For ha-dev (operator-approved 2026-09-26). CT 111 on esh-pve at 10.0.90.20:
Matter/Thread IPv6 (Echo ULA + RA route-information) is link-only, so the
server sits on esh-iot and HA reaches it over routed IPv4 ws :5580.
- playbooks/esh-matter-lxc.yaml: kernel RA (accept_ra=1,
rt_info_max_plen=64), forwarding off, Docker ip-forward/iptables off;
nftables admits 5580 from HA 10.0.50.46 only and SSH from mgmt ranges;
the CT is added to esh-pve's vzdump job (fabric credentials).
- stacks/matter-server: ghcr.io/matter-js/matterjs-server:1.4.0 (digest),
host networking, /data on the CT.
- Acceptance: fdad:: SLAAC, ping6 thermostat, 2 Thread RIO routes learned, ws
server_info from inside the HA container; 5580 refused from 10.0.50.45,
nh3-dev and a temporary VLAN 90 netns vantage.
- qwen3-embedding and reranker: second deployment on nh3-ml1 (config);
reranker-a3-bge-v2-m3: second DB deployment via /model/new.
- router_settings.enable_weighted_failover: true. Only the three
multi-deployment groups are affected.
- Measured by stopping nh3-ml1 TEI: without failover 7/40 embeds 500'd;
with it rerank 80/80, embed 38/40 at onset and 60/60 over a 34 s outage;
nh3 rejoins rotation after restart. Split 12/28 embed, 22/18 rerank.
For brokkr's dataset foundry (operator-approved 2026-09-26, relayed).
- stacks/lfm-vl-seat: llama.cpp server-cuda b11176 (digest-pinned), Q5_K_M +
mmproj Q8_0, :8030; gateway alias lfm25-vl-3b (LiteLLM restarted, 36 s).
Positive control exact; null control shows it describes a missing image.
- stacks/vibevoice-asr-seat: audio.cpp v0.8.2-audio8-perf-hotfix (the GGUF's
own runtime, not vibevoice.cpp) on cuda 12.8 runtime + libgomp + libsoxr,
sha256-pinned; :8031 direct. LibriSpeech WER 3/69, RTF 0.07-0.14; ~31 s
cold first request.
Same model revision (df3ce67, blob sha matches fv-ml1), vLLM v0.24.0 and flags;
0.33 of the Ada (~5.4 GB, fv-ml1's absolute budget). Healthy, KV 79,808 tokens.
Parity (teacher-forced true code, 40 FIM prompts, 2,215 tokens, cache-salted):
each host is bit-exact with itself; cross-host |dlogprob| median 0.049, top-1
agreement 0.966 (Blackwell vs Ada + fp8 KV); against ground truth no quality
difference (mean logprob diff +0.008 +/- 0.019 SE). Speed on-box: ~5x slower
(64-tok FIM p50 ~1.0 s vs ~0.2 s; 63 vs 338 tok/s). Gateway coder-fast left on
fv-ml1 pending Prime's call.
- AMT re-IP'd over WS-Man to static 10.100.250.61/24 (gw/DNS .1): AMT keeps
its old DHCP lease across a VLAN move, so it was unreachable until changed
(reached via a temporary on-link /32 on vmbr0 + ssh tunnel, since removed).
- KVM redirection enabled, redirection listener on, IPS_OptInService
OptInRequired=0; all read back. Password vaulted as nh3-pve/amt-admin.
- scripts/amt-wsman.py: stdlib WS-Man get/put/invoke client (digest auth,
AMT 16 legacy-renegotiation TLS), password from $AMT_PW.
- PFI-UDMSE port 6 override: native nh3-mgmt, tagged VLANs blocked (was
forward all / native default). Reservation nh3-pve-amt -> 10.100.250.61.
- nh3-pve: arp_ignore=8 / arp_announce=2 on enp88s0 (now on vmbr0's untagged
L2) so the host never answers ARP for 10.100.250.60 with the AMT port's MAC.
- DNS nh3-pve-amt.nh3.internal -> 10.100.250.61.
- Homepage: NH3-PVE-AMT card under Infra - NH3 (no siteMonitor/ping: AMT drops
ICMP and its legacy-renegotiation TLS fails Homepage's fetch).
- AMT keeps its old 10.100.0.151 lease until rebind/expiry (~1920-2224 PT
2026-09-26); it does not re-DHCP on a VLAN change or link drop (measured).
AMT had no IP because Linux had enp88s0 admin-down (it left vmbr0 on 09-25 and
had no auto stanza); igc powers off the I226-LM PHY when down, so AMT had no
link. With the port up (no IP, unbridged) AMT took a lease within minutes.
- nh3-pve: `auto enp88s0` (manual, unbridged) and sysctl.d disable_ipv6 on it;
backup /root/interfaces.bak-20260925-amt; runtime already matched, no reload.
- UDM: reservation nh3-pve-amt -> 10.100.0.151 (untagged nh3-default; the
cable is on an nh3-sw1 trunk, not the UDM).
- DNS nh3-pve-amt.nh3.internal. AMT 16.1.25 answers TLS :16993 and :664.
nh3-ml1's first Temperature alert (2026-09-25 2105, 88.8 C) was nh3-pve's CPU
package during the nightly vzdump; the GPU sat at 47 C. hwmon is not namespaced,
so an LXC's agent reports its host's coretemp sensors under the LXC's name.
- hosts/{nh3,esh}-ml1.yaml: SENSORS=-coretemp_*,acpitz (blacklist); GPU and
NVMe temperatures verified still reported.
- Hub: Temperature >95 C / 5 m on nh3-pve and esh-pve for the CPUs (i9-13900H
TjMax 100 C; nh3-pve 2-hour averages reach 88 C on busy days).
- nh3-pve README: runs warmer than esh-pve; workload confounds it, check
airflow on the next visit.
NH3 site visit done: Secure Boot off, iGPU restored as boot VGA, AMT port cabled.
- nh3-pve: NVIDIA 580.178.04 (DKMS, open modules) via pve-nvidia-host.yaml.
- nh3-ml1 = CT 109 @ 10.100.50.80 via gpu-lxc.yaml; embed-rerank (TEI 1.9.4)
deployed with HOST_NAME/HOST_IP labels.
- Parity vs esh-ml1 (1,126 texts, 2 runs/host, controls): embed cosine min
0.999993 = own noise floor; overlap@10 1.000 vs MRL-256 positive control
0.684; rerank top-1 1.00, max diff 0.0014 vs floor 0.0020. On-box speed
identical within rep spread.
- gpu-lxc.yaml: first step upgrades lxc-pve to >= 6.0.0-2 (Proxmox fix#7006).
With 6.0.0-1 every docker run in a nesting CT failed on runc 1.5's sysctl
reopen; applied on nh3-pve (one package).
- pve-nvidia-host.yaml: document that the headers meta drags in the newest
kernel (nh3-pve went 6.8.12-11 -> -43 at the next reboot).
- Monitoring: Beszel NVIDIA agent + 5 alerts, Kuma #29/#30, Homepage
nh3-ml1-docker, Dozzle agent (hub 8 clients). DNS nh3-ml1.nh3.internal.
- nh3-pve README: SB/IGFX/driver/kernel state, btmtk oops on -4x kernels,
AMT cabled but unreachable on the network.
Gateway routing to nh3-ml1 is not changed.
- esh-pve-nvidia-host -> pve-nvidia-host: headers/dkms/build-essential step,
nouveau blacklist + guarded unload (refuses if nouveau bound a device)
- esh-ml1-lxc -> gpu-lxc: host vars have no defaults (elway aborts on undefined),
rootfs storage/startup order parameterized, CT kept out of all-guests vzdump jobs
- embed-rerank: Homepage labels take HOST_NAME/HOST_IP, defaults = esh-ml1
nh3-pve and esh-pve are the same Minisforum MS-01 (BIOS AHWSA.1.17). With a
card in the x16 slot its root port takes bus 01 and every NIC moves down a
bus (measured on esh-pve), so predictable names change (enp2s0f0np0 ->
enp3s0f0np0 etc.) and vmbr0 would boot with no uplink. systemd .link files
now pin all NICs by MAC, baked into every initramfs and synced to the ESP;
udev confirms the files apply. The AMT-capable I226-LM (enp88s0) leaves
vmbr0's bridge-ports in the file (next boot), so cabling it for AMT cannot
loop the STP-less bridge.
Also: documented the NanoKVM (https://10.100.250.171) as nh3-pve's console
OOB and that AMT is not wired; nh3-dev's Beszel agent no longer binds NAS
shares (it died on the last NH3 cold start); post-boot checklist in
persistent-memory.
- Beszel: NVIDIA agent (stacks/beszel hosts/esh-ml1.yaml), hub system
registered with Status/Disk/CPU/Memory/Temperature alerts; GPU samples
verified (RTX 2000E Ada util, VRAM, power, temp).
- Uptime Kuma: health monitors for the TEI embed (:8001) and rerank (:8013)
services — the sole backends behind the gateway, so the one exception to
"seats are out of Kuma's lane". Reward seat excluded (no consumer).
- Homepage: dockerd on tcp/2375 bound to 10.0.50.80 (playbook step);
esh-ml1-docker added to docker.yaml.
