9dbd829b9d
One rule on nh3-scale (CT 107): -d 10.100.10.50/32 -j MASQUERADE, above the RFC1918 RETURNs in /usr/local/sbin/mesh-exit-masq.sh, so it survives a reboot rather than living only in the running ruleset. Cause. A host that runs Tailscale installs -A ts-input -s 100.64.0.0/10 ! -i tailscale0 -j DROP. The fleet's subnet routers run NoSNAT: true with RFC1918 explicitly exempted from masquerade — deliberate source preservation, and a departure from Tailscale's own --snat-subnet-routes=true default — so a mesh client's packet reached nh3-dev's ens18 still sourced 100.64.x and died at the anti-spoof rule. Every NH3 host that does not run Tailscale was unaffected, which is why this read as a DNS or routing fault rather than a policy one. Masquerading just this destination makes it behave like every other host and leaves source preservation absolute elsewhere. Verified before and after against 13 targets from nh3-dev and 9 from the MacBook Air, and again after restarting the service so the chain was rebuilt from the script rather than from the manual insert. nh3-dev.nh3.internal now resolves and connects from the mesh, ssh and the Booth port included, with no script changes anywhere. Records the failed approach prominently, because it is the attractive one: advertising 10.100.10.50/32 from nh3-dev itself black-holed it from ESH, Anaheim, FV and Irvine. ip rule there puts lookup 52 at priority 5270 ahead of main at 32766, and becoming a subnet router let table 52 capture cross-site traffic the node has no accepted route for. Its own LAN and the internet kept working throughout, so a single-host check confirms a break it cannot see.
nh3-dev
NH3-site developer box — 10.100.10.50 (WireGuard-reachable from the NH3
subnet). General-purpose dev VM that hosts agent-fleet sidecars and live Claude
Code sessions; not a Docker-stack host in the stacks/ sense.
Reach: ssh 10.100.10.50 (as lkraven), or the dedicated agent identity
ssh -i ~/.ssh/infra-ops_ed25519 infra-ops@10.100.10.50 (NOPASSWD sudo).
infra-ops bootstrapped here 2026-06-04 (see [reference_infra_ops_sudo_identity]
in auto-memory). Note: Claude Code sessions often run natively on this box, so
local Bash already executes here — no SSH-to-self needed for non-privileged work.
What runs here
- NH3 egress proxy — RETIRED 2026-09-06 (replaced by headscale exit nodes;
danteddisabled, config.retired). Was: durable internal-only SOCKS5socks5h://10.100.10.50:1080(dante, ACL'd to the WG net). Residential egress for colo services gated on their datacenter IP (e.g. YouTube bot-gate). Runbook + setup committed; consumers point*_PROXYat it. - Docker runtime —
docker-cesince 2026-09-14. Was Debian'sdocker.io20.10.24 + the Pythondocker-compose1.29.2 v1 CLI +containerd1.6.20, with nocli-pluginsdirectory at all — sodocker compose(space) was not a command: it printed a help blurb and exited 0, which a deploy script cannot distinguish from success. Migrated viaplaybooks/upgrade-docker-ce.yamlto docker-ce 29.8.0 / compose plugin v5.5.1 / containerd.io 2.3.5 / buildx v0.37.1. The v1docker-compose(hyphen) binary is gone and no shim was installed (operator ruling 2026-09-14) — fix callers, don't paper over them.- ⚠
vastblue-u5-pg(an emptypostgres:16probe container,restart: no, plaindocker run, anonymous volume) and its volume were removed when the old daemon stopped. The playbook is not the cause — it has norm,pruneorpurge, and the other five containers survived, two of them long-exited. Almost certainly--rm/AutoRemove=true, unprovable after the fact because the container record is gone. Measured beforehand as zero user tables in every database, so no data was lost. Lesson: captureAutoRemoveandRestartPolicytogether when snapshotting a container you are about to bounce. - The playbook's restart loop runs as the deploy identity, not root, and a
stack
.envmay legitimately be root-owned0600(/opt/docker/compose/beszel/.env) — compose bails before doing anything, so the stack reported FAILED whilerestart: unless-stoppedhad already brought it back healthy. Fixed 2026-09-14: the loop retries undersudo -nbefore calling it a failure. Verified against beszel — plainrc=1 permission denied, sudo retryrc=0 Container beszel-agent Started. A false FAILED in automation output is worse than a quiet one; it trains readers to skim the failure lines.
