Setting the release number was a platform change. FORGEFIRM_RELEASE sat
in forgefirm-image.bb, the recipe hashes as content of meta-forgefirm,
and a change to the content of a layer invalidates every acceptance
result. So a version bump threw away the campaign that was meant to
authorize that very release, and the number therefore had to be decided
before the image the campaign ran on. Nothing said so: the release-flow
page went straight from the kas configuration to the artifact and the
pipeline, while the gate quietly required the recipe value, the rootfs
stamp, the archive's meta-version and the tag to agree. v0.0.1 was cut
on a tree whose number happened to be right; the next one would have
cost a second campaign to discover the rule.
The number moves to forgefirm-release.inc, which carries it and nothing
else, and the manifest leaves that file out of the layer content hash
exactly as it leaves out the component pin files
(FORGEFIRM_MANIFEST_VERSION_SUFFIX, and the same list in
scripts/manifest-from-tree.py, which computes the identity on a
workstation and must agree byte for byte). release.sh reads the number
from the new file.
The version is metadata, not platform content, and this only makes the
manifest say what it already meant: the version string was already
outside the identity hash, and it was the file carrying it that defeated
that. Nothing is weakened. release.sh still requires the number to equal
the rootfs stamp, the .fw meta-version and the release tag, and
image.health still compares the stamp on the running machine with the
manifest's.
Proven: the tree manifest is byte-identical across a bump from 0.0.1 to
0.0.2 (identity a64e51b8e5ecca0af683d4f0 either way, the meta-forgefirm
layer hash unchanged), where before the two differed. bitbake resolves
FORGEFIRM_RELEASE=0.0.1 and FORGEFIRM_VERSION_STRING=v0.0.1 for the
release image through the new require, and the dev image still overrides
the string with its build timestamp.
The rootfs mounted read-write, so a slot ran with its own files open to
change, and the factory-slot mounts rode along on the release image.
Both images now carry the read-only-rootfs feature: the ro root line and
the rcS default, the volatile links made at rootfs time, a writable copy
of /var/lib at boot, a build failure for a post-install that needs the
machine, and the removal of shadow, base-passwd, update-rc.d and
update-alternatives.
What must last or change at run time is handled file by file:
- forgefirm-users renders the four account files from the record into
/run/forgefirm/accounts and bind-mounts each copy over its /etc file
(useradd and the rest are gone with shadow); a render writes through
the mount, and the image's own files apply until the first render.
- forgefirm-banner bind-mounts a copy of /etc/issue and writes the
address block through it.
- sshd keeps its host keys under /data/forgefirm/ssh, so the fingerprint
survives updates; both sshd configs carry the same HostKey lines.
- forgefirm-logging passes logrotate a state file under /var/run
(logrotate refuses to run without one).
- forgefirm-persist points the boot timestamp and the random seed at
/data/forgefirm.
The dev image appends the /factory slot mounts, without nofail (busybox
mount hands it to the kernel, which rejects it). The rootfs command
entries lose their semicolons: on scarthgap the value is the task's
vardeps, split on whitespace, so "name;" left the function body out of
the signature and a changed body did not remake the rootfs; with the
bodies tracked, the dev image's DATETIME string needs a vardepsexclude.
release.sh gains the read-only gate (root ro, no /factory line,
ROOTFS_READ_ONLY=yes, host keys on /data). image.health checks the
mounts, the account binds, the banner bind, the host keys and the
dev-only /factory mounts.
Proven on the bench reference (dev image 20260909140901): / ro, /data
rw, /var/lib a tmpfs copy, the four account files and /etc/issue bound
from tmpfs, the host keys in /data/forgefirm/ssh, no "Read-only file
system" line in any log; forgectrl.auth and commission.account-login (a
temporary account rendered, logged in over HTTPS and removed again),
kernel.latch-locked-idle and motion.liveness-probe PASS; logrotate runs
with the volatile state. forgetest unit tests 335 OK; both images build
clean, and debugfs on the built rootfs shows every setting above.