- Dozzle: agent v10.4.1 on esh-ml1. The hub's DOZZLE_REMOTE_AGENT still
named ana-ml2's 10.250.50.54 and irv-ml1's retired 10.100.79.3; repointed
to 10.251.50.54 / 10.6.110.50 (fv-ml1 and irv-ml1 logs were missing).
- Documented nh3-dev's Beszel agent failing on NH3 cold start (bind of an
automounted NAS share); revived by hand, fix still open.
- Audit: Skywork-Reward-V2-Llama-3.1-8B is still #1 of 188 on AllenAI's
RewardBench 2 per-sample results; no Skywork V3; the -40M sibling is
vendor-marked experimental. Our AWQ W4A16 quant: 0.847 vs published bf16
0.860 on a 150-prompt sample (within +/-2.9 pt SE), 96.2% pairwise
agreement. Double BOS from vLLM on pre-templated text costs a further
~2.7 pts; callers must send add_special_tokens=false.
- No working consumer: 0 requests since 2026-09-13; Worldtree Domari points
at a dead IP with a non-vLLM schema (reported to worldtree-dev).
- Move: sha256-identical model copy; vLLM v0.24.0 on esh-ml1 :8003 at 0.55
util (KV 1.30x of a 16k request). Parity vs fv-ml1: 149/150 verdicts,
99.8% pairwise signs, raw |delta| median 0.049.
- Gateway /scalar-judge passthrough -> 10.0.50.80:8003; fv-ml1 vllm-reward
removed (~10.2 GB freed on GPU 1). stacks/vllm now holds only vllm-coder.
Prime, 2026-09-25: TEI serves embedding + reranking for esh-ml1 and the fleet
from now on; fv-ml1 retires both once esh-ml1 is up.
- stacks/embed-rerank: vLLM -> TEI 1.9.4 (89- Ada build), same ports
8001/8013, fail-closed truncation (--auto-truncate false; embed
--max-batch-tokens 32768).
- litellm: qwen3-embedding -> esh-ml1 only (hosted_vllm/, unchanged address);
reranker -> huggingface/ provider at :8013 (hosted_vllm/ 422s on TEI's
`texts` body). DB alias reranker-a3-bge-v2-m3 patched to the same target.
- Verified via the gateway against the retiring fv-ml1 seats: embed cosine
median 0.999927 (n=203); rerank top-1/top-3 29/30.
- stacks/vllm: vllm-embed and vllm-rerank-a3 removed (containers retired on
fv-ml1, GPU 1 freed ~6.1 GB); reward + coder unchanged.
- Bake-off record moved to docs/pfi/embed-rerank-tei-vs-vllm-bakeoff.md;
CLAUDE.md gains the TEI convention.
esh-pve: NVIDIA 580.178.04 (open modules, DKMS) installed on the host from
NVIDIA's .run and loaded live, no reboot. nvidia-persistenced unit creates the
device nodes before pve-guests; the T400's vfio-pci ids and `blacklist nvidia`
retired. playbooks/esh-pve-nvidia-host.yaml.
esh-ml1: CT 110, unprivileged Debian 12, 10.0.50.80, GPU nodes via devN,
NVIDIA userspace from the same .run (--no-kernel-modules), docker-ce +
nvidia-container-toolkit (no-cgroups). playbooks/esh-ml1-lxc.yaml. Not in the
vzdump job on purpose. DNS esh-ml1.esh.internal.
stacks/embed-rerank: Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B :8001 + bge-reranker-v2-m3 :8013 on
the same vLLM v0.24.0 digest and flags as fv-ml1. Measured parity: embed
cosine FV-vs-ESH median 0.999908 (min 0.999772), inside both self-noise
floors; rerank max |delta| 0.000145 vs floor 0.000181, identical ranking.
litellm: qwen3-embedding and reranker gain an esh-ml1 deployment at order 2
behind fv-ml1 (order 1). Order fallback proven with throwaway groups:
refused primary +0.15 s, host-down primary ~18.7 s per call, dead-only 500.
Also: repaired the DB-only alias reranker-a3-bge-v2-m3, dead since the
fv-ml1 relocation (still named 10.250.50.54); documented the third
unkillable homepage wedge on esh-docker-vm.
After the 2026-09-24 NH3 outage pfi-gx10 stayed off. It has no BMC, and the
ASUS firmware defaults to staying off after AC loss. With Prime's approval,
bytes 3-4 of the UEFI Setup variable were changed from 0x1d,0x00 to
0x1c,0x01, a community recipe that matches factory power-on units. The
readback shows exactly those two bytes changed. The original 85-byte raw
variable (attr header included) is committed here and also kept on the box.
The README records that an OS shutdown is not a test of this setting. It
stays off by design, and two such "tests" were invalid. The only valid test
is pulling and restoring AC, which Prime will do on 2026-09-25. It also
records the revert procedure.
After the 2026-09-24 NH3 power outage every NFS line from nh3-nas failed at
boot: nh3-docker's /mnt/compose and /mnt/backup, and nh3-dev's /mnt/backup.
The NAS is the slowest box to serve NFS, and the plain fstab mounts stayed
down until remounted by hand. nh3-dev's /mnt/smithy already used
x-systemd.automount, and the same boot shows it self-healing on its next
access. playbooks/nh3-nfs-automount.yaml brings the other lines to that
shape (_netdev,nofail,x-systemd.automount,x-systemd.mount-timeout=30).
Hard-mount semantics are unchanged; only WHEN the mount happens moves.
Applied and read back on nh3-docker and nh3-dev: every nh3-nas line carries
automount, each automount unit is active, and each share is NFS-mounted after
access. A second run on nh3-docker is a no-op. The fstab check judges only
errors the rewrite ADDS, because nh3-dev's installer cdrom line has a
pre-existing verify error. The first run caught that and aborted without
writing.
servers/nh3-pve/README.md now lists each guest's expected state after a
power loss: nh3-laser is on-demand and stays off (Prime), pbs-nh3 now has
onboot=1 (it had none and stayed down), and pfi-gx10 is bare metal that
does not auto-power-on.
Operator directive 2026-09-24: clock times are written in 24-hour local
(US Pacific) format, four digits, no colon. Claude seats get it from the
global CLAUDE.md (dotfiles fe63a67). Codex (~/.codex/AGENTS.md) and Grok
(~/.grok/rules/00-fleettools.md) read this file through symlinks, so the
same rule goes under Non-negotiables here.
Operator ruling 2026-09-24. On ana-docker the stack is `docker compose
down`: the container is removed and port 7878 is closed. Kept for revival:
- the data dir /opt/docker/conf/task-board/data (tasks.db, last written
2026-09-11)
- the task-board:local image
- stacks/task-board/ and the host's compose + .env
The Uptime Kuma monitor (id 3) was deleted before the stop so it could
not page, and its row is removed from monitors.yaml. Homepage drops the
card on its own, since it reads the container's labels.
Hooks: the container log showed no hook POSTs in 30 days. The only
traffic was open browser tabs holding /events, and the plugin was already
uninstalled on nh3-dev. Removed the paragraph that told sessions to call
task_* tools (CLAUDE.md, and the fork-fleet.sh template that seeds new
repos), the vestigial TASK_BOARD_SESSION env in .claude/settings.json, and
the listings in README and FLEETTOOLS.
Global CLAUDE.md now defines how to reach Miranda: every message becomes a
summary on Prime's phone, URGENT means she phones him, and no noise. The
project section had prefixed every message URGENT and said 'when unsure,
send it', which contradicted that. It now points to the global section for
mechanics and keeps only what is infra-ops-specific: the standing order
covers matters already fixed, the consequence test, and the channel's
dependency on svos.service and hermes-gateway (a routine svos restart is
about 100s of deafness).
Operator standing order 2026-09-24: infra-ops informs Miranda of every
high-urgency matter, fixed or needing the operator. Records the send form
(URGENT — subject, what/state/operator-action body), the consequence-based
urgency test, and the channel's dependency on svos.service and
hermes-gateway, with a fallback route for outages that take those down.
Round trip verified: test thread 01M3A0RP4Q8T0KNGH8TMFSNDA6, ack in ~1 min.
The 2026-09-14 normalization (826a63b) moved /opt/docker/compose/<stack>
dirs to root:docker 2775. git refuses a worktree whose top-level dir has a
different owner, so yt-voice-clipper's webhook auto-deploy on irv-ml1
(git fetch/reset as lkraven) failed with 'dubious ownership' from then on.
Found 2026-09-24 when v0.3.13 did not land.
The fix keeps the convention: one safe.directory entry per repo for the
deploy user. Applied on irv-ml1 and the deploy re-run: main 2af9b3a,
/diagnostics reports 0.3.13. A sweep of the other normalized hosts found no
other checkout deployed by a non-root user.
Three of the four failures in the week to 2026-09-23 (09-19, 09-21, 09-23)
had one signature. The Cloudflare zone lookup returned an empty body at its
15s cap, a bare json.load crashed with tracebacks instead of a cause, and the
script carried empty IDs on to a PATCH against zones//dns_records/.
Cloudflare rejected it, so there was no DNS impact, but only by accident.
- Cloudflare calls go through cf(): 3 announced tries, and a call counts
only when the body says success:true.
- success:true is not trusted as shape. pick() validates every body and
prints only the fields asked for, or one line saying why not. It requires
exactly one zone named phasefinal.com and exactly one A record named
headscale.phasefinal.com, each with a non-empty id and content. Two A
records are refused rather than half-updated, and an empty id can no
longer shift the content into the id slot.
