Two related changes shipped together. The stack rename is independent but adding `vllm-reward` to the existing `vllm-qwen3` would have made that name actively misleading. **Rename:** `stacks/vllm-qwen3/ → stacks/vllm/`. Updated all in-repo references (README.md root, servers/ana-ml2/, stacks/llama-swap/, configs/restic/ana-ml2/, docs/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md). Two intentional history mentions retained (servers/ana-ml2 + stacks/vllm README). **Add `vllm-reward` service:** serves Skywork-Reward-V2-Llama-3.1-8B-AWQ on port 8003. The AWQ output is a locally-quantized model (not from HF), so bind-mounts `/tank/aimodels/llm:/local-models:ro` rather than the shared HF cache. Model config.json declares LlamaForSequenceClassification which vLLM's pooling runner picks up automatically — produces a single reward score per input via /classify. **Flag note:** the user's spec listed `--task classify`, but vLLM 0.19.1 deprecated --task in favor of --runner pooling (model architecture in config.json drives the classification head). Compose uses --runner pooling with a comment explaining the substitution. **GPU memory:** no rebalance needed — production had already tuned EMBED/RERANK down from 0.40 to 0.20 each (canonical .env.example now matches reality). Adding REWARD at 0.30 totals 0.70, leaving ~14 GB headroom on the 48 GB Ada. **Server-side:** brought existing vllm-qwen3 down, mv'd /opt/docker/compose/vllm-qwen3 → /opt/docker/compose/vllm, appended REWARD_* lines to existing .env (preserving API_KEY/HF_TOKEN), deployed new compose via scripts/deploy-stack.sh, brought all 3 services up. **Smoke tests:** - /health on 8001/8002/8003 → 200 - /v1/models on 8003 → lists Skywork/Skywork-Reward-V2-Llama-3.1-8B-AWQ with max_model_len 16384 - /classify with a sample conversation → returns LABEL_0 with prob 0.9999 (single-output regression-style reward score, expected shape for a reward model)
277 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
277 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Fleet disaster-recovery runbook
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What breaks when a given host/service goes down, and how to recover.
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Ordered by blast-radius severity — read top-down.
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**First action for ANY multi-service outage:** check ana-nas
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reachability. Many fleet-wide "things are broken" events trace back
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to ana-nas's NFS exports going stale. See [ana-nas SPOF memory](../../../.claude/projects/-home-lkraven-development-eshpfi-management/memory/incident_ana_nas_spof.md)
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for details, or just `ping 10.250.50.50` first.
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## Governing principle: backups must not risk production
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Any backup strategy that could take down the host it's backing up is
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worse than the risk it mitigates. Specifically applies to:
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- **NFS-serving hosts (CT 109 / ana-nas):** scheduled vzdump of the
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container itself is prohibited. The rootfs is trivially rebuildable;
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the data lives on ospool bind-mounts captured via ZFS snapshot at
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the host level. If rootfs config is worth preserving, capture via
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`rsync /etc /root` to a known location — no snapshot, no freeze.
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- **DB servers on NFS storage (VM 105 / pfi-postgres):** prefer
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`pg_dump` + restic over full vzdump. fs-freeze on NFS-backed
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PGDATA is a failure mode waiting to happen.
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- **Any host with heavy I/O concurrency during the backup window:**
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schedule its own backup outside the fleet window OR use `mode=stop`
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(planned brief downtime beats random-freeze risk).
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Incident reference: 2026-04-23 — CT 109, 112, 113 all went offline on
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pfi-pve during morning backup window. Backup suspected as trigger
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(full root cause TBD). See `memory/incident_ana_nas_spof.md`.
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---
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## Tier 0 — Storage fabric (catastrophic blast radius)
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### ana-nas (CT 109 on pfi-pve, 10.250.50.50)
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**Blast radius:**
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- ~~pfi-postgres (VM 105) — PGDATA on `/mnt/db`~~ — **migrated to local disk 2026-04-23**. vaultwarden, gitea, paperless-ng, zammad no longer cascade on ana-nas outage. Left in history for the recovery pre-migration.