BRINGUP describes the present: the 54-test catalog and its seven-test
always core, the tier counts, the shipped low-temperature gates, the
density floor ($35 = 10), the two local core commits, the ffboot env
write, the aa-offset route, the current bench image, and the bench
measurements the audit asks for (pooled into the next session). The
workstation shell notes and every em dash are gone.
forgetest: the takeover waits for the cloud client too (found by its
command line); the unauthenticated /boot probe names the endpoint's
parameter; the UI prose is American English. Recipes: forgetest
fetches its package directory and init script only and drops
__pycache__ at unpack; the dev image no longer re-adds forgectrl; the
release image's remove list drops the gfui-client the BSP no longer
has; the platform identity strips the kernel's local-version hash
from the modules directory name, so a re-patched kernel keeps its
fingerprints. grblhal restart is stop then start. release.sh --dev
packs the dev image. fixture.sh refuses a readable env file.
Bench tools: the live-fire drills measure the lid-IR baseline before
every run and point at the fire-watch thresholds the engine reads;
one thermistor conversion (gfbench.degc) serves every drill; the six
dated measurement records leave the tool directory; feeder.c names the
two sysfs writes its caller makes.
Host tests: forgetest 258 pass; the coverage lint reports no uncovered
path across 54 tests. Acceptance: forgectrl.auth covers the /boot
probe; update.* cover ffboot and the manifest identity; the runbook
and bench-tool changes have no catalog consequence.
A component pin bump counted as a platform change: the layer content hash
in the platform identity covered the recipe carrying the SRCREV, the
platform is folded into every acceptance fingerprint, so every image
that carried any component update invalidated the whole catalog (dev
image 20260816191951: every test domain-changed after a one-line
forgectrl bump; the two manifests differ only in
platform.layers.meta-forgefirm). The component entry already identifies
the pinned source file by file; the pin double-counted it.
Component pins now live in <recipe>-pin.inc (SRCREV and the PV that
moves with it, nothing else) - forgectrl, grblhal-glowforge and
forgefirm-app here, the BSP components in meta-openglow - and
forgefirm-image-manifest.bbclass leaves *-pin.inc out of the layer
content (FORGEFIRM_MANIFEST_PIN_SUFFIX). Recipe bodies, patches, config
fragments, init scripts and third-party pins with no manifest entry stay
layer content; a pin written into a recipe body still hashes (the safe
direction). manifest-from-tree.py mirrors the rule and reads pins
through the recipe's requires; test_tree_manifest.py proves both
(pin bump: hash unchanged; recipe body or inline pin: changed).
Bitbake resolves the same SRCREV/PV for every pinned recipe.
Docs: ACCEPTANCE.md (what layer content is), kas/README.md (the pin
files in the push order), BRINGUP.md (the finding and the bench
consequence: the first image built with the pin files is itself a
platform change, so its campaign is a full one; pin bumps inherit
after it).
No catalog consequence: nothing in the image's behavior changes; the
change is to the acceptance identity computation, proven by the unit
tests and the CI lint on the tree manifest.
Every image records the identity of its build inputs. forgefirm-manifest.bbclass
gives a component recipe a per-file source fingerprint (git ls-tree blob ids,
submodules recursed; file:// sources hashed with git hash-object); the kernel
and glowforge.ko publish theirs through do_deploy because kernel-module-split
leaves the module recipe's main package empty. forgefirm-image-manifest.bbclass
assembles the entries with the platform identity - machine, modules directory,
device tree hashes, layer content hashes (meta-forgefirm and the meta-openglow
layers by content, the kas-managed layers by revision) - into
/etc/forgefirm-manifest.json and deploys a copy next to the image. Layer
revisions and dirty flags stay outside the identity, so a rebuild from an
unchanged tree keeps its content hash and the release and dev images of one
build share it. The acceptance tool and the release gate read this file.
ScottW514