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docs(#17): self-drive+observe contract, bifrost self-test runbook + snapshot

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- docs/contracts/issues/17.contract.md — issue-scoped v2.1 contract for #17
  (Bifrost-binding the chat client). v1 scope = single-plane bind +
  dispatch-layer op-feed (composite endpoint + turn-pane UI parked). Design
  consulted via /heid, paraphrase-gated via /heid-contract-review panel; two
  internal inconsistencies fixed (OpEvent turn_id reservation made literal;
  session_id-for-all-verbs correction). Validates OK, prd drift-clean.
- docs/bifrost-self-test.md — reusable runbook for driving + observing the
  full Bifrost round-trip against our own provider (the manual form of #17;
  pins the consumer-key-as-bearer tripwire).
- persistent-memory.md — snapshot: observe brick shipped, self-drive proven,
  #295 root-caused (upstream, scope-axis asymmetry) -> #296/#297, agent_self
  -> canonical decided.
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docs/bifrost-self-test.md
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# Bifrost round-trip self-test
How to drive **and** observe a full Tier-3 Bifrost round-trip against
ratatoskr's *own* provider — bind a Worldtree session to our affect/memory
store, fire a turn, and read exactly what Worldtree dispatched to us,
correlated with the turn that triggered it.
This is the **manual form of issue #17** (self-drive + correlated-log
affect/memory ops). Until #17 ships that capability inside the TUI/web/CLI,
this runbook is the reproducible loop — and it is the substrate worldtree-dev's
#296 (salience-algorithm research) and #297 (recall scope/assembly research)
diagnose against.
> First proven by hand 2026-06-16 while isolating #295's recall leg.
## The load-bearing tripwire: which key signs the bind
A bound session-create authenticates as the **Bifrost consumer**, not the
canary client. Worldtree signs the Bifrost handshake JWT with the
**session-create bearer token** (HS256 shared-secret model); our provider
verifies it against `RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY`.
So the bearer on `POST /sessions` **must be the consumer Heimdall key**
(`RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY`, in `~/.config/ratatoskr/provider.env`) — **not**
`WORLDTREE_API_KEY` (the mimir/foundational TUI key in `env.sh`). They are two
different keys for two identities of ratatoskr.
| Bearer used on `POST /sessions` | Handshake at our provider |
|---|---|
| `WORLDTREE_API_KEY` (mimir/TUI key) | **401** `bifrost.auth_rejected` → 502 to client |
| `RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY` (consumer key) | **200 OK** → session bound |
ratatoskr is two identities: the conversation-API **canary client**
(`WORLDTREE_API_KEY`) and the Bifrost **consumer/provider**
(`RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY`). Self-driving a bound session crosses into the
consumer identity, so it uses the consumer key. #17's Bind half has to carry
this distinction.
## Prereqs
- Provider(s) running on this box (nh3-dev, `10.100.10.50`):
- memory → `ratatoskr-memory-provider` on `:8391`
- affect → `ratatoskr-provider` on `:8390`
- Each is a dev background shell, env-sourced from `provider.env`. The memory
provider's stdout carries the inbound observe log (`[memory-provider]` lines
added in `memory_store.py`).
- The provider endpoint is reachable + allowlisted from Worldtree
(`10.250.50.152`): `http://10.100.10.50:8391`. The allowlist
(`BIFROST_CLIENT_ALLOWED_HOSTS`) is **Worldtree-side, infra-ops-owned** — if a
bind 502s with a route/allowlist error, that entry is the thing to check.
- A memory-enabled Tier-3 agent defined on the instance. `ratatoskr:smoke`
(scope `end_user:smoke-user`) is the standing fixture; it is hidden from
`GET /agents` (Tier-3 agents are not in the public roster) but resolves on
session-create.
## Steps
```bash
cd ~/development/ratatoskr
set -a && . ~/.config/ratatoskr/provider.env && set +a # RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY etc.
