feat(fv): mesh dead-man's switch on fv-ml1; partial progress on FV cross-site routing

WATCHDOG (done, proven). fv-mesh-watchdog probes two independent anchors every
minute and, after 5 consecutive failures, puts Tailscale back to known-good:
accept-routes off, re-up against headscale with a stored key. It touches
nothing else — a watchdog with a wide remit is a second way to lose the box.

Two anchors that cannot share a failure mode: a plain-internet one and a
mesh-only one. If BOTH fail the site uplink is down, Tailscale cannot fix that,
and it deliberately does nothing — thrashing tailscaled during an ISP outage
turns a wait into an incident. Disable file at /etc/fv-watchdog.disable for
planned work.

Proven by positive control, not assumed: counter incremented 1..4 without
acting, fired the restore at 5 (tailscale up ran, tailscaled restarted), and
reset to 0 once the real anchor returned. fv-ml1 stayed reachable throughout.

This exists because a  on fv-ml1 black-holed it
from its own LAN earlier the same day: it accepted 10.251.0.0/16 from the
gateway — its OWN subnet — and routed the local network through the tunnel.

FV CROSS-SITE ROUTING (partial). Two changes landed, the path is still broken:

  1. acceptSubnetRoutes 0 -> 1 on the FV gateway's tailscale plugin, via
     settings/set + service/reconfigure (the documented apply, not a reboot).
     The GATEWAY now has 10.0/16, 10.100/16 and 10.250/16 in its routing table
     and reaches NH3 and ESH itself. It could not before.

  2. Remote-site MASQUERADE rules on nh3-scale. The existing jump matched only
     -s 100.64.0.0/10, so traffic from another site's LAN never entered
     MESH-EXIT and kept its original source; an NH3 host then replied via its
     own LAN router instead of back through nh3-scale, making the path
     asymmetric. The rule is confirmed firing (counter increments on FV
     traffic) but does not complete the path.

Still failing: fv-ml1 -> NH3/ESH LAN addresses. Mesh addresses work perfectly
from fv-ml1 (100.64.0.1, 100.64.0.4), Anaheim works over the metro link, and
the FV firewall log shows the outbound passing on tailscale0 with
src=10.251.50.54 and no reply ever returning. The remaining gap is forwarded
FV-LAN traffic specifically, not the gateway's own.