- No write without both IDs. The run ends on a confirmation that the record
now reads the new address. The previous final line was an echo whose exit
status was always 0, even when the parse inside it failed.
- Only a global unicast IPv4 is published (python ipaddress is_global).
Loopback, RFC1918, link-local, CGNAT and documentation ranges are retried
and then refused.
- curl -q as the first argument ignores ~/.curlrc, so a verbose config can
never log the bearer token. The vault CLI path is quoted. The empty
data-array expansion is safe under set -u on bash < 4.4.
Tests: services/headscale-ddns/test_headscale_ddns.py, 12 cases with curl,
the vault CLI and sleep stubbed. Each failure case asserts the FATAL line's
stated reason, so a run that died earlier for an unrelated cause cannot pass
it. The documentation-range fixtures (203.0.113.x) were themselves rejected
by the new public-IP guard: a free positive control.
Live: a manual run and a unit run both printed "unchanged 70.230.226.88",
Result=success. Cross-model bug-hunt (heid "Talus", Gróa + seat): all 8
findings folded.
elway's sudo upload did scp-as-user then `sudo mv`, and mv keeps the owner,
so every file it installed "as root" (systemd units, /etc configs, root-run
scripts) ended up owned by the SSH user. A sudoers drop-in installed that
way would be rejected by sudo outright.
elway:
- Sudo uploads now chown to root:root by default. Playbooks can override
with `upload.owner:` and ad-hoc runs with `--owner`. An owner is refused
on a non-sudo upload, and `--owner` outside an ad-hoc `--upload` is an
error rather than silently ignored.
- Ownership and mode are applied to the STAGED file, then a single mv
publishes it, so a failed chown can no longer leave the live path owned
by the SSH user. chown runs before chmod so setuid bits survive. A trap
removes the staged file on every exit path.
- A directory dest is refused before anything moves. mv would otherwise
drop the file inside the directory under a staging name.
- `mode` was spliced unquoted into the remote root shell line. It is now
validated as octal (^[0-7]{3,4}$) and shell-quoted, on both the sudo
and non-sudo paths.
- `mode` and `owner` must be quoted YAML strings. YAML 1.1 turns a bare
0644 into 420, a bare 1000:0 into 60000 and a bare yes into True, and
str() of each is a different value that looks valid. All 85 playbooks
already quote them.
- New preflight(): every step is resolved before any remote action. An
undefined var or a templated owner that resolves badly is now refused
up front, not after earlier steps have already changed the host.
scripts/fleet-ownership-audit.sh (new, read-only) finds files in root's
territory owned by a normal user. Tier A lists /etc, /usr/local, /root and
cron, judging symlinks by their target. Tier X covers files that root-run
units exec from /opt, /srv, /home or /volume1, reading drop-ins and quoted
paths. Tier B only summarises /opt app trees. A host that is unprivileged,
whose find fails, or whose run dies is reported INCOMPLETE (exit 5), never
clean. Completion is marked with a per-run nonce.
Verification: 24 unit tests in scripts/test_elway.py. Live checks on
esh-docker-vm: default lands root:root; the override lands infra-ops:adm at
4755 with setuid intact; a bad group fails with dest untouched and no
staging left; a directory dest is refused; a bad mode is refused before
any copy. Audit positive controls on nh3-dev (a drop-in-only root Exec, a
quoted path containing a space, a symlink to a user-owned target) were all
flagged; esh-docker-vm negative control was 0. Probes removed. Cross-model
bug-hunt (heid, Gróa arm + seat) findings folded.
Operator decision. paperless-ngx's database lives on esh-vm-db and is backed
up at the source by that host's fail-closed pg_dumpall. esh-docker-vm's
second copy had failed auth every night since 2026-04-24 behind a WARN. Its
`> paperless.pg_dump` redirect left a 0-byte file in every snapshot
(confirmed in snapshot 6ec9f74f), which looked like a dump but held nothing.
The block was the only consumer of /etc/restic/dbcreds.env, so the creds
loader is gone and the template dbcreds.env.example is deleted. The host
file was moved (not deleted) to /var/lib/restic/repair-20260923/.
Paperless's media volumes are still captured under /var/lib/docker/volumes.
Also fixes ownership. elway's sudo upload does scp-as-user then `sudo mv`,
so the hook deployed at 08:04 landed infra-ops:infra-ops even though root
executes it. Both esh-docker-vm playbooks now chown it back to root and
verify root:root 700.
Verified: the live hook hash matches canonical (e0d3ddcef1bddf43), and
the manual backup saved snapshot decfae71 with 3 staged dumps and no WARN
lines.
Uptime Kuma moved from esh-docker-vm to ana-docker on 2026-09-22. The
pre-backup hook's fallback lookup, `docker ps | grep -E "uptime.kuma"`,
then matched nothing and exited 1. Under set -euo pipefail that aborted the
hook, and resticprofile treats a failed run-before as fatal, so no snapshot
was taken from 2026-09-22 01:00 until this fix (backup-freshness: 54h stale).
The block is removed rather than guarded because there is nothing on this
host left for it to back up. The header now records the invariant the
"blocks only WARN" promise depends on: every optional-service lookup must sit
inside an `if` test or end in `|| true`. The remaining blocks were checked
and all do.
Deployed with playbooks/esh-docker-vm-restic-drop-kuma-block.yaml (the
pre-fix hook is kept in /var/lib/restic/repair-20260923/). The live hook
hash matches the canonical copy (43e6bea8b8569602). The manual backup saved
snapshot 6ec9f74f, and backup-freshness now reports all backups fresh.
A deliberate `systemctl --user restart hermes-gateway` paged infra-ops as a
FAILED unit (msg 3716) while the unit was already back up. Cause is a Hermes
v0.21.1 race: the planned-stop marker watcher runs the shutdown handler before
systemd's SIGTERM, consumes the marker, and the SIGTERM re-runs the handler,
which then classifies the stop as unexpected and exits 1.
Corrects the README claim that OnFailure never fires on a deliberate restart:
that holds only when the main process exits with a success status. Measured on a
throwaway unit (3/3 paged without SuccessExitStatus, 0/3 with it, and crash
restarts are unaffected), and a survey of every stop on nh3-dev since 09-15
found hermes-gateway to be the only unit that does this.
The host-side fix is drop-in hermes-gateway.service.d/
20-planned-stop-exit1-is-clean.conf (SuccessExitStatus=1). No alarm coverage
is lost: Restart=always ignores the classification, and StartLimitIntervalSec=0
means the unit can never reach `failed` from a start failure.
In-flight rewritten for 2026-09-22 evening. The operator approved both carried
calls ("decide to do both pending"): the NRestarts flap sampler is to be BUILT
(163bb97) and the restic content-assertion ruling is RATIFIED as-is (ba60fda).
Recorded in Recent decisions with tracking pointers, and their modality flipped
in the handoff from do-not-touch to genuine pending work.
safe-rm: installed on nh3-dev, delegated to infra-hermes, now fleet-wide 6/6
with acceptance met. Wiring ruled to /etc/bash.bashrc above the case-$ guard
rather than /etc/environment -- an rc self-guards, smaller blast radius, covers
bash-over-ssh. ⭐ The guarded acceptance test caught infra-hermes's own silent
wiring failure in flight: a probe that cannot destroy what it tests also cannot
lie about it.
⚠ Recorded twice over because it will otherwise be trusted for the wrong class:
safe-rm is a BLACKLIST. It refuses rm -rf /home and deletes an unset-variable
path without complaint. set -u is the actual cover for the habit that prompted
the install.
D-0010/D-0011: genuine, operator-approved, misrouted to this seat by pane_find
matching a ROLLING PANE TITLE. Belayed both, nothing lost. svos-dev owns the fix
and found the sharper half -- pane_send structurally cannot deliver a harness
command, so D-0010 promised an unachievable /clear and its receipt reported
success anyway. {"sent": true} is a claim about transmission, never effect.
Live thread carried: restic/ana/esh-docker-vm has drifted 36h -> 44h against a
48h threshold while every other repo sits at 12h. Drifting, not static.
Corrects my own framing from earlier today. I told the operator D-0010's /clear
"cost nothing by luck of the delivery mechanism". svos-dev verified the code:
bifrost.py:1322 prefixes every relayed string with the card id, so a slash
command never begins the line. pane_send STRUCTURALLY cannot execute a harness
command in a target pane -- a property, not luck.
Which makes the card worse than a misroute. It promised "type /clear into
terminal_2 and clear booth-dev's context"; that effect was never achievable at
all. The executed event then recorded {"sent": true} -- true about the bytes,
false about the effect. Three defects in one approved action, and only the
first was visible.
Recorded because it is the sharpest instance of the day's pattern and the only
one that cost something outside an agent's triage time: it consumed an OPERATOR
APPROVAL. Vuong approved an action believing it would take effect and the
system told him it had.
General form worth carrying beyond SVOS: {"sent": true} is a claim about
transmission, never about effect. Any receipt that cannot distinguish the two
will eventually report success for something that did not happen.
The failed-START notifier built earlier today had its first REAL firing at
15:28: headscale-ddns.service exited 1 after succeeding all afternoon. The
detection worked. The alarm was also useless, and that is the finding.
Both failure paths exited 1 IN SILENCE, so the message said "exit status 1" and
nothing else. An alarm you cannot act on costs the same triage as no alarm at
all -- the notifier did its job and the subject script had no diagnostics for it
to carry.
