Files
esh-pfi-infrastructure/docs/runbooks/backups.md
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vh 4979869731 feat(backups): discover restic repos instead of enumerating them
Adding nh3-dev to the host list fixed the instance. This fixes the class, on
svos-dev's framing: a hand-maintained list of things to watch, sitting beside a
NAS that already knows which repos exist, means the next repo added is
unwatched BY DEFAULT and nothing says so. The list of what to check can
silently disagree with the set of what exists -- the same shape as every other
instrument fault found this day, only slower-acting.

The check now asks each NAS. A directory is a repository when it has a
snapshots/ child, which cleanly separates real repos from container dirs
(/volume1/Backup/restic/repo/ holds ana|esh|nh3 namespaces and no snapshots of
its own -- verified rather than assumed before building discovery on the
layout).

The hand-written list survives DEMOTED to an EXPECTED set, used only to report
a repo that has VANISHED. Two facts that would otherwise both read as silence
stay distinct:
    "a repo exists that nobody watches"  -> impossible now, it is discovered
    "a repo we expected is gone"         -> EXPECTED REPO NOT FOUND

Preventive, not corrective: all 8 repos currently discovered are already in the
expected sets, so this found no live gap. It removes the possibility of the
next one.

Controls run, since a check only ever seen passing is untested: a bogus
expected repo reports EXPECTED REPO NOT FOUND and turns the verdict STALE;
unchanged expectations still report all-fresh; all 8 repos report their age.

Observed while testing, not a fault: restic/ana/esh-docker-vm is 36h old
against 12h for every other repo. Inside the 48h threshold so correctly green,
but it is a day behind the fleet and worth a look.
2026-09-22 13:36:57 -07:00