URL=http://10.250.50.152:8081 # personal Worldtree
HK="$RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY" # the CONSUMER key — the tripwire
```
**1 — Bind a fresh (cold) session to our provider.** `bifrost.endpoint_url`
points at the plane you want (`:8391` memory, `:8390` affect); caps are
negotiated by the handshake, not declared here (`BifrostBindingRequest` is
`{endpoint_url, scope}` only, `additionalProperties:false`). A 201 means the
handshake verified.
```bash
curl -sS -X POST "$URL/sessions" -H "Authorization: Bearer $HK" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agent_id":"ratatoskr:smoke","end_user_id":"smoke-user",
"bifrost":{"endpoint_url":"http://10.100.10.50:8391","scope":null}}'
# -> 201 {"session_id":"...", "kind":"consumer_defined", ...}
```
**2 — Snapshot the fixture** (to detect any promotion the turn writes):
```bash
sqlite3 -readonly memory.db \
"SELECT chunk_id, json_extract(record_json,'\$.verbatim.text') FROM memory_chunks;"
```
**3 — Fire ONE turn** into the bound session, reusing ratatoskr's own SSE
client (handles composite ids + no-read-timeout). Bearer = the consumer key:
```bash
RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY="$HK" uv run python - <<'PY'
import asyncio, os, httpx
from ratatoskr.sse_client import stream_turn, Text, Done, Error, Cancelled
SESSION="<session_id from step 1>"
URL="http://10.250.50.152:8081"; KEY=os.environ["RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY"]
async def main():
async with httpx.AsyncClient(base_url=URL,
headers={"Authorization":f"Bearer {KEY}","User-Agent":"ratatoskr-selftest"},
timeout=httpx.Timeout(connect=10.0,read=None,write=10.0,pool=10.0)) as c:
async for ev in stream_turn(c, SESSION, "What kind of chocolate do I like?"):
if isinstance(ev, Done): print("ANSWER:", ev.response); return
if isinstance(ev, Error): print("ERROR:", ev.error_code, ev.message); return
asyncio.run(asyncio.wait_for(main(), 150))
PY
```
**4 — Read the inbound pair** from the provider's stdout (the observe brick).
For a background-shell provider, that is the task output file; tail it:
```
[memory-provider] memory-call search REQUEST: scope_filter={...} top_k=... vec_dim=1024
[memory-provider] memory-call search RESPONSE: N hit(s) [{'chunk_id':..., 'score':..., 'scope':...}]
```
**5 — Re-snapshot the fixture** (step 2's query). A new row = the turn was
promoted (a salience-algorithm event; relevant to #296). Audit, don't blindly
delete — promoted failure-surfaces may be wanted corpus.
## Reading the result
The `search REQUEST` `scope_filter` vs the `search RESPONSE` hit count is the
whole diagnosis surface:
- **0 hits** → the filter didn't match any stored chunk. Compare the filter's
axes against the stored `scope`. INV-005 requires **every** filter axis to
match, so an extra axis on the filter that the chunks don't carry (e.g.
`agent_self`) zeroes the result even when `end_user` matches. That's a
**scope-build / persist-recall-symmetry** question (Worldtree-side).
- **Hit present but the model says "no memory"** → we returned it; Worldtree
dropped it downstream of search → **recall-assembly / injection**
(Worldtree-side).
Either way our store + search are provable from this surface; the recall
*efficacy* must be judged at the model's answer in a **cold (history-free)**
session, never from a wire 200 (a `search` returns 200 whether or not its hits
are injected).
### Worked example (2026-06-16, #295 → #297)
Cold turn "What kind of chocolate do I like?" against the `smoke-user` fixture:
```
REQUEST: scope_filter={'end_user': 'smoke-user', 'agent_self': 'ratatoskr:smoke'} top_k=128
RESPONSE: 0 hit(s)
ANSWER: "I don't have access to your past preferences..."
```
Root cause: the recall filter carried `agent_self` but the stored chunks are
`{end_user: smoke-user}` only → the `agent_self` axis excluded all of them.
