memory: svos Heimdall key minted — worldtree-personal, ledger key verified still live
user_id=svos, key_id=eab3cdbe, wt_live_ format, on worldtree-personal (10.250.50.152:8081). Deployment established by locating the ledger key there rather than assumed: created 2026-07-13, last used today, matching ledger-dev's account exactly. Value vaulted at nh3-dev/development/svos/worldtree-api-key and verified against the mint response before the scratch copy was removed. Delivered by vault path rather than over althing — ledger-dev runs on the same box under the same uid, so the bus never carried the credential. The ledger key was read back from /admin/keys AFTER the mint and is untouched, which is what keeps their deletion ordering possible. Plan tier left unset deliberately and disclosed: the API offers no way to read a user's current tier, so matching it would have been a guess. Also records the operator ruling that worldtree-dev owns code only and no ops, which supersedes the global CLAUDE.md routing of Heimdall auth to worldtree-dev.
This commit is contained in:
+20
-3
@@ -181,9 +181,26 @@ below is a live commitment or a known-open risk._
|
||||
b48a11c), so the redirect is no longer load-bearing for any known consumer. Handle `ledger-dev` → `svos-dev` is an
|
||||
operator action at the post office.
|
||||
|
||||
- **OPEN, with ledger-dev: mint a `svos` Heimdall user + API key.** Never actually
|
||||
asked of me until 2026-09-05 (it sat in their runbook as "awaiting infra-ops"
|
||||
while addressed to worldtree-dev, who hold no key material). Constraints: string
|
||||
- **DONE 2026-09-05 — `svos` Heimdall user + API key minted** on operator
|
||||
authorization. `user_id=svos`, `key_id=eab3cdbe`, suffix `d5ec48c2`, `wt_live_`
|
||||
format, on **worldtree-personal (10.250.50.152:8081)** — established by finding
|
||||
the `ledger` key there (created 2026-07-13, last used 2026-09-05T13:34, exactly
|
||||
as ledger-dev described). Value vaulted at
|
||||
`nh3-dev/development/svos/worldtree-api-key` (sha 23c10c9c7219, verified on
|
||||
read-back) and delivered by vault path, NOT over althing — ledger-dev runs on
|
||||
nh3-dev under the same uid, so the bus never carried the secret. The `ledger`
|
||||
key was read back after the mint and is untouched and live (`disabled=False`).
|
||||
⚠ **Plan tier left UNSET, deliberately**: `POST /admin/keys` takes an optional
|
||||
tier (user|free|pro|admin|readonly-admin) and there is **no way to read a user's
|
||||
current tier back** — no GET, `/admin/usage` returns an empty users list, and
|
||||
`/admin/events` is a live SSE stream, not an audit log. Guessing would have
|
||||
handed over a key that quietly differs; `POST /admin/users/svos/tier` fixes it in
|
||||
one call if their cutover hits a limit. **OPERATOR RULING 2026-09-05: worldtree-dev
|
||||
owns code only, no ops — key material is infra-ops's.** Supersedes the global
|
||||
CLAUDE.md line routing "Heimdall scopes (Worldtree auth) → worldtree-dev".
|
||||
|
||||
- **Original constraints on that mint** (recorded because the deletion ordering is
|
||||
a permanent trap, not a one-time step): string
|
||||
`svos` verbatim (WT tier 3 admits only `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{2,63}$`, INV-181-15);
|
||||
**keep the existing `ledger` key LIVE**, do not revoke. Ordering is load-bearing —
|
||||
`DELETE /agents/{agent_id}` refuses any caller that is not the row's owner, so
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user