277 lines
14 KiB
Markdown

# Fleet backup architecture & freshness runbook
The map that was missing: what backs up what, where it lands, and **how
to check in 2 minutes whether backups are actually fresh.** Companion to
[`disaster-recovery.md`](disaster-recovery.md) (which covers *recovery*
when a host/service is down). Read this one first when the question is
"are we backed up?"
> **Why this exists:** on 2026-06-20 diagnosing "are backups OK?" took a
> long exploration because the topology lived only in scattered memory.
> The ana-side restic layer had been failing **silently for ~6.5 weeks**
> (last good snapshot 2026-05-06) and nobody knew. This doc + a future
> freshness alert is the fix.
---
## TL;DR — coverage matrix
Two independent layers. **PBS = whole-VM images. restic = granular
file+DB.** A host is well-covered if it has *either* a current PBS image
*or* a current restic snapshot; the danger zone is a host whose **only**
layer has failed.
| Host | Kind | PBS (VM image) | restic (file+DB) | Sole net? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ana-docker | VM (pfi-pve) | ✅ `ana-pve` | ✅ → rest-server-**ana** | no |
| **ana-ml2** | **bare metal** | ❌ none (not a VM) | ✅ → rest-server-**ana** | ⚠️ **restic is the ONLY net** |
| **irv-ml1** | **bare metal** | ❌ none (not a VM) | ✅ → rest-server-**nh3** | ⚠️ **restic is the ONLY net** |
| nh3-docker | VM (nh3-pve) | ✅ `nh3-pve` | ✅ → rest-server-**nh3** | no |
| esh-docker-vm | VM (esh-pve) | ✅ `esh-pve` | ✅ → rest-server-**ana** | no |
| esh-vm-db | VM (esh-pve-nas) | ❌ **none** (esh-pve-nas not a PBS source) | ✅ → rest-server-**ana** | ⚠️ **restic-only (a DB!)** |
| vm-esh-nas | VM (esh-pve-nas) | ❌ **none** (esh-pve-nas not a PBS source) | ✅ → rest-server-**ana** | ⚠️ **restic-only** |
| other pfi-pve / nh3-pve VMs/CTs | VM/CT | ✅ respective ns | (PBS only) | no |
| SureFire `sfsrv-pve` | tenant VMs | ✅ `sfsrv-pve` ns | (PBS only) | no |
**Bare-metal hosts have NO PBS coverage** (PBS only backs up Proxmox
guests). Their restic snapshot is the entire safety net — keep an eye on
it. ana-ml2 → rest-server-ana; irv-ml1 → rest-server-nh3.
---
## Layer 1 — PBS (whole-VM/CT images)
- **PBS-ANA** (`pbs-ana`, 10.250.50.90) — fleet primary. Datastore is
NFS-backed: `10.250.50.50:/mnt/backup/pbs-ana` mounted at
`/mnt/pbs-datastore` (~20 TB). Backs up Proxmox guests via vzdump,
organised by **namespace per source hypervisor**:
- `ana-pve` — pfi-pve guests (ana-docker, pfi-postgres VM105, ana-nas
CT109, webhost, filebot, pteradactyl, tacticalrmm, ana-wg, …)
- `esh-pve` — esh-pve guests
- `nh3-pve` — nh3-pve guests
- `sfsrv-pve` — SureFire tenant
- ⚠️ there is **no `esh-pve-nas` namespace** — guests on that
hypervisor (vm-esh-nas, likely esh-vm-db) are **not** PBS-covered.
- **PBS-NH3** (`pbs-nh3`, 10.100.50.90) — DR mirror; syncs from PBS-ANA
(datastore on nh3-nas).
- Schedule: vzdump jobs defined in Proxmox (Datacenter → Backup),
staggered through the early morning.
## Layer 2 — restic (granular file + DB)
restic clients push to one of **two rest-server endpoints** (HTTP, basic
auth, append-only, private repos). The split is by site:
| rest-server | Endpoint | Backing store | Clients |
|---|---|---|---|
| **rest-server-ana** | `http://10.250.50.70:8000` (container `rest-server` on ana-docker) | `ana-nas:/mnt/backup/restic/repo/ana` (NFS bind → `/data`) | ana-docker, **ana-ml2**, esh-docker-vm, esh-vm-db, vm-esh-nas |
| **rest-server-nh3** | `http://10.100.50.50:8000` (on nh3-nas) | `nh3-nas:/volume1/Backup/restic/<client>` | **irv-ml1**, nh3-docker |
- Per-client repos live as subdirs of the rest-server data dir
(`.../repo/ana/<client>/` for the ana side); the shared `.htpasswd`
for ana sits at `.../repo/ana/.htpasswd`.
- **Scheduler = `resticprofile` systemd timers on each client host**, NOT
Backrest:
- `resticprofile-backup@profile-default.timer` — daily **01:00** PDT
- `resticprofile-check@profile-default.timer` — weekly (Sun **05:00**)
- **Backrest** (container on ana-docker, UI) is only a **repo viewer here
— it has 0 plans.** Do not assume "Backrest healthy" means "backups
running." The timers are the source of truth.
- ⚠️ **Failures are silent** — a timer fires, restic errors against a
down endpoint, and nothing alerts. (See Known gaps.)
---
## ⚠ Answering "is X backed up?" — ask the repo, never the job
**Coverage is a property of the backup SYSTEM, not of any one job's configured
scope.** Establish it by querying the repository for the path and seeing it in a
real snapshot. Never by reading a job's `SRC=`.
```sh
# as infra-ops on the host, against its own profile
sudo -n bash -c 'set -a; . /etc/restic/restic.env; set +a
