26 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# `[2026-09-27]` restic: repository URL out of the systemd units on all 8 hosts, and vaulted (Prime)
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`resticprofile schedule` copies `env-file` values into the generated units under /etc/systemd/system
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(0644). So `RESTIC_REPOSITORY`, including the rest-server basic-auth password, was readable by any local
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user on every env-file host (found on esh-docker-vm; `systemctl cat` works without sudo). Blast radius:
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the password allows reading the encrypted blobs and appending to one repo, and nothing more (rest-server
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is `--append-only`, and the passphrase is a separate file).
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**Fix** (`6e203dc`, `30f2c97`): `playbooks/restic-repository-file.yaml` does four things:
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- derives `/etc/restic/repository` (root 0400) from `restic.env`;
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- uploads the profile switched to `repository-file`, guarded by the live profile's pre-change sha;
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- runs `cat config` through the new profile;
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- re-schedules, then verifies the units exist and contain no `rest:http`.
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Applied to ana-docker, fv-ml1 (`configs/restic/ana-ml2`), esh-docker-vm, esh-vm-db, irv-ml1, nh3-dev,
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nh3-docker, and vm-esh-nas once Prime had bootstrapped infra-ops there. esh-ml1 was built that way. An
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independent check across all 8 found 0 leaking units. nh3-docker's scheduled unit ran a real backup
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(`a29b889d`). Every host's URL and passphrase are vaulted as `<host>/etc/restic/{repository,password}`.
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- `restic.env` is **kept** (root 0600): the per-host READMEs and the freshness probe source it. **A rotation
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must update the vault, `restic.env` and `repository`.**
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- The rotation itself stays Prime's (backups runbook, Known gaps). The move stops the ongoing exposure but
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does not un-expose what was readable.
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- Before the edit, esh-docker-vm's and irv-ml1's live profiles had drifted ahead of the repo, and were
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pulled in first (`c698751`).
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