Cause was transient and harmless: icanhazip.com did not answer inside its 10s
cap, so the IP came back empty and the regex guard refused it. No DNS impact --
the record already held the right address, verified against 1.1.1.1 before
touching anything, and the next timer run succeeded. Arithmetic confirms it:
~17s vault read + 10s curl timeout = 27s against the 28s the failing run took.
Fixed, both verified by making them fail:
- every exit path names its cause; a missing vault key names the key, an
EMPTY token is distinguished from a failed read, and a dead WAN lookup adds
"DNS left unchanged" because that is the fact the reader needs
- the WAN lookup retries 3x with ANNOUNCED attempts -- one third-party blip
should not page a human, and a silent retry would hide a degrading
dependency
⚠ ALSO: this script was not tracked anywhere. A fix to the thing every mesh
client resolves through lived on exactly one disk. Script, unit and timer are
in the repo now.
Measured and recorded: the vault read is 17 of the script's 18 seconds, every
10 minutes. Not a fault, but it bounds any retry budget and it is fleet-wide --
svos-dev's alarm unit carries the same 17-second note.
In-flight rewritten for 2026-09-22. The Booth is booth-dev's now (extracted to
vh/booth, v0.2.0 shipped by them); infra-ops retains only its Uptime Kuma
monitor.
Eight decisions recorded, and three OPEN OPERATOR DECISIONS filed under Recent
decisions with commit tracking pointers rather than under in-flight, per the
deferred-work rule: the NRestarts flap sampler (163bb97), safe-rm, and
confirming the restic content-assertion ruling that reached me relayed by
svos-dev rather than Miranda (ba60fda).
Detail file for the day's throughline: five instrument errors, one shape -- a
tool that enumerates 'things that are fine' has selected against its own
subject. Four were mine, one a peer's, and mine included making theirs, on the
same day we were both cataloguing the habit. Written down because a rule both
parties broke while discussing the rule needs to live where a fresh session
reads it.
Two loose threads carried: talk.service failed while still serving on :8092,
and restic/ana/esh-docker-vm 36h behind the fleet.
Adding nh3-dev to the host list fixed the instance. This fixes the class, on
svos-dev's framing: a hand-maintained list of things to watch, sitting beside a
NAS that already knows which repos exist, means the next repo added is
unwatched BY DEFAULT and nothing says so. The list of what to check can
silently disagree with the set of what exists -- the same shape as every other
instrument fault found this day, only slower-acting.
The check now asks each NAS. A directory is a repository when it has a
snapshots/ child, which cleanly separates real repos from container dirs
(/volume1/Backup/restic/repo/ holds ana|esh|nh3 namespaces and no snapshots of
its own -- verified rather than assumed before building discovery on the
layout).
The hand-written list survives DEMOTED to an EXPECTED set, used only to report
a repo that has VANISHED. Two facts that would otherwise both read as silence
stay distinct:
"a repo exists that nobody watches" -> impossible now, it is discovered
"a repo we expected is gone" -> EXPECTED REPO NOT FOUND
Preventive, not corrective: all 8 repos currently discovered are already in the
expected sets, so this found no live gap. It removes the possibility of the
next one.
Controls run, since a check only ever seen passing is untested: a bogus
expected repo reports EXPECTED REPO NOT FOUND and turns the verdict STALE;
unchanged expectations still report all-fresh; all 8 repos report their age.
Observed while testing, not a fault: restic/ana/esh-docker-vm is 36h old
against 12h for every other repo. Inside the 48h threshold so correctly green,
but it is a day behind the fleet and worth a look.
Operator ruling 2026-09-22 (relayed via svos-dev): have the freshness check
assert snapshot content rather than REST-server reachability, so the green
light is a statement about DATA rather than about a daemon.
⚠ FIRST, A CORRECTION TO MY OWN REPORT. I ran `grep -ic restic` against
backup-freshness-alert.sh -- the WRAPPER -- got 0, and told the operator that
nothing on the fleet verified restic. Wrong. check-backup-freshness.sh has
always checked restic snapshot ages, for seven hosts. I grepped one file of a
two-file tool and generalised, which is the identical error a peer had just
made with dev-backup, made while correcting them.
THE REAL GAP was narrower and still real: the NH3 host list read
`irv-ml1 nh3-docker` and omitted nh3-dev -- the repo holding every Claude Code
session transcript, althing routes, hermes run history and Miranda's
conversation. /volume1/Backup/restic/nh3-dev/ has always existed and always
been written nightly; it was simply never enumerated, so a total failure of the
one repo nobody could reconstruct would have gone unreported indefinitely.
THE CONTENT ASSERTION, built on svos-dev's ladder (list proves the repo
answers; ls proves the index; check proves structure; RESTORE proves the bytes
come back):
- CONJUNCTIVE: latest snapshot newer than MAX_AGE_H AND the probe path
present AND a restore returns non-zero bytes. "A snapshot exists containing
X" is satisfied by a three-month-old one; "the latest is recent" is
satisfied by an empty one. Age alone was the old problem; content alone is
the same problem rotated.
- IT RESTORES. Metadata is what survives the failures worth fearing -- a
pruned or partially-written repo can list a path whose blobs are gone.
~493KB from ~/.local/state/svos, sub-second. Large paths are not restored:
a repo that returns one file will return others.
- IDENTITY: the timer runs as lkraven, which has no NOPASSWD sudo on nh3-dev,
so the probe hops through infra-ops@localhost. /etc/restic is root-only by
design.
⚠ restic ls ALWAYS PRINTS A HEADER LINE, matched or not. A path absent from the
repo returns 1 line; a real one returned 6. Counting with `grep -c .` read the
header as a hit, so the ABSENT case fell through and reported "blobs gone" --
telling an operator the repository was corrupt when the truth was a mistyped
path. Now `grep -c '^/'`.
TESTED BY MAKING IT FAIL, because a check only ever seen passing is untested:
bogus probe path -> "absent from snapshot"; BACKUP_MAX_AGE_HOURS=1 -> "12h old
(>1h)"; healthy -> snapshot id, age, entries, bytes restored.
Two additions, both from a 2026-09-22 exchange with svos-dev.
THE RULE. Coverage is a property of the backup SYSTEM, not of one job's
configured scope. A peer checked dev-backup.sh, found SRC=$HOME/development,
and reported to the operator -- with specifics and unhedged -- that five
home-directory paths including Miranda's entire conversation had never been
backed up anywhere. All five were in that night's restic snapshot. dev-backup
is the hourly job for one directory; resticprofile is the daily job covering
all of /home/lkraven. Checking one job and generalising to the system produced
a confident, false, escalated claim. The runbook now carries the query that
answers the question properly.
THE GAP THAT VERIFYING IT EXPOSED, and it is worse. grep -ic restic against
scripts/backup-freshness-alert.sh returns 0. The checker inspects PBS guest
ages and pings the rest-servers for liveness -- which confirms the server
answers, not that a snapshot was written. If resticprofile stopped entirely the
light would stay green, correctly by its own definition, forever. Restic holds
the whole home directory; PBS holds VM images. The layer with the granular data
is the unwatched one, and the light is not merely blind but actively reassuring
about a system it cannot see.
Recorded as an open gap rather than patched, because fixing it changes what an
existing green light means and people have been reading that light for months.
svos-dev found an interaction between the two detectors by doing the recovery
rather than reasoning about it: clearing a failed unit is REQUIRED before
systemd will start it again, and reset-failed zeroes NRestarts in the same
motion. Verified here -- a start-limited unit refused to start until
reset-failed, which took NRestarts 3 -> 0.
So the standard recovery from a failed-START alarm erases the history a flap
sampler would depend on, routinely rather than as an edge case. A unit that
fails, is cleared, then flaps starts its history from zero, delaying the first
flap alarm by the whole threshold -- exactly the window where a just-fixed unit
is most likely still sick. Mitigation recorded: store a last-seen timestamp so
a counter going BACKWARDS is itself detectable as a reset rather than read as
quiet.
Also recorded as its own shape: 'nothing to count is not the same as not
counting'. The first manual-restart check read NRestarts flat and would have
concluded a sampler goes blind whenever a human touches a unit. Artifact of the
test -- that unit had already hit its start limit and stopped auto-restarting,
so the instrument was reading correctly from a subject that had stopped
producing. Verify, then ask what the verification could not have seen.
OnFailure fires when a unit enters failed. A unit that keeps re-earning its
retries never enters failed, so the alarm never fires for it. svos-dev warned
this was the consequence of the interval divergence; measuring it showed the
gap is most of the box.
MEASURED: a unit shaped like booth/althing-po-herald (Restart=always,
RestartSec=5s, burst 5, interval 10s) ran 9 restarts over 45 seconds cycling
active/activating and NEVER reached failed. No alarm would have fired.
Covered: the 7 timer-driven oneshots (Restart=no, so any failure lands in
failed immediately) and svos.service (burst 3 per 5min -- it genuinely gives
up). NOT covered: ten daemons that flap instead, and hermes-gateway, whose
start limiting is disabled outright.
svos.service's divergent 5min window is deliberate and load-bearing (operator
ruling 2026-09-11, 'fatal both ways'). NOT to be harmonised: that would restore
the flapping the ruling forbids AND silence the alarm on the one daemon it
currently works for. Whether the OTHERS move to 5min is a behaviour change for
ten services and an operator call.