Branch (a), scope asymmetry — fed to #297.
## Notes / foot-guns
- **HTTP, not HTTPS.** The spec requires `endpoint_url` be HTTPS; dev is relaxed
via the Worldtree-side allowlist. Don't "fix" our provider to HTTPS to make a
bind work — check the allowlist entry first.
- **Cold means cold.** Reuse of a session with history can satisfy a "recall"
from plain conversation history. Always bind a *fresh* session for a recall
probe.
- **Stray sessions** created by probes are harmless empty rows on the dev
instance; no cleanup required.
- This loop is the thing #17 productizes into the chat surfaces; when #17 lands,
the bind+observe steps move inside the TUI/web/CLI and this runbook becomes the
underlying contract check.
docs/contracts/issues/17.contract.md
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---
contract_version: "2.1"
target_module: "ratatoskr.sessions + ratatoskr.provider (+ cli/tui/web trigger surfaces)"
scope: "Issue #17 v1 — make the canary chat client self-drive AND observe its own Bifrost provider. Two parts. (1) BIND: `create_session` gains an optional single-plane Bifrost binding (`BifrostBinding{endpoint_url, scope}`) authenticated with a DISTINCT consumer Heimdall key; Worldtree runs the handshake synchronously at POST /sessions, so handshake failure is a session-create failure (502), surfaced on the create path. A plane selector (`memory`→:8391 / `affect`→:8390) + the consumer key thread through CLI / TUI / web; bound-state is visible. (2) OBSERVE: a structured op-feed in the provider, instrumented at the DISPATCH/ASGI layer (where the JWT ctx / session_id lives — bifrost passes ctx to upsert_many but NOT to search/get/delete, so the existing store-method stdout shim cannot see session_id), emitting JSONL {session_id, plane, op, req_summary, resp_summary, status, ts}. OPERATOR DECISIONS LOCKED: single-plane-per-session for v1 (composite endpoint fronting both planes is PARKED — vNext); op-feed with session-level correlation for v1 (turn-correlated debug-pane UI is PARKED — needs turn_id, TBD). Provider store scope semantics MUST NOT change (AND-parity with bifrost's reference store is a hard constraint). Direct in-session TDD; live-smoke against personal Worldtree is the load-bearing acceptance gate."
depends_on:
- "httpx"
- "ratatoskr.sessions"
- "ratatoskr.provider.memory_store"
- "ratatoskr.provider.affect_store"
- "bifrost"
used_by:
- "ratatoskr.cli"
- "ratatoskr.tui"
- "ratatoskr.web.server"
language: "python"
complexity: "medium"
estimated_loc: 260
confidence: 0.78
assumptions:
- "PROVEN this session (manual end-to-end against personal Worldtree v0.35.3): `POST /sessions` with `bifrost={endpoint_url, scope:null}` runs the handshake synchronously and returns 201 when it verifies. `BifrostBindingRequest` is `{endpoint_url, scope}` ONLY (live OpenAPI, additionalProperties:false); capabilities are negotiated at the handshake, not declared in the bind request. So a session binds exactly ONE provider endpoint → ONE plane's dispatch flows."
- "PROVEN: the session-create BEARER is the identity Worldtree signs the Bifrost handshake JWT with (HS256 shared-secret). Bearer = the canary key (WORLDTREE_API_KEY) → handshake 401 `bifrost.auth_rejected` → 502 to the client. Bearer = the consumer Heimdall key (== the provider's RATATOSKR_HEIMDALL_KEY string) → handshake 200. So a BOUND session-create MUST authenticate with the consumer key, NOT the canary key. These are two distinct ratatoskr identities."