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- ana-docker rest-server-ana — repo data on `/mnt/backup` → all ana-side restic clients fail (ana-docker, ana-ml2, esh-docker-vm, vm-esh-nas)
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- PBS-ANA datastore — NFS-backed on `/mnt/backup/pbs-ana` → fleet vzdumps fail, PBS-NH3 sync fails
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- ana-docker NFS mounts for `/mnt/docker`, `/mnt/compose`, `/mnt/pve-VMStorage` if used → various stack misbehavior
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**Recovery** (see full procedure in `memory/incident_ana_nas_spof.md`):
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1. `pct start 109` on pfi-pve if stopped; `pct console 109` to see boot if stuck
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2. Once responsive, remount NFS on each consumer and restart services:
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- pfi-postgres: `umount -lf /mnt/db; mount /mnt/db; systemctl restart postgresql`
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- ana-docker: `sudo mount -a; sudo docker restart rest-server` — usually enough. `mount -a` re-attempts all fstab entries and bypasses the "failed" state that `mnt-backup.mount` gets stuck in (fstab uses bare `defaults` without auto-retry). If rest-server still errors with `/data/.htpasswd: permission denied`, you've got a **ghost file on the local mount point** — see incident memory for the clean-up procedure (stop rest-server, unmount NFS, rm the ghost, remount, restart).
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- PBS-ANA: `umount -lf /mnt/pbs-datastore; mount /mnt/pbs-datastore; systemctl restart proxmox-backup proxmox-backup-proxy`
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3. Re-run failed PBS vzdump job for affected VMs (Datacenter → Backup → Run Now)
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4. Restic clients recover automatically on next 01:00 schedule
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**Prevention:**
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- Re-schedule ana-nas's own vzdump OUTSIDE the 03:00 fleet window (concurrent NFS load during fleet backup + self-backup is the suspected 2026-04-23 crash root cause)
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- Consider moving pfi-postgres PGDATA to local VM disk (reduces SPOF)
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---
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### nh3-nas (Synology RS2418+, 10.100.50.50)
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**Blast radius:**
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- nh3-docker, nh3-dev restic clients — writes to `rest-server-nh3` fail
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- PBS-NH3 datastore — mirror sync can't write new chunks
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- ana-nas → nh3-nas rsync (04:00 daily) — fails
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**Recovery:**
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1. Power-cycle via DSM web UI or physical button if unresponsive
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2. DSM boots 3-5 minutes; NFS exports auto-start
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3. Verify PBS-NH3 datastore recovered:
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```
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ssh pbs-nh3 'ls /mnt/pbs-datastore/.chunks | head; systemctl restart proxmox-backup proxmox-backup-proxy'
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```
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4. ana-nas-side rsync retries at next 04:00; no manual action unless you want to trigger now
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**Notable:** nh3-nas outage is LESS severe than ana-nas because:
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- No production DB depends on it
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- It's a mirror/DR tier, not primary
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- Ana-side backups keep running independently
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---
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## Tier 1 — Hypervisors (regional blast radius)
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### pfi-pve (Proxmox VE, 10.250.250.31)
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**Blast radius — everything hosted on it:**
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- ana-docker (VM), ana-nas (CT 109), pfi-postgres (VM 105), pfi-ana-webhost, ana-filebot, pfi-pteradactyl, pfi-tacticalrmm, ana-wg, PBS-ANA (VM), + others
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Essentially **all Anaheim primary services** go offline. Because ana-nas lives here too, Tier-0 cascade applies simultaneously.
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**Recovery:**
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1. Is the Proxmox host itself up? iDRAC/IPMI console for hardware diagnosis.
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2. If the host is up but VMs/CTs aren't starting: `systemctl status pve-cluster qemu-server pve-container` on the host.