Also recorded, svos-dev's framing of the two installer bugs: a tool that
enumerates 'things that are fine' and acts on them has selected against its own
subject. Neither bug failed randomly -- both were anti-correlated with purpose,
working better the healthier the fleet looked.
Two defects, both found by the tool failing to cover a unit that was already
broken. talk.service has been sitting in `failed` (exit 143) while its
containers keep serving 200 on :8092 -- precisely the "unit died, the thing
keeps serving, nobody knows" case this alarm was built for -- and the installer
had not hooked it.
1. SELECTION: --state=running skipped anything not already healthy. A unit that
is down at install time never got hooked, which inverts the tool's purpose.
Now the union of enabled unit-files and all loaded units.
2. PARSING, and this is the sharper one: systemd decorates a FAILED unit with a
leading "●", so `awk '{print $1}'` returned the bullet instead of the name,
and the sanitiser reduced it to an empty string and dropped the row. The
parser silently lost exactly the rows that matter. --plain suppresses the
decoration. Same shape as every other instrument error today -- it reported
cleanly while looking at the wrong thing.
Selection now 23 units. Deliberately INCLUDES the timer-driven oneshots
(dev-backup, ha-backup, fleet-tls-cert-check, headscale-ddns,
seat-inventory-drift, brokkr-landscape-scan, soong-ci-relay): a backup or a
cert check that fails silently is the same class, and all seven were clean at
install time so they are not a known noise source. EXCLUDES dbus, gpg-agent and
dirmngr as OS plumbing, the notifier's own template and instances, and
svos-failed-alarm -- hooking an alarm with an alarm is a loop with extra steps.
svos-dev challenged a claim this README made -- that a crash-loop yields one
message per episode -- with a measurement: one 2026-09-19 boot-gate refusal on
svos.service produced FIVE transitions into failed, and the operator got five
messages.
Measured here before accepting it, because a peer's number is still a number
someone else took: a unit with Restart=on-failure, burst 3, interval 30s
produced 7 journal failure lines and exactly ONE notifier invocation. So the
multiplier is not universal -- it needs retries spanning start-limit windows or
an external restarter. svos.service carries StartLimitIntervalSec=5min, which
is how it accumulated five.
Both conditions exist on this box, so the guard goes in as cheap insurance
rather than as a fix for something proven here. The README now states both
numbers and which restart policy each of the twelve units carries, since that
is what decides the exposure. Noted with it: hermes-gateway has start limiting
DISABLED, so it retries forever and may never reach failed at all -- worth
knowing before trusting this alarm to cover it.
Design, taken from svos-dev's shape:
- Keyed on a hash of the CAUSE (unit + result + exit status + the shape of
its last error lines), never the unit name alone. A genuinely different
failure inside the window is a new fact and must still page; suppressing by
unit would hide a second, worse failure behind the first.
- Suppression is LOGGED to suppressed.log, never silent. An alarm that
quietly declines to fire is indistinguishable from one that is broken.
⚠ The first test of this appeared to show the cooldown not working, and the
test was wrong rather than the code -- it invoked the script BEFORE failing the
unit, so the two calls legitimately saw different states and computed different
fingerprints. Re-run the way systemd actually invokes it: same cause 3x -> 1
sent, 2 suppressed and logged; a different cause inside the same window -> sent.
svos-dev found the failure neither Beszel nor Uptime Kuma can see, and
measured it: a config change on 09-19 made svos.service refuse to boot, the
RUNNING process predated the change and kept serving, and the service sat one
restart from dark for three days. Every uptime probe was green and correct --
the thing was up. The signal that catches this is failed-START, not down.
A count after that conversation: 13 running user units on nh3-dev, ZERO with
an OnFailure hook. Including althing-po-herald, whose silent failure cuts
infra-ops's own mail delivery -- a blind spot in the notification path every
other alarm on this fleet depends on.
One template, one drop-in, 12 units hooked (dbus excluded as systemd's own
plumbing). Not noise: OnFailure does not fire on a clean restart or a
deliberate stop, and with Restart=on-failure a crash-loop yields one message
per episode rather than one per attempt.
⚠ %i, NEVER %I -- and the acceptance test is the only reason this is right.
%I unescapes the instance name and systemd escaping maps "-" to "/", so the
first run delivered a message for "onfailure/selftest.service", a unit that
does not exist, with a spool path that tried to create directories.
althing-po-herald.service would have arrived as althing/po/herald.service.
It "worked" -- mail was delivered -- which is exactly the kind of success that
is not one. The referring unit passes %n raw, so literal %i is correct.
⚠ The notifier never reports itself, guarded twice on purpose: the template
carries no OnFailure, and the script bails on its own instance name. A
notification loop is the one bug that pages you forever.
Delivery is spool-first. postbox has no outbox, and an alarm for moments
nobody is watching must survive the post office being one of the things that
is down. If the herald itself fails, the message still REACHES the post office
(postbox talks to it directly; the herald only delivers inbound pokes) -- not
pushed, but stored for the next read.
Acceptance-tested twice against a unit that exits 42: once to catch the %I
bug, once to confirm the fix. Test unit removed.
svos-dev's call and the better one: The High Seat is the English name for
Hlidskjalf, the seat Odin watches all the worlds from, and watching every
session at once is what the board does. mdi-monitor-dashboard described the
artifact; the eye describes the job.
Deployed and verified in /api/services, not assumed.
Requested by svos-dev relaying the operator, 2026-09-22. Reversible work, so
the relay is fine to act on without escalating.
Manual services.yaml entry rather than container labels, because SVOS is a
user-level systemd unit (svos.service) on nh3-dev and nh3-dev is NOT one of
the five hosts in docker.yaml -- Homepage has no Docker API to discover it
through. Same reason the Booth, WhereTF, talk and the infra-hermes seat are
listed by hand, and the comment says so at the entry.
⚠ siteMonitor is "/" deliberately. There is no /api/health on this service:
that path 404s, and a monitor pointed at it would report the board
permanently down while it serves perfectly. svos-dev flagged it and it is
verified here -- / returns 200 and serves the SPA (<title>The High Seat</title>).
Group is Apps, which exists in settings.yaml's layout with tab: Main. An
invented group name gets no tab and renders on ALL tabs, which is how
Scriberr's "AI Systems" leaked across the whole dashboard in August.
Icon mdi-monitor-dashboard is my choice -- svos-dev explicitly did not guess
at one and offered to take a different suggestion.
Verified in a browser, not just in the API: the card renders in Apps with a
green site-monitor at 28 ms.
TAILSCALE IPv6. `tailscale status` had been reporting, continuously:
2 add route failures; first was: permission denied
adding address fd7a:115c:a1e0::6/128 from tunnel interface: permission denied
with tailscale0 carrying only 100.64.0.6/32 while headscale had assigned it
an IPv6 address it could not use.
Not a capability problem -- tailscaled runs as root with the full bounding
set. /etc/sysctl.conf:59 sets net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6=1, and
`default` is inherited by NEWLY CREATED interfaces; tailscale0 is created at
daemon start, inherits it, and the kernel returns EPERM for every attempt.
Fixed with a scoped systemd drop-in rather than flipping the global default.
That line carries no comment, but IPv6-off-by-default on a host with ~26
docker bridges reads as deliberate, and changing it would hand IPv6 to every
future bridge as a side effect of fixing Tailscale.
⚠ It must be ExecStartPost, not /etc/sysctl.d. A sysctl.d entry for a
per-interface key is applied at boot, BEFORE tailscale0 exists, and is
silently ignored -- the setting would look present and do nothing.
Also learned: setting the sysctl on the LIVE interface is not enough.
tailscaled only attempts the address at startup or on a netmap change, so
the verify failed for 60s until the daemon was restarted. Restart is part
of the operation, not an afterthought.
Verified: fd7a:115c:a1e0::6/128 present on tailscale0, health clean, mesh
and services (arbo, ytvc) up.
README. It documented the pre-headscale topology as current -- "Reachable
IP: 10.100.79.3 (WireGuard tunnel endpoint)", "No direct LAN access", and a
refresh caveat telling you to bring WG up. That sends anyone triaging this
host to the wrong layer, which is the exact tax the file exists to prevent.
Now: mesh primary at 100.64.0.6, LAN 10.6.110.50, and wg0 documented as
STILL UP with a live peer -- tailscale uses that address as its direct
endpoint, so it is load-bearing, not vestigial.
Recorded with it, because these cost hours tonight and will cost them again:
- Irvine is a TENANCY behind a Fortinet PFI does not control. Its TLS
inspection breaks Tailscale's relay and control channels (41 cert
warnings/week, 4 control-plane episodes in 14 days). Usually invisible
because direct peer paths carry the data. No fix on our side.
- Diagnose reachability with `tailscale ping`, NOT the status output:
headscale said "online" and status said "active, 19.7 GB" while nothing
on the host answered. Both are last-known state; only a round trip is
liveness.
- The ~26 docker bridges make tailscaled report captive portals.
Two stale claims corrected: the hostname rename it called "pending" is done,
and `ollama` is listed as running on :11434 when it is gone -- verified, no
unit file, nothing listening, no process. It is banned fleet-wide.
NAMES. Homepage already answers "what is this service called", so the monitor
name is now that name verbatim -- a second naming authority is how drift starts,
and an alert reading "[Uptime Kuma] Beszel hub is DOWN" sends you hunting for a
card that does not exist. Only two rows moved (Beszel hub -> Beszel, Dozzle hub
-> Dozzle); the " hub" suffixes were mine, not the services'.