- "PROVEN: dev HTTP is accepted (spec wants HTTPS) because the provider host:port is on Worldtree's `BIFROST_CLIENT_ALLOWED_HOSTS` allowlist — a Worldtree-side, infra-ops-owned config. The endpoint_url must be the WORLDTREE-VISIBLE base URL (e.g. `http://10.100.10.50:8391`), not the client's loopback. Provider routes live at `/bifrost/handshake` + `/bifrost/memory-call` (memory) and `/bifrost/affect-call` (affect) under that base."
- "PROVEN (bifrost source, memory.py:244 vs 262): `dispatch_memory_call` passes `ctx` to `upsert_many` but NOT to `search`/`get`/`delete`. So the recall verb's store method has no session_id; correlation identity must be captured at the dispatch/ASGI layer (JWT ctx), not inside the store method. turn_id (finer than session_id) availability is UNVERIFIED — a contract-stage JWT-claims/envelope dump resolves it; design the op-feed to accept a turn_id later without a schema break."
- "Provider stores MUST NOT change scope semantics. `_scope_matches` stays AND (byte-faithful to bifrost reference `reference_server/memory.py:398`); the missing axis-lattice validation (my store admits a wider axis set than the reference) is a SEPARATE parity item, GATED on the `agent_self`-canonicity resolution, and OUT OF SCOPE for #17."
- "The existing `create_session(client, agent_id, *, end_user_id=None)` (sessions.py:179) is extended, not replaced (pre-v1, no compat shim). The httpx client carries the canary key as its default Authorization; the bound create overrides the bearer per-request with the consumer key."
- "Tests use `respx` for the bind unit tests (mirroring tests/test_sessions.py) + the in-process op-feed; the live-smoke acceptance is manual (per the repo's load-bearing-smoke posture), captured as a documented runbook step, not a unit test. `docs/bifrost-self-test.md` is the manual procedure this feature productizes."
- "v1 ships the CLI + TUI + web trigger surfaces in lockstep (the repo's BOTH-presenters-in-lockstep rule); the op-feed is read by the debug surface as structured lines for now (pane-correlated rendering is PARKED)."
open_questions:
- "turn_id on the wire: does Worldtree put a turn_id (or traceparent) in the Bifrost request JWT claims / envelope? If yes, the op-feed echoes it and turn-correlation becomes exact; if no, correlation is session_id + time-window (weaker). RESOLVE via a JWT-claims dump during the first TDD slice. Does NOT block v1 (session_id correlation is the v1 target); it gates the PARKED pane-UI."
- "Composite endpoint (PARKED): a thin ASGI fronting both :8390/:8391 advertising both caps at handshake would let one session observe both planes. Deferred to vNext per operator. If pursued, it needs per-underlying-store parity checks + per-plane failure status (a facade routing bug is a new failure class) — NOT just `handshake lists both caps`."
- "Key identity unification (PARKED — operator's call, crosses Heimdall): v1 assumes two keys. Do not derive one from the other."
- "Auto-bind on Tier-3 agents (PARKED — operator's call): v1 is explicit opt-in only. Auto-bind hides the most important debug variable (which identity + endpoint the session bound to)."
prd:
issue: 17
issue_url: "https://gitea.phasefinal.com/vh/ratatoskr/issues/17"
body_sha256_16: "58a420956e6226fb"
lock_in_comment_id: null
lock_in_sha256_16: null
lock_in_at: null
pinned_at: "2026-06-16T07:45:00+00:00"
dependencies:
- issue: 2
path: "src/ratatoskr/sessions.py"
reason: "create_session is the bind site. Same posture: caller-owned httpx client, async-native, no Worldtree imports, frozen-dataclass parse, exception `.body` truncated to [:1024]."
- issue: 5
path: "src/ratatoskr/sessions.py"
reason: "end_user_id already threads into the POST /sessions body; the bifrost field is added alongside it with the same optional-when-None posture."
