memory: triton backend is a HARD NO on the Ampere comfy box (fp8e4nv), deferred to Ada
Recorded under Tried-and-abandoned: --enable-triton-backend on irv-ml1's A6000 crashes every render (triton's fp8 dequant needs fp8e4nv/e4m3, which sm_86 lacks; the global --fp8_e4m3fn-text-enc dequant dies at CLIPTextEncode, taking fp8 and int8 alike). Reverted cleanly; cu130 rebuild won't fix a hardware format limit; revisit at the Ada refresh. Also captures the compose-env-needs-recreate-not-restart mechanics lesson.
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@@ -225,6 +225,8 @@ _167 older entries archived to archival-memory.md._
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## Tried and abandoned
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- `[2026-08-03]` **ComfyUI `--enable-triton-backend` on the irv-ml1 A6000 crashes EVERY render — Ampere has no hardware e4m3.** adhoc-agent's operator-approved probe: comfy_kitchen's triton backend has a FUSED int8 matmul that would beat the eager backend's ~1.9x-slower unfused int8 path (21.3s vs 11.2s fp8 on the Moody Krea2 int8 checkpoints). Flipped it (added to `COMFY_CMDLINE_EXTRA`, recreated) → `triton.compiler.errors.CompilationError: ValueError("type fp8e4nv not supported in this architecture. supported: fp8e4b15, fp8e5")` in `comfy_kitchen/backends/triton/quantization.py:145 dequantize_per_tensor_fp8`, failing at **node 5 CLIPTextEncode**. Triton's fp8 dequant kernel targets `fp8e4nv` (Hopper/Ada e4m3); **sm_86 Ampere (A6000) lacks hardware e4m3** → the JIT compile dies. With triton on it grabs the **global** `--fp8_e4m3fn-text-enc` dequant, so every render (fp8 AND int8) dies upstream at the text-encode step — the int8 UNet path never ran, so the convrot-coverage caveat wasn't even the limiter. Reverted cleanly (~15s to healthy, image unchanged `sha256:94afb8ca`, sage intact, prod restored). **The parked cu130 rebuild won't fix it** (e4m3 = hardware format, not CUDA version). **DEFERRED to the Ada refresh** (operator: "ada is coming, we'll optimize then" — Ada sm_89 has native e4m3, so triton's fp8 path should compile there). **Mechanics:** `--enable-triton-backend` is a compose `environment:` var, so toggling it needs `docker compose up -d` (**recreate**), NOT `docker restart` (reuses the baked env, no-ops silently). Full: auto-memory `parked_triton_backend_ampere_fp8`.
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- `[2026-08-03]` **corviduo-dev shared containerd: a concurrent-pull race fails ONE instance's deploy; DON'T "prune to fix" — the image is in-use by the instance that won the race.** b169 personal deploy failed at `docker compose pull` (`Lchown … no such file or directory` on the big torch layer → looked like disk pressure / corrupt snapshot). ACTUAL: NOT disk (56G free, inodes 7%). demo + personal + pinned share ONE `/var/lib/containerd` on corviduo-dev; demo (from main) and personal (from staging tag) extracted b169's shared torch layer simultaneously → personal's hit a partial snapshot mid-race and aborted while demo's completed. The image `6e34a87` was FULLY VALID — demo was RUNNING it healthy. Fix = just re-run the failed deploy (image already materialized; compose pull finds it present). **NEAR-MISS:** worldtree-dev's suggested "prune unused images/snapshots" would have rmi'd `6e34a87` = the image the running demo depends on → demo outage. **Lesson: before any prune/rmi "cleanup," `docker ps` the running images — an "unused" image may be a co-tenant's live one; and verify the failure's REAL cause (disk? inode? in-use? race?) before applying the suggested remedy.** (Pipeline fix, deferred: serialize demo-from-main + personal-from-staging, or a per-image pull lock, to avoid the shared-layer extraction race.)
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- `[2026-08-02]` **`docker exec` into worldtree containers defaults to ROOT — root writes contaminate the uid-1000 (vh) KB tree.** My `sudo docker exec … --reindex` on personal ran as ROOT (muninn app = uid 1000); its wing git-commit + atomic note-swap left root-owned files in the `worldtree-personal_worldtree-kb` volume: a root-owned `.old-<job>` backup dir (blocked the uid-1000 retry's `rmtree` → Errno 13, because unlink needs write on the DIR and it was root:root 755) AND **60 root-owned loose git objects** in `.git/objects/`. Fix (host-side, corviduo-dev): `sudo rm -rf` the superseded `.old-` dir (tar'd aside to /tmp first) + `sudo find … -user 0 -exec chown 1000:1000` the objects (ownership-only, git-content-safe; the `.git/objects/XX/` dirs were vh-owned so these weren't a hard blocker, but violated "clean tree"). **RUNBOOK RULE (worldtree-dev, ADOPTED):** any `docker exec` into worldtree containers that WRITES pipeline state runs **`-u 1000`**, never default-root — same genus as the mv footgun (acting without matching the target's constraints; 3rd such slip in one session). **GOTCHA that hid the scope:** `find … -user 0 | head -20` TRUNCATED (the `.old-` dir alone had 153 files, so the first page was all `.old-`) → I "verified clean" off a partial list. Never `head` a scope-defining find; count first (`| wc -l`). **Related blind-spot (muninn-dev):** a root-owned job SUBDIR passes every requeue guard (job_row/dispatch/list_jobs render fine) AND `/health` (contract's `os.access(ingestion_root, W_OK)` tests only the ROOT dir, so a foreign-owned subdir under `pending/` still reports `ingestion_root_writable: true`) — then the uid-1000 gate can't write into it. "Clean board + green /health + failure at next mutation." muninn-dev added an OWNERSHIP column to the standing post-move check to catch it; two green signals both miss a foreign-owned subdir otherwise.
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