The remaining mixed case is deliberate and is now documented as such. talk, vor
and task-board are lowercase on Homepage and in their own repos; title-casing
them here would make this board disagree with both. What actually looked messy
was scripts/kuma's own ASCII-ordinal sort, which buried every lowercase name
below every capitalised one. Fixed to case-insensitive.
⚠ RENAME SAFETY, which this pass needed and did not have. The seed keys on NAME,
so editing a name would have read as a brand-new monitor: added fresh, with the
old row orphaned, still checking, still alerting, and holding all the history.
`rename_from:` names the old row for one run. Verified: both renamed monitors
kept their IDs and all 67 heartbeats.
Added with it, an orphan warning for any row on the board the spec no longer
names -- because a forgotten monitor keeps paging. Its first cut diffed against
the PRE-EDIT snapshot and so cried wolf on its own successful renames; it
re-reads the board now. A warning that fires on its own correct work is worse
than no warning.
STATUS PAGE + WIDGET. The Homepage uptimekuma widget reads a PUBLISHED status
page (/api/status-page/<slug>), not the admin API -- which is why the widget
labels were deliberately absent from the rebuild: a dashboard widget pointed at
a 404 is the suspected mechanism behind both of Homepage's unkillable D-state
wedges, so shipping one on purpose would have been daft.
The page now exists at slug `nethealth` (the pre-rebuild slug, so old references
still resolve) and is DECLARED IN monitors.yaml, applied by `kuma seed`. Same
principle as the notification channel: a from-scratch rebuild restores the page,
the channel and the monitors together, and nothing the widget depends on lives
only in Kuma's database. Verified in a browser: "13 SITES UP / 0 SITES DOWN /
100% UPTIME" on the dashboard.
⚠ saveStatusPage calls imgDataUrl.startsWith() unconditionally, so passing null
throws and leaves the page CREATED BUT EMPTY -- which reads as success from
/api/status-page (200, correct title) while the group list is silently blank.
Pass "" instead. Commented at the call site.
Reported by draupnir after the Booth v0.2.0 consumer note, and it is the
higher-impact half of what it found: this file is autoloaded by every agent
family on this box through the shared FLEETTOOLS bootstrap pointer, so it is the
first thing a cold session reads about the Booth. Draupnir was a live specimen —
it read this page earlier in the same session to post a booth, before the
announcement landed, and only luck of scope kept it off the broken surfaces.
Stale and now corrected: `booth asks` presented as the listing verb (it is a
deprecated alias and emits JSON now, not the old table); `<stem>.ask.json` /
`<stem>.answer.json` presented as the storage (one `.marks.json` per booth
replaced them, and the answer sidecar 404s forever, so a remote session polling
it is polling nothing); the `#ask-<stem>` anchor convention.
Not stale, and left alone deliberately: the `data-booth-ask=` placeholder
conventions. The inline placement engine survives v0.2 and is removed in a later
unit, so those still work exactly as documented.
Added: `booth marks` and `booth marks-import`, the marks.json HTTP read path,
the partially-answered-counts-as-open change, and the 409-on-damaged-file
behaviour.
THE BRIDGE. `beszel-althing` hardcoded a "[Beszel] " subject prefix and a
Beszel hub footer from when Beszel was its only caller. Routing Uptime Kuma
through it unchanged would have delivered Kuma outages labelled [Beszel],
pointing the reader at the wrong dashboard -- an alert that lies about its own
source is worse than no alert.
Now a route registry: /beszel and /kuma, each with its own prefix, footer and
payload parser, because the tools do not agree on a shape (Beszel sends
{title, message}; Kuma sends {heartbeat, monitor, msg}). Generalising cost a
dict; a sibling service would have cost a second unit, a second port and a
second thing to notice had died.
Renamed beszel-althing -> althing-alert-bridge with it. A service named after
one consumer that carries two is the invisible coupling that sends a future
session looking in the wrong place.
⚠ /beszel IS FROZEN and this refactor proves it rather than claiming it. The
three original tests were kept BYTE-UNCHANGED -- including the one asserting
the exact postbox argv -- and deliver() still defaults to the Beszel route so
they exercise it. A new test asserts the Kuma footer never leaks into a Beszel
body or vice versa. Verified live after the rename: a real POST to /beszel
landed as "[Beszel] BRIDGE RENAME CHECK" with the correct hub footer, read back
from the thread rather than trusted from the receipt.
Payload shapes are parsed HERE, not via Kuma's custom-webhook-body feature,
because Kuma's notification config lives in its own database -- and that
database was destroyed and rebuilt from scratch hours ago. Anything living only
in a tool's DB is lost on the next rebuild; format knowledge belongs in git,
next to a test.
parse_kuma also handles the monitorless case. testNotification and cert-expiry
alerts carry no monitor and no heartbeat, and the first cut fabricated "unknown
monitor is ?" from them -- caught by sending a real one and reading the subject,
not by the suite. Fixed, pinned, and the earlier test asserting the bad
behaviour was corrected rather than worked around.
KUMA IS NOW WIRED. scripts/kuma gained notification support and the channel is
in monitors.yaml, seeded BEFORE the monitors and with applyExisting, so a
rebuild restores alerting and not just detection. Ground truth from the DB:
13 of 13 monitors carry the channel.
⚠ A THIRD instance of the same class of bug, worth naming: notifications() is
pushed as `notificationList` at LOGIN ONLY -- there is no event to ask with. The
first cut cleared the captured value before waiting, discarding the only copy it
would ever be sent, then blocked for the full timeout and reported an empty
list. That reads exactly like "no channels configured" and is a lie. Same family
as the getMonitorList ack-vs-push trap, different shape.
End-to-end, both shapes, read back from the inbox:
[Uptime Kuma] Homepage is DOWN + target + board link
[Uptime Kuma] althing (infra-ops) Testing (no fabricated subject)
[Beszel] BRIDGE RENAME CHECK + hub footer, unchanged
ALTHING CHAMBER RETIRED (operator). Three of its four containers had never
started -- created 2026-09-19, StartedAt epoch-zero, 0 restarts -- so :7881
refused, and nothing was watching it. Only its valkey was running, on the
project's own network with no external consumer. Stack, compose/build/conf dirs
and the local image removed; the Homepage card went with the label.
Homepage sat dead for three days in September while every monitoring tool
reported correctly. Beszel said its host was up -- it was. Uptime Kuma was not
watching it. The dashboard fell into the seam between two working instruments.
Measured before changing anything:
- Beszel: 18 hosts x {Status, CPU, Memory, Disk, Temperature}. Its alerts
table is (system, name, value, min) -- there is NO url column, so it is
structurally incapable of "this endpoint should return 200". Not a config
gap; the data model.
- Uptime Kuma: 6 rows, 2 of them folders. Four real monitors, all firewalls.
- So the two are NOT redundant. They are disjoint, and the service layer
between them was empty.
REBUILT FROM SCRATCH, operator-authorised ("uptime-kuma was never really
used... you can even dump the existing container and config"). Nothing was
migrated, which also skipped the one-way v1->v2 database migration.
- Pinned to 2.5.5. `:latest` is a documented trap now: upstream keeps it on
the 1.x line, so an August 2026 pull produced an image BUILT 2024-12-20
running 1.23.16. Verified by digest -- latest and 1 share one digest while
2/next carry 2.5.5. Pinned exactly, not floating on 2, for the same reason.
- Moved esh-docker-vm -> ana-docker. House placement rule puts cross-site
services beside the Beszel and Dozzle hubs, and esh-docker-vm has wedged
unkillably twice in four months. A monitor also cannot report the failure
of the host it runs on, so it should not share a failure domain with the
host layer.
- Normalised restart: always -> unless-stopped, which the 2026-08-18 README
flagged as worth doing on the next deliberate touch.
- UPTIME_KUMA_DB_TYPE=sqlite in the compose skips 2.x's interactive database
screen, so the stack comes up ready rather than parked on a form.
scripts/kuma is a first-party Socket.IO client, because both obvious paths are
wrong: there is no REST CRUD API in EITHER major version (server/routers/ holds
exactly two files, /metrics + badges + status pages), and the community wrapper
uptime-kuma-api is abandoned -- last release 2023-09-26, ceiling 1.23.1, no 2.x
support ever.
⚠ getMonitorList's callback returns only {ok:true}; the list arrives as a
SEPARATE pushed monitorList event. Reading the ack yields an empty board that
looks authoritative -- which duplicated all 13 rows on the first re-seed
before the bug was found. The client now waits for the push, and carries a
dedupe verb because of it.
13 monitors seeded from monitors.yaml, keyed on name so a re-run updates rather
than forking the board -- proven by re-running it (0 added, 13 updated), not
assumed. Every URL was probed before being written: all 200. A board that ships
red teaches everyone to ignore it.
Verified: 13 rows, no duplicates, all UP with "200 - OK" read from the database
WITH its WAL (a first read of kuma.db alone showed a stale 26 -- the copy
predated the deletes). Homepage renders exactly one Uptime Kuma card.
⚠ NOT YET WIRED: notification delivery. The board detects but tells nobody,
which is the same gap this work exists to close. The beszel-althing bridge
hardcodes a [Beszel] subject prefix and hub footer, so routing Kuma through it
unchanged would mislabel the alerts. Needs a decision before it is generalised.