---
# Issue #17 — Bifrost-binding the chat client: self-drive + observe
## Context
Ratatoskr is two identities: the conversation-API **canary client** (TUI/web/CLI
that runs turns and watches the SSE flow) and a Bifrost **Tier-3 provider**
(durable affect store :8390 + memory store :8391, separate ASGI apps). Until now
the canary couldn't drive its OWN provider — `create_session` never sent a Bifrost
binding, so every affect/memory round-trip was driven externally. #17 closes that:
the canary BINDS a session to its own provider and OBSERVES the resulting
affect/memory dispatch, so an operator can hunt latent cross-layer bugs from one
seat. The manual procedure proven this session lives at `docs/bifrost-self-test.md`;
#17 productizes it.
**v1 scope is deliberately narrow** (operator-locked): single-plane bind (composite
endpoint PARKED), session-level op-feed (turn-correlated panes PARKED). The load-
bearing risks are bind-time auth identity + capturing a correlation key the store
method can't see — both resolved below.
## Public surface
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BifrostBinding:
"""Session-create Bifrost binding (Worldtree BifrostBindingRequest, #160).
endpoint_url is the WORLDTREE-VISIBLE base URL of one provider plane."""
endpoint_url: str
scope: str | None = None
async def create_session(
client: httpx.AsyncClient,
agent_id: str,
*,
end_user_id: str | None = None,
bifrost: BifrostBinding | None = None,
consumer_key: str | None = None,
) -> SessionInfo:
"""POST /sessions. When `bifrost` is set the request authenticates with
`consumer_key` (NOT the client's default canary bearer) and carries the
`bifrost` field; Worldtree handshakes synchronously before 201. See FN
create_session."""
def endpoint_for_plane(plane: str, base_host: str) -> str:
"""'memory'->:8391, 'affect'->:8390 → f'http://{base_host}:{port}'. The
Worldtree-visible base URL. See FN endpoint_for_plane."""
```
```python
# Provider-side observe feed (ratatoskr.provider.opfeed) — dispatch-layer.
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class OpEvent:
ts: str # ISO 8601 UTC, capture time
plane: str # "memory" | "affect"
op: str # verb: search / upsert_many / emit / get / delete / handshake
session_id: str | None # from the JWT ctx at the DISPATCH layer — present for ALL
# JWT-carrying verbs (not just upsert_many; bifrost withholds
# ctx from search/get/delete STORE methods, but dispatch sees
# the JWT); None only if the JWT genuinely omits it
status: str # "ok" | "error"
req_summary: dict # per-verb, scope-only (see "Op-feed summary shapes"); no record bodies
resp_summary: dict # per-verb counts + ids/scores; never verbatim content
turn_id: str | None = None # INV-005 reservation made LITERAL: the field exists now,
# unused in v1 (session-level correlation), populated when
# Worldtree propagates a turn id (open question)
def instrument_provider_app(app, *, plane: str, sink: OpSink):
"""Wrap the dispatch/ASGI layer so every inbound bifrost-call emits one
OpEvent to `sink`, reading session_id off the JWT ctx where bifrost exposes
it. Does NOT touch store scope semantics. See FN instrument_provider_app."""
```
## Exception classes
```python
class BifrostHandshakeFailed(Exception):
"""502 bifrost_handshake_failed on bound session-create. Carries the
spec-level `detail.bifrost_error` (e.g. 'bifrost.auth_rejected')."""
def __init__(self, *, bifrost_error: str | None, body: bytes) -> None: ...
bifrost_error: str | None
class BifrostConsumerKeyMissing(Exception):
"""A bifrost binding was requested without a consumer_key. Raised BEFORE
HTTP (the bind must never silently fall back to the canary key)."""
```
## Invariants
- **INV-001 (auth identity, never fall back).** A `bifrost` binding REQUIRES a
non-empty `consumer_key`; absence raises `BifrostConsumerKeyMissing` before any
HTTP. The bound POST /sessions authenticates with `consumer_key`; an unbound
create authenticates with the client's default canary key. The two call sites
never cross. On 401-rooted handshake failure the error names the mismatch.
