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ops(ana-gw): restore WAN admin access ahead of the FortiGate cutover

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Re-open the ana-gw admin GUI on wan1 so the Anaheim edge can be
managed remotely if the cutover goes wrong, reversing part of the
2026-08-12 lockdown. Two config changes, nothing else (verified by
diffing pre/post `show full-configuration`):

- wan1 `allowaccess ping https` — https only; http, ssh, and fgfm
  stay off, and wan2 is untouched.
- `infra-ops` trusthost widened to all routable IPv4; the `admin`
  account stays locked to 10.0.0.0/8 so the guessable username
  remains unreachable from the internet.

Verified end-to-end from two sites: a real `/logincheck` POST returns
AUTH OK over the public path, on a browser-trusted Let's Encrypt cert
for ana-fw.phasefinal.com valid through 2026-10-27.

Two FortiOS behaviours worth recording, both of which cost time here:
a trusthost whose base address is 0.0.0.0 is silently treated as
unset (so there is no writable "any" — only decomposed ranges), and
trusthost is enforced before the TCP handshake, so a blocked source
sees a filtered port rather than a refused login.

Follow-ons captured in memory, not actioned: ACME renewal for the
admin cert needs port 80 on wan1 (next attempt ~2026-09-27), and a
~5 SYN/s source in 179.51.184.0/21 now draws SYN-ACKs at no
measurable CPU cost.
This commit is contained in:
Vuong Hoang
2026-08-23 14:03:40 -07:00
parent b6340519bc
commit 5af362e9d0
1 changed files with 3 additions and 1 deletions
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persistent-memory.md
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@@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ no longer deployed sidecars here. See Recent decisions.)
(no NOPASSWD)** — stage model pulls to `/home`, not root-owned `/worktank`.
## Current state / in-flight
_As of 2026-08-23 — a long multi-party ops session; the one thing waiting on the operator is the Anaheim tunnel cipher._
_As of 2026-08-23 — a long multi-party ops session; open with the operator are the Anaheim tunnel cipher and how long WAN admin on ana-gw stays open._
- **🔓 ana-gw WAN admin is OPEN again as of 2026-08-23 — deliberately, and it should be re-closed after the FortiGate cutover.** Operator asked for it as the cutover contingency ("so I don't have to drive down there"). `https://ana-fw.phasefinal.com/` (wan1's own IP 38.120.12.42) serves the admin GUI on a browser-trusted LE cert; **https only**, and only the `infra-ops` account is WAN-reachable (`admin` remains 10.0.0.0/8-locked). Verified end-to-end with a real login from two sites. This partially reverses the 2026-08-12 hardening on a box still running the **EOL, actively-exploited FortiOS 7.2 branch** — so the exposure is CVE-shaped, and time-boxing it is the mitigation. Re-close = `config system interface / edit wan1 / set allowaccess ping / next / end`. Config backups pre+post at `/var/tmp/ana-gw-config-20260823T20*.conf` on nh3-dev. **Two follow-ons:** (a) ACME renewal for that cert needs **port 80** on wan1 — currently absent, next attempt ≈2026-09-27, expiry 2026-10-27; (b) ~5 SYN/s from `179.51.184.0/21` now draws SYN-ACKs, CPU impact nil, unmitigated by choice. Detail + the FortiOS trusthost gotchas: auto-memory `reference_fortigate_ana_gw_access`.
- **⏳ THE OPEN ITEM: Anaheim's IPsec tunnel delivers ~25% of a verified 2 Gbps circuit.** Circuit measured at **2,153 Mbit/s**; the tunnel ceilings ~550 Mbit/s aggregate, ~230 single-stream. FortiGate CPU **idle**, IPsec **NPU-offloaded**, interface error-free — so it is not crypto exhaustion. Both tunnels negotiate **`aes256-sha1`**; **AES-GCM is the proposed change** and the operator has signalled he will authorize it. Not executed: production edge, needs a matching change at NH3 + ESH, each tunnel drops during renegotiation. → `persistent-memory.d/2026-08-23-anaheim-ipsec-tunnel-ceiling.md`