The Booth is now one of the most-used fleet tools -- 17 agent handles post to
it daily -- and it is taking an information-architecture rework plus a
cross-agent SVOS design retrofit from design-dev. That work wants its own
ROADMAP, contracts and blast radius, not the fleet-infrastructure repo's.
All 29 commits moved with it via `git subtree split`; the history carries real
lessons (two shipped-dead controls, the verbatim-injection traps) that a
squashed import would have thrown away.
Live service repointed and verified: the user unit and the ~/.local/bin/booth
symlink now resolve into ~/development/booth, healthz answers, all 24 booths
intact. services/booth/ keeps a pointer README, same shape as the
chatterbox-fast and tts-stack extractions.
Archived 15 entries (Recent decisions 14, Tried and abandoned 1) oldest-first
to archival-memory.md; 5 held back on the open-deferred-work guard and 164 on
the 14-day guard, so the index stays over the soft cap at 477 lines. An
over-cap file that keeps live decisions beats a scannable one that lost a
belayed item.
Four new detail files cover the day: the ops log and its four self-inflicted
failure modes, the Booth's two dead controls and the four-iteration layout
probe, the Gitea org grant plus the dead claude-bot token that had been
misreporting permissions, and the disk triage that rescued a LoRA adapter from
a directory this box sweeps at three days.
lv-mccarthy's run outcome remains unverified after two days and is the first
line of the in-flight section and step 1 of the handoff.
brokkr-smithy-dev exercised the slicer on real geometry and found OrcaSlicer
writes result.json into the working directory on --info. I verified it here and
it is worse: --help does it too, which is as read-only as an invocation gets.
An empty directory gained a result.json from --help alone.
Encoded in the wrapper and the Dockerfile rather than left to be rediscovered,
and the wrapper is now committed beside the image that backs it instead of
living only in a home directory on one host.
⚠ The reason they found it and I did not is worth keeping in the header: I
verified --help and called the slicer done. Usage text proves the binary
starts, not that it ingests our geometry or that it behaves while doing so.
They ran both controls through to STL and got manifold=yes, 520 facets,
return_code 0 on each -- which is the verification I should have run before
reporting the provisioning complete.
Not tidiness — necessity, established by ldd rather than assumed. Every
OrcaSlicer release ships only an Ubuntu 24.04 AppImage, which needs GLIBC_2.38
and GLIBCXX_3.4.32. irv-ml1 is Debian 12 on glibc 2.36. That gap is not
installable without moving the host to Debian 13, which is not a thing to do to
a box running twelve GPU and audio services in order to slice a plate.
Reaching back to an Orca built for Ubuntu 22.04 would run, and would mean
pinning permanently to a stale build -- the exact trap brokkr-smithy-dev
rejected when they chose Orca over an old PrusaSlicer tag. The container keeps
the slicer current AND leaves the host alone, which is the same argument that
made FreeCAD an AppImage, taken one step further because the host could not
satisfy this one at all.
The AppImage is extracted at BUILD time; --appimage-extract-and-run re-extracts
to /tmp on every invocation, which is wasted seconds and wasted disk per slice.
~/bin/orca-slice wraps it so the dispatcher calls a binary and the artifact root
is mounted at the same path inside and out.
⚠ Recorded honestly: I installed libwebkit2gtk-4.1-0 and 8 dependencies on the
host chasing errors serially before enumerating with ldd, and only then found
the glibc wall behind them. Those nine packages are unnecessary. Left in place
rather than autoremoved on a box running production services; flagged for the
operator.
Operator-authorized. build123d 0.12.0 + OCP, numpy 2.4.6, trimesh 5.1.0 in a
3.11 venv, FreeCAD 1.0.0 headless as an AppImage, artifact root on smithy.
The acceptance test is the point and it PASSES: brokkr-smithy-dev shipped a
contrastive control pair whose every property is construction-known, so the
install is checked against arithmetic rather than against a render. Both parts
build, both bounding boxes are exactly 40x40x5, and both volumes match to float
tolerance. These scripts had never been executed by anyone -- build123d is
deliberately absent from the authoring box -- so this was their first run.
FreeCAD is an AppImage BY CHOICE: the distro package drags a GUI/Qt dependency
tree onto a host running twelve GPU and audio services, where an AppImage is
self-contained, pinned and removable with one rm.
Slicer DEFERRED rather than guessed. PrusaSlicer's latest release ships no
Linux AppImage at all, and a guessed release filename had already produced a
4 KB error page in this same session. It is the one item they said could lag.
Two things worth keeping in the header: irv-ml1's ssh config pins the gitea
host to gitea_brokkr_smithy with IdentitiesOnly, whose comment is
irv-ml1-r14-deploy and NOT the arbo key that sorts first in ~/.ssh/*.pub -- I
registered the wrong one first, and the failure names the right one. And
`ssh irv-ml1` is lkraven with no NOPASSWD sudo while `ssh infra-ops@irv-ml1`
has it, so only the artifact-root step needs the other identity.
The deploy key was registered with claude-bot's own token rather than the
operator's site-admin token -- the org grant from earlier today doing real work
on its first use.
Operator: "release button covers delete button". Measured before touching
anything: release 58x24 at (323,266), × 30x30 at (349,268) — 30x22 px of
overlap on a 30px button, and `elementFromPoint` at the ×'s centre returned the
release form. The × I added yesterday was 100% unclickable from the moment it
shipped.
Cause: both were `position:absolute` on the same corner, each with its own
guessed offset, and `release` is the later sibling so it won. Replaced with one
flex row positioned once — release left, × right at the card corner where the
ephemeral lane's × already lives, so muscle memory transfers and neither can
drift back on top of the other when a label changes width.
Verified by measurement, not inspection: overlap 0 px, and clicks at each
control's centre now land on that control. The ephemeral lane's × and ★ were
re-checked and are unaffected.
ADDS scripts/layout-probe.py, because markup inspection STRUCTURALLY cannot see
this and I have now shipped two dead controls in two days by reading templates
instead of rendering them. It asks a real browser what a click at each
control's centre would hit.
It took four iterations to become trustworthy and the failures are the point:
1. `top.contains(el)` counted an ANCESTOR overlay as a hit -- the exact case
it exists to catch. Version one reported OK for a real overlay.
2. elementFromPoint is viewport-relative, so everything below the fold read
as occluded and buried the real findings.
3. getBoundingClientRect() on a WRAPPED INLINE element is the union of its
line boxes, whose centre lands in the gutter between them -- three zip
links reported occluded by their own parent. Real geometry, wrong question.
Only the fourth version fires on a genuine overlay while staying silent on the
clean page. Both controls were run; a probe never seen to fail proves nothing.
173 tests pass.
Three operator reports, one of them a real defect I had claimed was working.
THE REVEAL BUTTON DID NOTHING, for a day. Its handler sat after the content
block's closing tag, and a child template's out-of-block content is silently
DISCARDED by Jinja. The button rendered. The handler never reached the browser.
Two commits and a README paragraph said click-to-reveal worked, and the suite
passed the entire time because nothing asserted against the SERVED page -- the
template really did contain the code.
Two guards, both confirmed to FAIL when the defect is reintroduced rather than
merely added and assumed protective:
* test_reveal_handler_actually_reaches_the_served_page greps the response
* test_no_orphaned_markup_after_the_content_block guards the structure
While moving it, caught a second instance of the same class: the explanatory
comment I wrote for the fix contained a literal Jinja endblock tag, which Jinja
would have parsed as a real tag and used to close the block early.
KEPT-LANE ×. Wiping a kept booth required release-then-find-it-in-the-other-
lane. That protected nothing and cost a hunt -- the board you just released is
loose in a feed that turns over, and you have to go find it to finish a job you
had already decided on. Protection now lives in the confirmation, which names
the booth and says KEPT, instead of in the number of lanes you must traverse.
Release stays as the reversible option.
IN-BOOTH KEEP. `☆ keep` / `★ kept — release` beside "Wipe now", so promoting
does not mean navigating back to the index. The booth page did not previously
know its own kept state; it does now. Both post a `next` field to stay put --
and `next` is a form field, so it is attacker-controlled: only same-site
absolute paths are honoured, with `//host`, schemes and backslashes refused,
tested.
173 tests pass.
The check collapsed two different findings into one verdict. On 2026-09-20 it
printed "RESULT: STALE" while reporting 37 FRESH layers and zero stale ones --
every backup body provably current, the three ❌ rows all yesterday's pre-fix
runs aging out of the 36h window. infra-hermes caught it in triage: a reader,
or a forwarder, could page someone over a state where nothing is stale.
STALE is a claim about backup AGE. A job that ran and errored is a different
claim with different urgency. They now have different words and different exit
codes:
0 all backups fresh
1 STALE -- a body past the threshold, or an endpoint down
3 ERRORED-JOBS -- every body fresh, a vzdump job errored recently
The alert wrapper mirrors the code and matches its own wording to the finding:
🟡 "Backup jobs errored — all bodies fresh" instead of 🔴 "Backup freshness
ALERT", and it now exits with the check's code rather than flattening
everything to 1, so `systemctl status` distinguishes the states too.
This is the same defect class the rest of this script was built to fix, one
level up: not an instrument that fails to look, but one that looks correctly
and then reports the wrong word for what it saw. An alarm that cries outage
over a healthy fleet earns being ignored exactly as fast as one that stays
silent over a broken one.
