50 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
# nh3-svos: host for the NEW SVOS operating system (VM 111 on nh3-pve-2, NH3)
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Built 2026-10-05 at svos-dev's request, relaying Prime ("stand up a dedicated VM for it on nh3-pve-2"). It runs the
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new SVOS (repo `corviduo/svoperatingsystem`): a FastAPI/uvicorn kernel (SQLite WAL, synchronous FULL, one writer),
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an interface connector, an optional voice adapter and a static phone/desktop UI.
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**It is a separate instance.** The existing High Seat (`svos.service` on nh3-dev, `:8770`) and Miranda are NOT
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migrated by this host.
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**Ownership split:** infra-ops owns the VM, OS, access, backups and ingress. svos-dev owns the application: install,
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configuration, enrollment and acceptance.
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| Address | `10.100.50.43`, VLAN 50 (nh3-servers), static via cloud-init; `nh3-svos.nh3.internal` |
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| Guest | VM **111** on **nh3-pve-2**, `onboot 1`, tag `svos` |
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| Shape | 4 vCPU `x86-64-v3`, 8 GiB, 100 GB on `vmstore` (local NVMe LVM-thin, discard on). nh3-pve-2 had 47 GB RAM and 946 GB vmstore free at build |
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| OS | Debian 13 genericcloud, Python 3.13 + venv, SQLite 3.46, systemd-timesyncd (synced), qemu-guest-agent |
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| Identities | `vh` 1000 (operator keys + lkraven@nh3-dev, so svos-dev's session can ssh in; NOPASSWD sudo from cloud-init, plus `/etc/sudoers.d/91-vh-verifypw` so `sudo -v` agrees), `infra-ops` 850, **`svc-svos` 801** (nologin; the only writer of the data root) |
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| Data root | `/var/lib/svos`, svc-svos 0700, on the local root ext4. Never NFS, never shared |
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| Releases | `/opt/svos` root:svc-svos 2775, with `releases/` for svos-dev's layout. The git checkout is not a runtime dependency |
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| Docker | none, by design |
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| Backups | nh3-pve-2 vzdump job, nightly **21:30**, `all 1` → pbs-ana namespace `nh3-pve-2` (mirrored to pbs-nh3 at 06:30), snapshot mode with guest-agent fs-freeze |
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| App-consistent hook | svos-dev's `/etc/qemu/fsfreeze-hook.d/50-svos` stops the SVOS services on freeze and restarts the ones that were running on thaw. ⚠ **Debian's qemu-ga does NOT run fsfreeze hooks unless configured** (no `-F` in the unit, no `qemu-ga.conf` by default). Here `/etc/qemu/qemu-ga.conf` points it at **`/usr/local/sbin/fsfreeze-dispatch`** (`configs/qemu-ga/fsfreeze-dispatch`), which unlike the stock `/etc/qemu/fsfreeze-hook` propagates failure: if a freeze hook fails, it thaws that hook and the completed ones and exits 1, so qemu-ga refuses the freeze. Tested 2026-10-05 via `qm guest cmd 111 fsfreeze-*`, both success and failure paths. The live-service backup drill is still pending |
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| Monitoring | Beszel native agent 0.18.7 (`playbooks/beszel-native.yaml`, `configs/beszel-agent/hosts/nh3-svos.env`), hub system `t6y646ifa3x7xxv`, alerts CPU>95%/15m, Disk>85%/5m, Memory>90%/10m, offline/2m. Up 2026-10-05 |
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## Build (reproducible)
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```bash
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scripts/elway infra-ops@10.100.250.62 --playbook playbooks/nh3-pve-2-cloudinit-vm.yaml --var vmid=111 \
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--var name=nh3-svos --var ip=10.100.50.43/24 --var cores=4 --var memory=8192 --var disk=100G --var tags=svos \
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--var "description=..."
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scripts/elway vh@10.100.50.43 --playbook playbooks/bootstrap-infra-ops-user.yaml
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scripts/elway infra-ops@10.100.50.43 --playbook playbooks/nh3-svos-host.yaml
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```
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## Ingress / auth: NOT built yet, proposal pending (Prime + svos-dev)
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App side, per svos-dev 2026-10-05: kernel on `127.0.0.1:8400 --trust-loopback` (its Unix-socket mode needs a 0700
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kernel-owned dir and creates a 0666 socket, so no shared-group socket in this build), interface connector on
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`127.0.0.1:8403`. Static UI at `/opt/svos/current/static`. `/api/*` → kernel with the prefix stripped (`/api/health` is
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the kernel's); `/health`, `/verbs/ping|pins|pin|unpin`, `/openapi.json` → connector unchanged. ⚠ With
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`--trust-loopback`, every local process is inside the identity trust boundary, so run no untrusted workloads here.
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Agreed design (option A): Caddy on the tailnet address only, `forward_auth` to a loopback WhoIs responder fed the real
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socket peer (`{http.request.remote.host}:{port}`), fail closed, allow-list of logins, client identity/forwarding headers
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stripped, Origin passed through untouched.
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App listeners stay private (loopback or a Unix socket). The front door has to give the browser **HTTPS**: the UI and the
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voice adapter need a secure context for the microphone. It also has to give the kernel's adapter a **verified identity**
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in `Tailscale-User-Login`, with any browser-supplied copy stripped. See the svos-dev thread of 2026-10-05.
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