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3. Start VMs/CTs in dependency order:
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- **First**: CT 109 (ana-nas) — everything else on the host that uses NFS depends on it
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- **Second**: PBS-ANA VM (resume backup target)
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- **Third**: VM 105 (pfi-postgres) — many apps wait on this
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- **Fourth**: ana-docker, then other VMs
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4. After all VMs/CTs up, re-apply the Tier-0 ana-nas recovery steps for any consumers with stale NFS mounts.
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**Prevention:** PBS-ANA → PBS-NH3 nightly sync means VM image backups are recoverable at NH3 if pfi-pve is unrecoverable; can restore key VMs to nh3-pve and cut over (cold DR).
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---
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### nh3-pve (10.100.250.60)
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**Blast radius:**
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- nh3-docker (VM) — NH3 site's Docker stacks
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- PBS-NH3 (VM) — DR mirror target
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- Other NH3 VMs
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**Recovery:** same pattern as pfi-pve. PBS-NH3 being down breaks DR replication but doesn't affect primary backups (ANA side is authoritative).
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---
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### esh-pve + esh-pve-nas (10.0.250.35 + 10.0.50.55)
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**Blast radius:**
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- All ESH home-lab workloads: esh-docker-vm, vm-esh-nas, media services, home automation stacks
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**Recovery:** restore VMs from PBS-ANA (cross-site pull). Not production-critical; no SLA.
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---
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### sfsrv-ana (Dell R630, 10.250.250.115, iDRAC 10.250.250.110)
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**Blast radius:** SureFire tenant workloads.
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- PBS-ANA namespace `sfsrv-pve` has daily snapshots
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- Coordinate with tenant before any recovery action per hosting agreement
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**Recovery:** restore from PBS-ANA sfsrv-pve namespace. Tenant may have app-level recovery procedures that take precedence.
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---
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## Tier 2 — Docker hosts (per-stack blast radius)
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### ana-docker (VM 10.250.50.70)
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**Blast radius — services hosted on it:**
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- rest-server-ana (fleet restic target; depends on ana-nas NFS)
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- Backrest UI, Beszel hub, Dozzle hub, Traefik (ANA), CrowdSec, Gitea, Vaultwarden, Seafile, Synapse, OpenWebUI, SearXNG, IT Tools, others
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**Recovery:**
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1. VM restart on pfi-pve: `qm stop <vmid>; qm start <vmid>`
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2. After boot, stacks auto-start via `docker compose up -d` (compose files at `/opt/docker/compose/*/`)
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3. Check each stack with `docker ps` / dockge
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4. If `/mnt/backup` (NFS) is stale after pfi-pve reboot, force remount
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### nh3-docker (VM 10.100.50.40)
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**Blast radius:**
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- rest-server-nh3 (if migrated there — currently on nh3-nas Synology directly)
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- NH3-only stacks
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**Recovery:** VM restart on nh3-pve. Cross-site Beszel/Dozzle agents on ana-docker keep reporting independently.
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### esh-docker-vm + vm-esh-nas
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**Blast radius:** ESH home-lab Docker workloads. Paperless, HA, CWA, pgadmin (esh-docker-vm); dockge, filezilla, agents (vm-esh-nas).
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**Recovery:** VM restart on respective ESH hypervisors. Not production-critical.
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---
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## Tier 3 — Workload VMs/LXCs
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### pfi-postgres (VM 105 on pfi-pve)
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**Blast radius:** vaultwarden, gitea, paperless-ng databases.
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**Recovery:** usually it's actually an ana-nas issue (see Tier 0). If postgres itself is the problem:
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1. Check logs: `sudo tail -200 /var/lib/postgresql/*/main/log/postgresql-*.log`
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2. If clean: `sudo systemctl restart postgresql`
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3. If WAL corruption: restore from PBS vzdump (most recent snapshot)
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### ana-wg (CT 113 on pfi-pve) — WireGuard VPN
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**Blast radius:** remote-access VPN down; remote admin sessions drop but on-prem ops continue.