- **INV-002 (bind-time, not turn-time, failure).** The handshake runs
synchronously on POST /sessions. A bad URL / down provider / wrong key / HTTPS
rejection fails SESSION CREATION (502 → `BifrostHandshakeFailed`), surfaced on
the create path BEFORE any turn / before alt-screen (TUI) — never deferred to
first-turn. Mirrors issue #6's pre-alt-screen error routing.
- **INV-003 (one plane per session).** A binding targets exactly one endpoint =
one plane. v1 documents this limit explicitly; binding both planes for one turn
is the PARKED composite-endpoint feature, not a v1 path.
- **INV-004 (no scope-semantics change).** The observe instrumentation is
READ-ONLY over the dispatch path; it MUST NOT alter `_scope_matches`, the
AND-parity, or any store behavior. The op-feed reports the effective scope used
per op; it never rewrites scope client-side.
- **INV-005 (correlation key at the dispatch layer).** session_id is captured from
the JWT ctx at the dispatch/ASGI layer — present for ALL JWT-carrying verbs,
INCLUDING search/get/delete (bifrost withholds ctx from those STORE methods, but
the dispatch layer still verifies + reads the JWT). `session_id=None` ONLY if the
JWT genuinely omits it (a claims-dump open question, not the store-method gap).
`OpEvent` carries a literal `turn_id: str | None = None` field — the reservation
is a real field defaulted to None in v1, not a future schema change.
- **INV-006 (data hygiene).** Bound debug sessions write to DURABLE stores. The
smoke procedure uses an explicit test scope (`end_user:smoke-user`) and a
documented cleanup path; the contract's acceptance asserts the fixture
before/after so a debug run's promotions are visible, never silent. (Promotion
of a turn is expected behavior, not a bug — but it must be observable.)
- **INV-007 (observe captures failures + late ops).** The op-feed records non-2xx
/ error ops (status="error"), never hides or double-counts them. The `OpSink` is
a CONTINUOUS append-only feed — NOT per-session-scoped, no per-session teardown in
v1; late ops that land AFTER the SSE turn-end simply append with their timestamp,
so a consumer can apply a post-turn grace window (the PARKED pane-UI's concern; v1
just must not drop late ops). A sink write that FAILS is swallowed from the
dispatch path (instrument_provider_app POST-003) BUT logged to stderr — an observe
gap is never silent.
- **INV-008 (both presenters in lockstep).** The bind trigger + bound-state
indicator land in CLI, TUI, and web together (the repo's add-to-all-presenters
rule). Web creates the bound session SERVER-SIDE; the consumer key never reaches
the browser.
- **INV-009 (secret hygiene).** Both keys are redacted in all UI/logs. The
consumer key is PRIVILEGED (it is the handshake identity), not equivalent to
read-only conversation access; config that stores it uses no weaker file
permissions than the canary key (cf. provider.env mode 600).
## Data flow
BIND (client → Worldtree): CLI/TUI/web resolve `plane` + the consumer key →
`endpoint_for_plane(plane, worldtree_visible_host)` → `BifrostBinding` →
`create_session(..., bifrost=binding, consumer_key=...)` → POST /sessions with
bearer = consumer key → Worldtree handshakes synchronously to the provider
endpoint → 201 (bound) or 502 (`BifrostHandshakeFailed`).
OBSERVE (Worldtree → provider → feed): a bound turn makes Worldtree dispatch
affect/memory bifrost-calls to the provider → `instrument_provider_app` wraps the
dispatch layer → one `OpEvent` per call (session_id from JWT ctx when present) →
`OpSink` (JSONL) → the debug surface reads structured lines. The store path is
untouched (INV-004); observe is read-only over dispatch.
## Function contracts
```contract
FN create_session(client: httpx.AsyncClient, agent_id: str, *, end_user_id: str | None = None, bifrost: BifrostBinding | None = None, consumer_key: str | None = None) -> SessionInfo
BRIEF: POST /sessions; when a bifrost binding is given, authenticate with the consumer key (not the canary key) and carry the binding so Worldtree handshakes synchronously to our provider.
