_tts_endpoint now guards its JSON body (bad JSON / non-str → deterministic 400; untrusted
fields degrade, never 500). Its sibling POST handlers do NOT: _create_session_endpoint
(server.py:188) and _submit_turn_endpoint (server.py:~294) call await request.json()
with no guard, so a malformed JSON body raises json.JSONDecodeError → an uncaught 500.
Surfaced by the heid code-review + bug-hunt panels on the TTS chunking work (2026-08-02;
Regin F4 / Kimi F5): the validation asymmetry is now that every POST handler EXCEPT _tts_endpoint 500s on malformed JSON. Pre-existing (unchanged code), so deliberately out
of scope for the TTS commit (d59f907) — filing as the follow-up.
Repro:
POST /api/sessions with body not json{ → 500 (want 400)
POST /api/turns/{sid} with body not json{ → 500 (want 400)
POST /api/tts with body not json{ → 400 (the correct shape)
Fix: hoist a shared "parse JSON body or 400" helper and route all POST handlers through it
(mirrors _tts_endpoint's try: await request.json() except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError): → 400).
Low-risk, additive; each handler keeps its own field validation.
`_tts_endpoint` now guards its JSON body (bad JSON / non-str → deterministic 400; untrusted
fields degrade, never 500). Its sibling POST handlers do NOT: `_create_session_endpoint`
(`server.py:188`) and `_submit_turn_endpoint` (`server.py:~294`) call `await request.json()`
with no guard, so a malformed JSON body raises `json.JSONDecodeError` → an uncaught 500.
Surfaced by the heid code-review + bug-hunt panels on the TTS chunking work (2026-08-02;
Regin F4 / Kimi F5): the validation asymmetry is now that every POST handler EXCEPT
`_tts_endpoint` 500s on malformed JSON. Pre-existing (unchanged code), so deliberately out
of scope for the TTS commit (d59f907) — filing as the follow-up.
Repro:
- `POST /api/sessions` with body `not json{` → 500 (want 400)
- `POST /api/turns/{sid}` with body `not json{` → 500 (want 400)
- `POST /api/tts` with body `not json{` → 400 (the correct shape)
Fix: hoist a shared "parse JSON body or 400" helper and route all POST handlers through it
(mirrors `_tts_endpoint`'s `try: await request.json() except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError): → 400`).
Low-risk, additive; each handler keeps its own field validation.
Provenance: heid panels — code-review thread `01KZ21MCC0FKQP59NFZPXCK17B`, bug-hunt thread
`01KZ21RNYH1DPSCPKWVXB9YTVQ`.
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_tts_endpointnow guards its JSON body (bad JSON / non-str → deterministic 400; untrustedfields degrade, never 500). Its sibling POST handlers do NOT:
_create_session_endpoint(
server.py:188) and_submit_turn_endpoint(server.py:~294) callawait request.json()with no guard, so a malformed JSON body raises
json.JSONDecodeError→ an uncaught 500.Surfaced by the heid code-review + bug-hunt panels on the TTS chunking work (2026-08-02;
Regin F4 / Kimi F5): the validation asymmetry is now that every POST handler EXCEPT
_tts_endpoint500s on malformed JSON. Pre-existing (unchanged code), so deliberately outof scope for the TTS commit (
d59f907) — filing as the follow-up.Repro:
POST /api/sessionswith bodynot json{→ 500 (want 400)POST /api/turns/{sid}with bodynot json{→ 500 (want 400)POST /api/ttswith bodynot json{→ 400 (the correct shape)Fix: hoist a shared "parse JSON body or 400" helper and route all POST handlers through it
(mirrors
_tts_endpoint'stry: await request.json() except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError): → 400).Low-risk, additive; each handler keeps its own field validation.
Provenance: heid panels — code-review thread
01KZ21MCC0FKQP59NFZPXCK17B, bug-hunt thread01KZ21RNYH1DPSCPKWVXB9YTVQ.