- ⚠
/opt/dockerownership — normalised fleet-wide 2026-09-14 toroot:docker 2775(setgid) viaplaybooks/normalize-docker-tree.yaml, operator ruling. Was a three-way split:root:root 755here,root:root 777on nh3-docker + ana-docker (world-writable, from a 2024chmod -R 777to get a git clone working),lkraven 755elsewhere. Not a personal username (lkravenis one of three the operator uses) and not a new admin account — thedockergroup already existed on every host holding exactlylkraven+infra-ops. ⚠ This is not privilege separation:dockermembership is root-equivalent. A future non-root deployer needs a dedicateddeploygroup. Stack.envfiles went toroot:docker 0640— previously 31 of 74 were0600readable by only ONE of the two deploy identities (varying by file, which is what false-FAILED beszel during the docker-ce upgrade) and 43 were world-readable0644. No containers were bounced; these are inode metadata changes and.envis read only atcompose up./opt/docker/compose/talkwas createdlkraven-owned 2026-09-14 and tts-dev migratedtalkinto it the same day — it had been at~/talk, a convention violation that hid it from anything walking/opt/docker/compose/*/. Old path parked at~/talk.migrated-20260914;version: "3.8"dropped from its compose file (it existed only to satisfy the v1 CLI, which is now gone). Normalising the parent directory is unresolved — operator's call;/opt/dockeritself is a separate three-way split (755root,777root on two hosts,755lkraven).- Reachable from the mesh at its LAN address — via a masquerade exception on
nh3-scale, not via anything on this box. nh3-dev runs Tailscale, so it
carries the anti-spoof rule
-A ts-input -s 100.64.0.0/10 ! -i tailscale0 -j DROP. The fleet's subnet routers runNoSNAT: truewith RFC1918 exempted from masquerade (deliberate source preservation, a departure from Tailscale's--snat-subnet-routes=truedefault), so a mesh client's packet arrived onens18still sourced100.64.xand was dropped there — silently. Every NH3 host that does not run Tailscale was unaffected, which is what made it look like a DNS or routing fault. Fixed 2026-09-14 by one rule in/usr/local/sbin/mesh-exit-masq.shon nh3-scale (CT 107, nh3-pve):-d 10.100.10.50/32 -j MASQUERADE, placed above the RFC1918 RETURNs. Copy kept atservers/nh3-pve/mesh-exit-masq.sh. ⚠ Do not instead advertise10.100.10.50/32from nh3-dev. Tried the same day: it black-holed nh3-dev from ESH, Anaheim, FV and Irvine while leaving its own LAN and the internet up.ip rulehere putslookup 52at priority 5270, ahead ofmainat 32766, and becoming a subnet router let table 52 capture cross-site traffic this node has no accepted route for (RouteAll: false). A one-host check against its own LAN passes cleanly — test all four sites. - ttyd fleet driver-seat — web/iPad seat into the zellij
Claudesession (ttyd behind Caddy; OSC52 clipboard shim). User systemd services under~/.config. - mead-hall — Bifrost tool-provider sidecar (
:5173), CI-deployed fromvh/mead-hall. - Hermes Agent gateway — OpenAI-compatible agent API on
127.0.0.1:8765(hermes-gateway.service, user systemd, installed 2026-09-14 viahermes gateway install). Runs the per-user install at~/.hermes/hermes-agent(v0.21.1,b88e677); config in~/.hermes/{.env,config.yaml}. Stood up for SVOS/Miranda, which replaced Worldtree with Hermes on 2026-09-11 and cannot boot without it. Bearer auth is mandatory even on loopback — key vaulted asnh3-dev/hermes/api-server-key. ⚠ The gateway registers Hermes's full toolset by default — 28 toolsets, 14 enabled,terminal/code_execution/file/browseramong them. SVOS's security model is that write-capable tools are never registered, not that they are refused at dispatch, soplatform_toolsets: {api_server: []}is set inconfig.yaml(2026-09-14) and measured back as 28 rows / 0 enabled / 0 tools on/v1/toolsets. The endpoint still reports all 28 rows with their flags, which is what SVOS's_hermes_rosterderives its required-config line from — narrowing does not blind it. Becomes[svos_miranda]once SVOS's plugin lands in$HERMES_HOME/plugins/. - Hermes model backend →
