `GET /slots` inventory, `POST /boot`
(probe-gated), `POST /update/{check,download,apply,upload}`,
`POST /restore/factory` (archive md5 checked), `POST /system/reboot`.
**Bench-verified end-to-end 2026-08-08** (slot b as scratch, no
reboots): production-signed upload classified `forgefirm` and applied
(`signed:true`); dev-signed classified `unsigned`, apply refused until
`confirm_unsigned=1`; factory-2022 restore md5-verified and written;
boot-select flipped and reverted without reboot; path-traversal /
bogus-target / booted-root-slot writes all refused; `/slots` inventory
matched the physical layout. Original design notes below.
Backend endpoints + a panel page (OpenGlow visual identity):
- **Inventory**: slot contents (Phase 1 probe), current/next boot
selection, archive presence/version.
- **Update check** against the GitHub releases API (manual button +
periodic while idle; offline-tolerant, rate-limit friendly).
- **Apply release**: download `.fw` to `/data`, verify signature,
apply to inactive slot, verify, then flip only on explicit user
confirmation, prompt reboot.
- **Upload**: streamed multipart to `/data` (never RAM-buffered);
accepts `.fw` (verify; warn if unsigned) and `.wic.gz`/`.ext4.gz`
(dev; size + superblock sanity checks).
- **Boot selector** incl. SD, with warnings — most prominently on
switch-to-factory: the factory updater may auto-update and overwrite
the other slot. Refuses unprobeable targets.
- **Factory restore**: from the `/data` archive (offline) or cloud
latest (gfutilities device auth → GF-signed `.fw` → verify with GF
pubkeys) → inactive slot → flip. Optional cleanup of ForgeFIRM
residue in `/data` for true factory condition.
- Interlocks throughout: idle-only, update lock, never the active
slot, rollback = flip back to the previous slot.
*Exit: full loop on the bench — GUI upgrade, rollback via boot
selector, factory restore and return — without touching a shell.*
## Phase 5 — recovery refresh (reserved; build after 0–4 land)
- **v1 scope**: replace only the boot0 recovery squashfs (boot1 `/usr`
only if needed). Never write below offset 0xC0000 in boot0 — U-Boot
is physically untouchable by the refresh tool. Factory DTB and
kernel 3.14.28 stay.
- Userspace: static busybox + fwup + a small C webapp (ulfius) +
hostapd/wpa_supplicant. No Python. Must carry 3.14.28-matched WiFi
modules (decision gate: lift from the factory recovery vs rebuild
from Glowforge's published GPL kernel source).
- Functions: button-hold → AP + web UI (factory UX): upload a `.fw`
(verified against our **and** GF pubkeys — either firmware
installable), install from the `/data` archive, set boot target,
export logs.
- Flash tool: boot0/boot1 archived first (Phase 2 already does),
`force_ro` unlock, write high regions only, readback verify; if both
partitions are written, boot1 first, boot0 last.
- First flashes bench-gated on an attached serial console.
- Documented recovery ladder from then on: other slot → button-hold
recovery → SD card → serial console.
## Contracts
- **Artifacts** (consumers: installer, GUI updater, recovery):
`forgefirm.fw` (fixed asset name; signed; version in the fwup
metadata = release tag `v<semver>`; tasks `upgrade.a`/`upgrade.b`,
`complete` from Phase 5), `sha256sums.txt`,
`forgefirm-image-glowforge.rootfs.wic.gz` (SD burns).
- **Env**: SD = `0/0/1//dev/mmcblk1p1`; slot N = `1/0/N//dev/mmcblk2pN`
(`mmcdev/mmchwpart/mmcpart/mmcroot`, always one transaction).
- **Archive layout**: `/data/forgefirm/archive/` —
`factory-rootfs-<ver>.img.gz`, `boot0.img`, `boot1.img`,
`manifest` (slot versions, dates, checksums).
## Open questions / decision gates
1. **RESOLVED** (Phase 0): uEnv.txt keeps its `mmcargs` override with
`root=${mmcroot}` — slot-agnostic, hardware-verified.
2. **RESOLVED** (Phase 0): modern-fwup-packed signed archives apply
with the factory 0.14.2 binary (raw 32-byte pubkey form); no
shipped fwup needed on the factory side.
3. **RESOLVED** (Phase 3): size gates live in two layers — bitbake
fails past the 200 MiB slot; release.sh warns ≥ 170 MiB and fails
≥ 195 MiB.
4. **RESOLVED** (Phase 3): dev archives are always signed with the
dedicated dev key (`release.sh --dev`), never unsigned.
8. **RESOLVED** — production signing-key ceremony executed: key
generated on the build host (never in the repo, CI, or
cloud-synced plaintext; the build-host copy is the only online
copy, offline backups held by the operator), public key embedded
in the installer, and the chain verified: production-signed
archives verify with fwup 1.16 and the factory's 0.14.2 (raw
pubkey form); dev-signed archives are rejected. Custody optimizes
against compromise over loss: loss means users re-run a fresh
installer; compromise means attacker-signed firmware on fielded
machines.
5. Periodic GUI update check default-on vs opt-in (it pings the GitHub
API; proposal: on by default, apply always manual, config switch to
disable).
6. Recovery kernel modules: carried from the factory image vs rebuilt
from GPL source (Phase 5 gate).
7. U-Boot bootcount/auto-revert: **out of scope** — the recovery
ladder covers bad flips; revisit only if field incidents say
otherwise.
## Sequencing
0 → 1 → 2 + 2b → 3 → 4 → 5, strictly: everything after Phase 0 assumes
slot-agnostic images and working `.fw` round-trips; the GUI (4) reuses
the probe (1) and pipeline (3); recovery (5) is an independent
mini-project once the slot scheme is provenly stable. First
user-visible milestone is after Phase 2: a converted machine with
instant offline factory switchback.