PRE: [PRE-001 hard] bifrost is not None ⇒ consumer_key is a non-empty str -- else BifrostConsumerKeyMissing, before any HTTP (INV-001)
PRE: [PRE-002 soft] bifrost is None ⇒ request uses the client's default canary bearer -- unchanged pre-#17 path
POST: [POST-001 return_value] 201 → SessionInfo (unchanged parse) -- assert
POST: [POST-002 exception] 502 → BifrostHandshakeFailed(bifrost_error=detail.bifrost_error, body) (INV-002) -- assert
POST: [POST-003 exception] 422 ephemeral_does_not_accept_bifrost → SessionApiFailed -- assert
POST: [POST-004 exception] 404 → AgentNotFound; other non-201 → SessionApiFailed -- assert (unchanged)
STEPS:
1. body = {"agent_id": agent_id}; if end_user_id: body["end_user_id"] = end_user_id
2. if bifrost: body["bifrost"] = {"endpoint_url": bifrost.endpoint_url, "scope": bifrost.scope}; headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {consumer_key}"}
3. else: headers = {} (httpx client default bearer = canary key)
4. resp = await client.post("/sessions", json=body, headers=headers); route status per POST-*
```
```contract
FN endpoint_for_plane(plane: str, base_host: str) -> str
BRIEF: Map a plane name to the Worldtree-visible provider base URL (memory->:8391, affect->:8390).
PRE: [PRE-001 hard] plane in {"memory", "affect"} -- else ValueError
POST: [POST-001 return_value] returns f"http://{base_host}:{port}", port 8391 (memory) / 8390 (affect) -- assert
STEPS:
1. port = 8391 if plane == "memory" else 8390
2. return the Worldtree-VISIBLE base URL (not client loopback); HTTPS relaxation is allowlist-side, not a URL concern
```
```contract
FN instrument_provider_app(app, *, plane: str, sink: OpSink) -> ASGIApp
BRIEF: Wrap the provider's dispatch layer so each inbound bifrost-call emits one structured OpEvent (session_id from the JWT ctx) without touching store semantics.
PRE: [PRE-001 hard] app is a built provider ASGI app; sink is an OpSink -- guard
POST: [POST-001 side_effect] emits exactly one OpEvent per inbound bifrost-call, incl. handshake + error ops (INV-007) -- assert
POST: [POST-002 state_change] OpEvent.session_id = JWT ctx session_id when present, else None (INV-005) -- assert
POST: [POST-003 side_effect] a sink failure never propagates into the dispatch path — observe must not break serve -- assert
POST: [POST-004 return_value] store scope semantics untouched; read-only over dispatch (INV-004) -- assert
STEPS:
1. wrap the dispatch/ASGI layer so each inbound bifrost-call yields one OpEvent
2. read session_id off the JWT ctx if present; else None
3. summarise req (scope_filter/top_k for search; record-count+scopes for upsert) + resp (hit-count+ids/scores | upserted+replayed | error code) — NEVER verbatim content
4. emit to sink; swallow sink errors
```
## ERROR_ROUTING
| Wire | Exception | Surfaced |
|---|---|---|
| 502 `bifrost_handshake_failed` | `BifrostHandshakeFailed(bifrost_error)` | create path, names the bifrost_error; TUI pre-alt-screen |
| (pre-HTTP) bifrost w/o consumer_key | `BifrostConsumerKeyMissing` | config/CLI validation, before any request |
| 422 `ephemeral_does_not_accept_bifrost` | `SessionApiFailed` | create path |
| 401 at provider handshake (manifests as 502 to client) | `BifrostHandshakeFailed('bifrost.auth_rejected')` | error text: "bound create requires the consumer key, not WORLDTREE_API_KEY" |
## Acceptance — the ordered live-smoke gate (load-bearing)
The repo's smoke-is-load-bearing posture: this gate IS acceptance, run manually
against personal Worldtree, mirroring `docs/bifrost-self-test.md`.