Verified all three states by forcing each: BACKUP_JOB_WINDOW_HOURS=1 -> exit 0,
default -> exit 3, BACKUP_MAX_AGE_HOURS=1 -> exit 1.
The operator asked "no UI option to blur/unblur?" and was right twice over.
MISSING ENTIRELY ON TWO OF THREE BRANCHES. booth.html renders docs, media and
everything-else through separate <figure> blocks. The toggle went into the
media branch only, so inline docs -- the branch that puts readable text straight
on the page, the one that needs blur most -- had no control at all, and `other`
files only got a caption row if they happened to carry a caption.
This is the SECOND time this feature shipped having patched some branches and
not others; the blurred class itself had the same gap one commit ago. So the
toggle is now a single Jinja macro called from all three sites, which makes
"patched two of three" impossible rather than merely unlikely, and
test_every_item_kind_gets_exactly_one_blur_toggle counts toggles against figures
across mixed kinds so a fourth branch cannot quietly skip it.
INVISIBLE WHERE IT DID RENDER. v1 was a bare `◌` at 0.78rem in --muted with no
border, no label and no hover affordance. It now reads `◌ blur` / `◉ blurred`
with a border, matching the other per-item controls. A control nobody can find
is a control that is not there.
Docs get it in the doc bar beside ⤢ ⬇ ✕, with stopPropagation so submitting it
does not collapse the <details> it lives inside.
Verified live on all three kinds: 3 figures, 3 toggles, and the POST round trip
blurs and un-blurs. 167 tests pass.
Two operator requests.
KEEP, BOTH DIRECTIONS. The kept lane could already release a booth back to
ephemeral, but an ephemeral booth could only be promoted from a shell -- so the
round trip was closed only if you had ssh. The /keep route and the `booth keep`
verb both already existed; only the button was missing. Adds ★ to the ephemeral
card, mirroring × on the other shoulder.
BLUR. Per-item cosmetic censoring: `booth blur <name> <file>...`, a ◌/◉ toggle
in each caption row, and 👁 click-to-reveal. State is `.blurred` in the booth
dir, one booth-relative path per line -- the same filesystem-is-the-state idiom
as .pins and .forever. An empty set deletes the marker rather than leaving a
zero-byte file, so `ls -a` tells the truth.
⚠ BLUR IS NOT ACCESS CONTROL, and the code, the docs and a test all say so on
purpose. A blurred item is still served at its own URL, still in the zip, still
on disk. The Booth has no auth by design. test_blur_is_cosmetic_the_file_is_
still_served asserts the 200 deliberately: if someone later "hardens" this into
a 403 that test fails, and it should, because half-implemented access control is
more dangerous than none.
Reveal is per-viewer and never persisted; a reload re-hides. With JS off an item
stays blurred, which is the safe direction to fail in.
Two things the first pass got wrong, both caught by checking rather than
assuming:
* The cover thumb. index.html has IDENTICAL markup in the kept and ephemeral
lanes, so a single-occurrence replace patched only the kept one and the
ephemeral front page happily displayed the thing someone had hidden. The
test that caught it was itself wrong first -- it matched the bare string
"blurred-thumb", which is in base.html's stylesheet on every page and so
passed in both states. It now asserts the attribute.
* Inline docs render through their own <figure> branch and were left
unblurred -- the branch that puts readable text straight on the page, so it
needed blur more than images do. The suite passed; a live curl caught it.
165 tests pass (154 pre-existing, unchanged).
Operator confirmed 2026-09-19 that fv-ml1 and the R420 running OPNsense are the
only loads on a dedicated 20 A circuit.
The governing number is 1920 W, not 2400: a GPU inference host running for hours
is a continuous load, so NEC's 80% rule applies. Worst case lands at ~1625 W
with the current caps -- about 85% of budget.
Measured via the BMC rather than assumed: 390 W instantaneous, 461 W max over a
2423 s sample, with GPUs at idle, giving a ~313 W non-GPU baseline.
Compare the GPU caps against the 300 W stock TGP, NOT the 325 W firmware
ceiling. The operator corrected this: 275 W across four cards saves 100 W, not
the 200 W you get by measuring against a number nobody would ever run at. Stock
300 W would put the circuit near 90%, which is not illegal but leaves nothing
for a heavier R420, PSU efficiency, or a warm day. Keep the caps.
The coupling matters more than the trip. OPNsense IS the Fountain Valley edge
and shares the breaker with the thing most likely to trip it, so an overload
takes the router with it and removes the remote path needed to diagnose or
power-cycle anything. fv-ml1's four PSUs do not help -- PSU redundancy protects
against a PSU dying, not against the circuit going away.
Three things are explicitly NOT measured and the file says so: fv-ml1 under real
4-GPU load, whether the BMC reports AC input or DC output, and the R420's actual
draw. Treat 1625 W as a floor.
Also corrects the hardware section, which claimed 2x GPUs. nvidia-smi reports
four.
Four attribution failures shipped on the day it was built, and every one of
them RECORDED SOMETHING -- just not something findable or attributable. The
individual fixes are in the commit log; the PATTERN was not written down
anywhere, so a future session would meet each one as an isolated bug rather
than as the fifth instance of a known shape.
infra-hermes asked for this after the fourth one: 'worth an audit line item so
the pattern is visible, not just the fixes.' He was right.
The operative warning is at the bottom: absence of an entry is not evidence of
absence of the event until you have checked this tool could have recorded it.
elway passes its `host` argument straight through, and that argument is an ssh
target. Five records of a real jobs.cfg change on esh-pve were written under
host `infra-ops@esh-pve`.
The consequence was not cosmetic. infra-hermes triaged the ESH backup job
errors, queried `--host esh-pve`, got nothing back, and correctly reported the
05:29 exclusion of VM 102 as an unattributed change. The record had existed the
whole time, five lines of it, under a name nobody would think to ask for. A log
you cannot query under the obvious name is not a log.
`normalize_host` strips any `user@` prefix on write AND on query, so records
written before this fix are findable too, and `audit` -- which matches records
by host name -- stops missing them as well.
Verified in both directions: a record written with `infra-ops@esh-pve` and one
written with `esh-pve` now both return for `--host esh-pve`, and the five
historical elway entries surface under that query.
The commit hook was APPENDED to .git/hooks/post-commit so as not to disturb
graphify's block -- and that made attribution a subordinate clause of
graphify's control flow. graphify owns EIGHT `exit 0` paths (rebase / merge /
cherry-pick in progress, GRAPHIFY_SKIP_HOOK, no changed files,
graphify-out-only, no python found), and every one of them returns before
reaching an appended line.
infra-hermes reported commits going unlogged and proposed a lock race: the
ops-log fcntl path held by graphify's detached rebuild long enough for a
best-effort `|| true` invocation to drop. Plausible, and wrong. The cause is
ordering and it is deterministic. eaaacc1 touched only
graphify-out/GRAPH_REPORT.md and hit the graphify-out-only exit; an empty probe
commit hit the no-changed-files exit. Neither could ever have been recorded.
Two data points that look flaky are worth reading as a control-flow question
before a concurrency one.
The block now goes immediately after the shebang. graphify's hook is preserved
byte-for-byte below it, and core.hooksPath stays unused because it would
disable graphify outright.
Verified in both states with real commits, then reset out of history: a
graphify-out-only commit -- the exact case that was silently dropped -- now
records, and a code commit still records AND still triggers graphify's rebuild.
The fallback recorded `lkraven@nh3-dev` when ALTHING_HANDLE was unset, which
reads like an answer while being the absence of one. It now records
`unattributed(lkraven@nh3-dev)` -- handles never contain @ or parentheses, so
the fallback cannot be mistaken for an identity.
Found by the commit hook's first independent test, which was not one I ran:
infra-hermes committed 0fe4da6 and the hook caught it unprompted -- but logged
him as lkraven@nh3-dev, not infra-hermes. His seat exports ALTHING_HANDLE from
althing-infra-hermes-seat-run.sh, while neither hermes-gateway.service nor his
pump unit carries it, so anything he does outside that one script logs with no
handle.
So the hook is real but partially blind: it distinguishes not-infra-ops from
infra-ops, which is enough to have told me e43e262 was not mine, and not
enough to name who made it. The env-var gap is his to close. Making the blind
spot announce itself in the record is mine -- an instrument that cannot answer
should say so rather than return something answer-shaped.
Both harnesses executed top-to-bottom on import, so anything collecting
them (pytest, a glob import) ran live-store side effects. main() guards
plus finally-block cleanup of the _t_* cron output dirs the fabricated
jobs leave behind.
Two agents share ONE checkout of this repo on nh3-dev, and every commit here
is attributed to Vuong Hoang by convention -- so a commit's author line says
nothing about which agent made it. The ops log closed that gap for HOST
changes; it did not cover commits to the shared tree.
Found the hard way today: e43e262 appeared interleaved between two of this
session's commits, in this session's own reflog, and was unattributable from
git, from the ops log AND from the althing bus. It was sitting in the push set
at the time, and forseti had explicitly asked that unrelated management-repo
commits not be pushed -- so the one thing needed to honour that request was
the one thing nothing recorded.
The hook APPENDS to .git/hooks/post-commit rather than replacing it, because
graphify already owns that file and core.hooksPath would disable it.
Best-effort by construction: a failure here must never fail a commit.
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