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**Recovery:** `pct start 113` on pfi-pve. Restart wg-quick service if needed.
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### pfi-pteradactyl (VM 107 on pfi-pve) — game panel
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**Blast radius:** hosted game servers offline.
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**Recovery:** VM restart. Not operationally critical.
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### pfi-tacticalrmm (VM 111 on pfi-pve) — RMM tooling
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**Blast radius:** RMM agent dashboards; agents continue running on endpoints but can't phone home.
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**Recovery:** VM restart; TacticalRMM services auto-start.
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### ana-filebot (CT 112 on pfi-pve) — file automation
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**Blast radius:** scheduled file operations (rename, organize); low-criticality.
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**Recovery:** `pct start 112`.
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### pfi-ana-webhost (VM on pfi-pve) — web workload
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**Blast radius:** hosted website(s) offline.
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**Recovery:** VM restart; web server auto-start.
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---
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## Tier 4 — Specialty workloads
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### ana-ml2 (bare metal Supermicro, 10.250.50.54, BMC 10.250.250.50)
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**Blast radius:** AI inference services (llama-swap, vllm). Consumer-facing chat/embedding/reward-scoring endpoints fail.
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**Recovery:**
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1. Check OS via SSH. If unresponsive, BMC console at <https://10.250.250.50>.
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2. If hardware issue: BMC logs, power cycle via IPMI, check GPU health (`nvidia-smi`).
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3. Docker stacks auto-start via compose `restart: unless-stopped`.
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**Notable:** no Proxmox hypervisor involved — recovery is pure bare-metal. File-level restic runs from inside the host. No vzdump coverage (it's not a VM). Backups via restic to rest-server-ana.
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### SureFire hosts (sfsrv-ana, sf-ana-container, sf-r630)
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**Blast radius:** tenant workloads (scoped to SureFire client).
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**Recovery:** coordinate with tenant. PFI responsibility is hardware + OS layer; application recovery may need tenant input. See `servers/sfsrv-ana/README.md` for hosting agreement scope.
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---
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## Tier 5 — Networking
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### FortiGate 60F (ESH gateway, 10.0.250.1)
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**Blast radius:** ESH site WAN + inter-site VPN to ANA/NH3.
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**Recovery:** physical console access; restore config from FortiManager if needed.
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### UniFi controllers (ESH 10.0.0.1, PFI 10.100.0.1)
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**Blast radius:** UniFi AP/switch management (existing config persists on devices; only changes need the controller).
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**Recovery:** device power cycle; controller reboot. Not critical for ongoing operations.
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---
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## Cross-cutting: what to check FIRST for ambiguous outages
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When symptoms are vague ("lots of things are down"), run this triage in order:
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```bash
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# 1. Is the Anaheim NAS alive?
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ping -c 2 10.250.50.50
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# 2. Are the hypervisors alive?
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for h in 10.250.250.31 10.100.250.60 10.0.250.35 10.0.50.55 10.250.250.115; do
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ping -c 1 -W 2 $h >/dev/null && echo "$h OK" || echo "$h DOWN"
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done
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# 3. WAN reachability between sites?
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# (from nh3-dev to ana-side IP; from ana-side to nh3-side IP)
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ping -c 2 10.250.50.70 # ana-docker from NH3
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```
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The first `DOWN` in the hypervisor list narrows blast radius to that site / that hypervisor's guests.
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---
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## What this runbook does NOT cover
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- Application-level restores from PBS / restic snapshots — that's per-service and lives in respective stack READMEs
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- Full site-failover (e.g., "move PFI fleet to NH3 entirely") — requires Phase-9-style DR plan, not built
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- Data-level integrity recovery (DB corruption, ZFS pool damage) — beyond this runbook's scope
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**Maintenance note:** update this file when:
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- New host gets registered (add to applicable tier)
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- New SPOF discovered (add blast-radius note)
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- A recovery procedure changes in practice
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