```
1. providers up → memory :8391 serving + op-feed sink attached (affect :8390 is symmetric, OPTIONAL for the memory-plane gate)
2. consumer key set → RATATOSKR_BIFROST_CONSUMER_KEY present; canary key separate
3. allowlist OK → endpoint_for_plane host on Worldtree's BIFROST_CLIENT_ALLOWED_HOSTS
4. bind 201 → ratatoskr --bifrost-plane memory → bound session, handshake 200
5. negative: canary → binding with the canary key → BifrostHandshakeFailed, the auth_rejected message names the consumer-key mismatch
6. turn → one turn into the bound session
7. assert op-feed → OpEvent captured with session_id == the BOUND session's id (not merely "some session_id"); {plane, op, req/resp summary, status}
8. assert hygiene → fixture before/after asserted (per docs/bifrost-self-test.md); promotions visible not silent
```
Unit tests (respx) cover: bind body shape, consumer-key override, the
missing-key precondition, 502→BifrostHandshakeFailed mapping, 422 ephemeral, and
the op-feed emitting one OpEvent per dispatched call incl. error + late op.
## v1 clarifications (paraphrase-gate fixups)
Pinned in response to the `/heid-contract-review` panel — closing under-specs that
let an implementer comply while violating intent.
- **Op-feed summary shapes (per verb).** `req_summary` / `resp_summary` are
scope-only, never verbatim content:
- `search` → req `{scope_filter, top_k}`; resp `{hit_count, [{chunk_id, score}]}`
- `upsert_many` → req `{record_count, [scope]}`; resp `{upserted, replayed}`
- `get` / `get_many` → req `{ids}`; resp `{found_count}`
- `delete_many` → req `{ids}`; resp `{deleted}`
- `emit` (affect) → req `{actor-scope}`; resp `{status}` (affect stays conduit-opaque)
- `handshake` → req `{caps_requested}`; resp `{caps_granted, ok}`
- **`BifrostBinding.scope` is an opaque pass-through** (Worldtree spec: ≤256 chars,
copied into the JWT payload unchanged). ratatoskr does NOT interpret it; v1 sends
`null`. A non-null value is operator-supplied and meaningful only to Worldtree.
- **Web bind split (INV-008 sharpened).** The web UI selects the PLANE; the consumer
key is SERVER-HELD (env/config), never sent from the browser; the server
constructs the bound session. The browser never sees the consumer key.
- **Bound-state indicator** shows at least `plane + endpoint + bound|failed status`,
not a bare boolean (so the operator can see WHICH identity/endpoint bound).
- **401-handshake message scoping.** The "use the consumer key, not WORLDTREE_API_KEY"
text is keyed on `bifrost_error == "bifrost.auth_rejected"`; other 502 handshake
failures surface the generic `BifrostHandshakeFailed` with their own `bifrost_error`.
- **`endpoint_for_plane` is the DEV helper** (returns `http://`, allowlist-relaxed).
A production HTTPS endpoint is supplied directly via `--bifrost-url`, bypassing the
plane shortcut — HTTPS is not constructed by `endpoint_for_plane`.
- **422 `ephemeral_does_not_accept_bifrost` → `SessionApiFailed` is deliberate** (no
distinct exception; it is an operator config error, surfaced as a generic create
failure). Not an oversight in the ERROR_ROUTING overlap with POST-004.
## Out of scope / PARKED (anti-creep)
- Composite endpoint (both planes, one session) — vNext; needs per-store parity + per-plane failure status.
- Turn-correlated debug-pane UI — needs turn_id (open question) + grace-window buffering + client read channel.
- Key identity unification (Heimdall) — operator's call, crosses service boundary.
- Auto-bind on Tier-3 agents — operator's call; v1 is explicit opt-in only.
- Provider axis-lattice validation (the agent_self parity item) — gated on the `agent_self`-canonicity cross-repo resolution; tracked separately, NOT #17.