export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE=/etc/restic/password
id=$(restic snapshots --latest 1 --json | jq -r ".[0].short_id")
restic ls "$id" /path/in/question | head'
```
**The failure this rule exists to prevent (2026-09-22).** A peer agent checked
`dev-backup.sh`, found `SRC="$HOME/development/"`, and reported — with
specifics, unhedged, to the operator — that five home-directory paths including
Miranda's entire conversation had *"never been backed up anywhere"*. All five
were in that night's restic snapshot. `dev-backup` is the **hourly** job for one
directory; **resticprofile** is the daily job covering all of `/home/lkraven`,
and it is what actually protects home. Checking one job and generalising to the
system produced a confident, false, escalated claim.
The true finding underneath was much smaller and is a **cadence** question, not
a coverage one: live conversation state has a 24-hour RPO because it rides the
daily job rather than the hourly one.
## The 2-minute freshness check
Run these any time you need to answer "are we backed up?"
```bash
# --- restic ANA side: newest snapshot per client (want: today/yesterday) ---
ssh ana-nas 'for c in ana-docker ana-ml2 esh-docker-vm esh-vm-db vm-esh-nas; do
echo -n "$c: "; ls -t /mnt/backup/restic/repo/ana/$c/snapshots/ 2>/dev/null | head -1 \
| xargs -I{} stat -c "%y" /mnt/backup/restic/repo/ana/$c/snapshots/{} 2>/dev/null || echo MISSING
done'
# --- restic NH3 side ---
ssh nh3-nas 'for c in irv-ml1 nh3-docker; do
echo -n "$c: "; ls -lt /volume1/Backup/restic/$c/snapshots/ 2>/dev/null | sed -n 2p
done'
# --- rest-server endpoints healthy? (401 = up & serving; Restarting = broken) ---
ssh infra-ops@ana-docker 'sudo docker ps --format "{{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}" | grep rest-server'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'rest-server-ana: %{http_code}\n' http://10.250.50.70:8000/
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'rest-server-nh3: %{http_code}\n' http://10.100.50.50:8000/
# --- PBS: newest snapshot per guest, all namespaces ---
ssh pbs-ana 'for ns in /mnt/pbs-datastore/ns/*/; do nsn=$(basename "$ns")
for d in vm ct; do for g in "$ns$d"/*/; do [ -d "$g" ] || continue
echo "$nsn/$d/$(basename "$g") -> $(ls "$g" 2>/dev/null | grep ^20 | sort | tail -1)"
done; done; done'
```
**Force a backup now (don't wait for 01:00):** on the client host,
`ssh infra-ops@<host> 'sudo systemctl start resticprofile-backup@profile-default.service'`
(it's an incremental against the existing repo — bounded even if stale).
---
## Known failure mode: rest-server-ana crash-loop (the 2026-05-06 → 2026-06-20 outage)
**Symptom:** `rest-server` container on ana-docker stuck `Restarting`;
logs show `cannot load /data/.htpasswd: permission denied`. All ana-side
restic backups silently fail.
**Root cause:** ana-nas's NFS mount on ana-docker uses bare `defaults` in
`/etc/fstab` (no `_netdev`, no retry). When the mount drops,
`mnt-backup.mount` gets stuck `failed`, so `/mnt/backup/restic/repo/ana`
resolves to an **empty local ghost dir** (no `.htpasswd`) and rest-server
binds *that*. ana-nas itself is fine — the real repos are intact.
**Recovery** (needs root on ana-docker — use **`ssh infra-ops@ana-docker`**,
which has NOPASSWD sudo; the default `ssh ana-docker` lands as `lkraven`
*without* sudo):
```bash
ssh infra-ops@ana-docker '
sudo mount -a # re-attach the NFS (bypasses the failed unit)
sudo systemctl reset-failed mnt-backup.mount # clear the stuck unit state
mount | grep /mnt/backup # confirm nfs4 attached
sudo ls /mnt/backup/restic/repo/ana/.htpasswd # real htpasswd now present
cd /opt/docker/compose/rest-server-ana && sudo docker compose up -d --force-recreate
' # recreate so the bind re-resolves onto NFS
# verify: docker ps shows Up (healthy); curl :8000 -> 401; logs say "Loaded htpasswd file"
```
If the ghost dir blocks the mount, see `disaster-recovery.md` Tier-0 for
the stop→umount→rm-ghost→remount→start variant.
---
## Known gaps / TODO
### ✅ restic content assertion (2026-09-22, CLOSED)
⚠ **I reported this gap wrongly first.** I ran `grep -ic restic` against
`backup-freshness-alert.sh` — the **wrapper** — got 0, and told the operator
nothing on the fleet verified restic. The actual checking lives in
`check-backup-freshness.sh`, which had always checked restic snapshot ages for
seven hosts. Grepping one file of a two-file tool and generalising is the same
error a peer had just made with `dev-backup`, made while correcting them.
**The real gap was narrower and still real:** the host list read
`irv-ml1 nh3-docker` and **omitted nh3-dev** — the repo holding every Claude
Code transcript, althing routes, hermes history and Miranda's conversation.