Full regression sweep clean: nh3-dev, ana-docker and esh-docker-vm all reach
all four sites plus the internet.
This commit is contained in:
vh
2026-09-15 00:25:55 -07:00
parent 80d982d1d8
commit 8c8559b8ec
4 changed files with 109 additions and 0 deletions
+6
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
[Unit]
Description=Restore fv-ml1 mesh connectivity if a change strands it
After=tailscaled.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/fv-mesh-watchdog.sh
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
#!/bin/sh
# fv-mesh-watchdog — restore fv-ml1's mesh connectivity if a change strands it.
#
# WHY: every path into the Fountain Valley site runs through equipment at FV.
# When fv-ml1 loses its way back to the fleet there is no console, no local
# hands, and the BMC sits behind the same gateway. On 2026-09-14 a
# `tailscale up --accept-routes` black-holed this box from its own LAN: it
# accepted 10.251.0.0/16 from the gateway — its OWN subnet — and started routing
# the local network through the tunnel. Recovery needed its mesh address, which
# only happened to still work.
#
# WHAT IT DOES: probes two INDEPENDENT anchors once a minute. After
# FAIL_THRESHOLD consecutive failures it puts Tailscale back to known-good:
# accept-routes off, re-up against headscale. It touches nothing else — not
# routes, not firewall, not services — because a watchdog with a wide remit is
# a second way to lose the box.
#
# ⚠ Two anchors on purpose, and they must not share a failure mode:
# WAN_ANCHOR plain internet, no mesh involved
# MESH_ANCHOR a fleet address only reachable if the mesh works
# If only the mesh anchor fails, the mesh is the problem and we act. If BOTH
# fail the site's uplink is down and Tailscale cannot fix that, so we do NOT
# act — thrashing tailscaled during an ISP outage turns a wait into an incident.
#
# Disable for planned work: touch /etc/fv-watchdog.disable
set -u
STATE=/var/lib/fv-mesh-watchdog
CONF=/etc/fv-mesh-watchdog.conf
DISABLE=/etc/fv-watchdog.disable
FAIL_THRESHOLD=5
WAN_ANCHOR=1.1.1.1
MESH_ANCHOR=100.64.0.1
LOGIN_SERVER=https://headscale.phasefinal.com
[ -r "$CONF" ] && . "$CONF"
log() { logger -t fv-mesh-watchdog "$*"; printf '%s fv-mesh-watchdog: %s\n' "$(date -Is)" "$*"; }
if [ -e "$DISABLE" ]; then log "disabled by $DISABLE — no action"; exit 0; fi
mkdir -p "$STATE"; COUNT_FILE="$STATE/consecutive_failures"
[ -f "$COUNT_FILE" ] || echo 0 > "$COUNT_FILE"
count=$(cat "$COUNT_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
ping -c 2 -W 3 "$WAN_ANCHOR" >/dev/null 2>&1 && wan=up || wan=down
ping -c 2 -W 3 "$MESH_ANCHOR" >/dev/null 2>&1 && mesh=up || mesh=down
if [ "$wan" = down ]; then
# Uplink is down. Tailscale cannot fix that and restarting it during an ISP
# outage only adds churn. Reset the counter so the mesh timer starts clean
# once the site is back.
[ "$count" -ne 0 ] && log "uplink down (wan=$wan mesh=$mesh) — not a mesh fault, counter reset"
echo 0 > "$COUNT_FILE"; exit 0
fi
if [ "$mesh" = up ]; then
[ "$count" -ne 0 ] && log "mesh recovered after $count failure(s)"
echo 0 > "$COUNT_FILE"; exit 0
fi
count=$((count + 1)); echo "$count" > "$COUNT_FILE"
log "mesh anchor $MESH_ANCHOR unreachable while WAN is up ($count/$FAIL_THRESHOLD)"
[ "$count" -lt "$FAIL_THRESHOLD" ] && exit 0
log "THRESHOLD REACHED — restoring known-good Tailscale state"
echo 0 > "$COUNT_FILE"
tailscale set --accept-routes=false 2>&1 | while read -r l; do log " set: $l"; done
if [ -r "$STATE/authkey" ]; then
tailscale up --login-server "$LOGIN_SERVER" --authkey "$(cat "$STATE/authkey")" \
--accept-routes=false --hostname "$(hostname -s)" 2>&1 | while read -r l; do log " up: $l"; done
else
log " no $STATE/authkey — cannot re-register; tried accept-routes=false only"
fi
systemctl restart tailscaled 2>&1 | while read -r l; do log " restart: $l"; done
log "restore attempt complete"
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[Unit]
Description=Run the fv-ml1 mesh watchdog every minute
[Timer]
OnBootSec=3min
OnUnitActiveSec=1min
AccuracySec=10s
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
+21
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@@ -30,3 +30,24 @@ iptables -t nat -A MESH-EXIT -d 100.64.0.0/10 -j RETURN
iptables -t nat -A MESH-EXIT -j MASQUERADE
iptables -t nat -C POSTROUTING -s 100.64.0.0/10 -o eth0 -j MESH-EXIT 2>/dev/null \
|| iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 100.64.0.0/10 -o eth0 -j MESH-EXIT
# ── Remote-SITE sources, not just mesh clients ────────────────────────────────
# The jump above matches only 100.64.0.0/10, so traffic from another site's LAN
# arriving over the mesh never enters MESH-EXIT and keeps its original source.
# An NH3 host then replies via its own LAN router instead of back through this
# node, the path is asymmetric, and the reply is lost. Measured 2026-09-15:
# fv-ml1 reached 100.64.0.1 and 100.64.0.4 fine while 10.100.50.40 failed
# outright, and the FV firewall log showed the outbound passing with
# src=10.251.50.54 and nothing ever coming back.
#
# Masquerading remote-site sources onto this node's LAN address makes the reply
# return here, where the conntrack state lives. It costs source visibility for
# cross-site traffic on the NH3 LAN — the same trade as the nh3-dev rule above,
# and the alternative is no connectivity at all.
#
# ⚠ Sites are listed explicitly rather than using 10.0.0.0/8: a blanket rule
# would also masquerade NH3-local traffic that has no business being rewritten.
for site_net in 10.251.0.0/16 10.0.0.0/16 10.250.0.0/16 10.6.110.0/24; do
iptables -t nat -C POSTROUTING -s "$site_net" -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 2>/dev/null \
|| iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s "$site_net" -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
done