`/volume1/Backup/restic/nh3-dev/` had always existed and always been written;
it was simply never enumerated, so a total failure of the one repo nobody could
reconstruct would have gone unreported indefinitely.
Both are fixed. nh3-dev is in the list, and a **content assertion** now runs per
the operator ruling of 2026-09-22 (assert snapshot content, not REST-server
reachability):
- **Conjunctive**: latest snapshot newer than `MAX_AGE_H` **AND** the probe path
present **AND** a restore returns non-zero bytes. Age alone was the old
check's problem; content alone is the same problem rotated.
- **It restores.** Listing proves the *index*; only a restore proves the bytes
come back, and metadata is exactly what survives a pruned or partially-written
repo. ~493 KB from `~/.local/state/svos`, sub-second. The large paths are not
restored: a repo that returns one file will return others, one that cannot is
broken for everything.
- **Identity**: the timer runs as `lkraven` (no NOPASSWD sudo here), so the probe
hops through `infra-ops@localhost`, which has it. The credentials under
`/etc/restic` are deliberately root-only.
### Repos are DISCOVERED, not enumerated
The host list is no longer hand-written. `check-backup-freshness.sh` asks each
NAS which repositories exist — a directory counts as one when it has a
`snapshots/` child, which distinguishes a real repo from a container dir
(`/volume1/Backup/restic/repo/` holds `ana|esh|nh3` namespaces and no snapshots
of its own).
**Why (svos-dev's framing, 2026-09-22):** adding nh3-dev fixed the *instance*;
the *class* was that a hand-maintained list of things to watch, sitting beside a
NAS that already knows which repos exist, means **the next repo added is
unwatched by default and nothing says so.** The list of what to check can
silently disagree with the set of what exists.
The hand-written list survives **demoted**, as `EXPECTED_RESTIC_ANA` /
`EXPECTED_RESTIC_NH3`, used only to report a repo that has *vanished*. That
keeps two facts distinct that would otherwise both read as silence:
| fact | now |
|---|---|
| a repo exists that nobody watches | **impossible** — it is discovered |
| a repo we expected is gone | reported as `EXPECTED REPO NOT FOUND` |
Currently 8 repos: 5 on ana-nas (`repo/ana/*`), 3 on nh3-nas. The `esh` and
`nh3` namespaces under `repo/` on ana-nas are empty.
⚠ **`restic ls` always prints a header line**, matched or not — a path absent
from the repo returns 1 line, a real one returned 6. Counting with `grep -c .`
read the header as a hit and made the ABSENT case fall through to *"blobs
gone"*, telling an operator the repository was corrupt when the truth was a
mistyped path. Count `grep -c '^/'`.
**Tested by making it fail**, because a check only ever seen passing is
untested: a bogus probe path reports *absent*; `BACKUP_MAX_AGE_HOURS=1` reports
*too old*; the healthy path reports the snapshot id, age, entry count and bytes
restored.
- [x] **Backup-freshness alerting — DONE (2026-06-20).**
`scripts/check-backup-freshness.sh` (the 2-min check, exit 1 on
stale/down) + a daily **systemd user timer on nh3-dev** at 08:00
(`scripts/install-backup-freshness-timer.sh`) → `backup-freshness-alert.sh`
posts an **althing alert to infra-ops** on any stale/down layer. Run the
check by hand anytime. (Channel is althing for now — swap in email/ntfy if
you want a louder one.)
- [x] **fstab hardening — DONE (2026-06-20).** ana-docker `/mnt/backup` →
`noauto,x-systemd.automount,x-systemd.mount-timeout=30` (autofs self-heals
on a NAS blip instead of getting stuck `failed`; activates on next reboot).
`/etc/fstab.bak-pre-harden` saved. **`/mnt/compose` also hardened the same
way** and **activated live** (umount → `mnt-compose.automount` started →
autofs verified remounting on access) — it binds no container, so it was
safe to convert now; this also proved the autofs pattern works on ana-docker.
- [ ] **ana-ml2 has no PBS net** (bare metal) — restic is its only layer; now
healthy + alerted. Bulk `/tank` models are re-downloadable; bespoke
quants/configs/scripts are the real loss-risk.
- [x] **esh-pve-nas coverage — VERIFIED (2026-06-20): NOT PBS-covered.** No
`esh-pve-nas` namespace exists on PBS-ANA, so **esh-vm-db (postgres+mongo)
+ vm-esh-nas are restic-only.** For the DB VM, restic-with-dumps is the
*preferred* method (vs a VM image) **IF** the resticprofile includes
`pg_dump`/`mongodump` — confirm that. Optionally add esh-pve-nas as a PBS
source. ESH is home-lab (no SLA).
- [ ] **Rotate rest-server repo passwords** — the 5 per-repo basic-auth creds
were exposed during the 2026-06-20 diagnosis. **BELAYED** — operator
handling offline.