gen-largeon the fleet LiteLLM gateway (free local compute), set 2026-09-14 per operator ruling. Until thenmodel.defaultsaidanthropic/claude-opus-4.6withmodel.base_urlat openrouter, butprovider: autoplus a lonezaicredential inauth.jsonsilently resolved Miranda to GLM-5.3 on the paid z.ai Coding Plan — three settings that had to be read together before the real answer fell out. Nowdefault: gen-large/provider: custom/base_url: http://10.250.50.70:4000/v1, verified by a real turn (hermes status→gen-large/Custom endpoint, plus a 660-token completion through/v1/chat/completions). The openrouter/nous credit warnings cleared with it. ⚠CUSTOM_API_KEY/HERMES_CUSTOM_API_KEYare INERT for bareprovider: "custom"— they only bind a namedcustom_providers:entry via itskey_env. Setmodel.api_keyinconfig.yamlinstead; its only env fallback is the legacy nameOPENROUTER_API_KEY. Get this wrong and the request ships the placeholderno-key-required, LiteLLM 401s inside the response body, andhermes statusstill reports a perfectly healthygen-large/Custom endpoint— so status alone cannot verify this change, only a real completion can. Thezaicredential is still inauth.json, present and unused;provider: customis explicit so it is not a candidate, andhermes fallback listis empty, so there is no degraded-mode route that quietly re-bills z.ai. Miranda fails rather than fails over if LiteLLM is down. nh3-dev/hermes/api-server-keyis free to rotate (hold released 2026-09-14, svos main7165272). It had been locked: SVOS signed its own Bifrost wall's HS256 dispatch tokens with the same value, so a routine rotation would have 401'd every Miranda tool call — silently, since losing signature validity does not raise. SVOS now verifies against its own secret (SVOS_BIFROST_DISPATCH_KEY, vaulted atnh3-dev/svos/bifrost-dispatch-key, theirs — nothing here reads it), and the Bearer has exactly one job again. Rotating it now only means svos-dev repointsSVOS_HERMES_API_KEY. ⚠ The invariant did not rot, its precondition did: "one shared secret" was sound while SVOS owned both ends of the key and stopped being sound the moment the runtime became externally managed. Worth remembering when any other peer reuses a credential across a boundary we control. ⚠ When thesvos_mirandaplugin arrives forhermes plugins validate, it will reference the dispatch key, not the Bearer — expected, not a defect. Assert its per-rowtoolsarray has seven or eight entries (repo_readis config-conditional on SVOS's side); any other number is a real fault.- bloom_music dev —
~/development/bloom_music; itsweb/test harness uses Playwright headless Chromium for OSMD browser-geometry assertions. - The Booth — ephemeral media drop board (
:8090,booth.service), from eshpfiservices/booth/. Lets CC sessions surface A/B renders + smoke results (and browser uploads for pickup) to the operator; 24h TTL, Homepage-linked. Since 2026-09-09 it also carries asks — a session poses a multiple-choice question in a booth, the operator answers a radio form + notes in the browser, and the pick lands as an answer sidecar the session reads (booth ask/booth answer --wait). ⚠ TheboothCLI is on PATH via~/.local/bin/booth→services/booth/scripts/booth, symlinked 2026-09-09; before that it was on no PATH at all, so every session following the global link-board convention was hittingcommand not foundunless it used the full path.~/.zshenvputs~/.local/binin PATH for non-interactivessh nh3-dev '<cmd>'too. - jackdaw-compose — JackDAW AI Composer
/composebackend (:8787,jackdaw-compose.service), a thin statelessbun server/index.tsfrom~/development/jackdaw→ LiteLLMgen. Origin-gated (INV-BK04/BK05), reached same-origin via the:4500bench's/composeproxy. Hosted for jackdaw-dev (their code; the model endpoint + key live in server env only — unit is0600, not committed).
Box-wide Playwright / Chromium (2026-06-04)
Available to every user/project on this box — no per-home playwright install:
- System shared-libs: apt-installed via
playwright install-deps chromium(Debian-12 set + xvfb), global. - Browser binaries: shared
/opt/ms-playwright(chromium-1223 + headless-shell + ffmpeg), root-owned, world-readable. Installed viainfra-ops. - Discovery:
PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/opt/ms-playwrightset globally in/etc/environment(PAM/all sessions) +/etc/profile.d/playwright-browsers.sh(login shells). A project justnpm i playwright(skip-browser-download is fine) and resolves the shared binary; verified launching headless from/optas a normal user. - To add more browsers / bump:
ssh infra-ops@10.100.10.50 'sudo env PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/opt/ms-playwright npx -y playwright install <browser>'.
Notes
- PFI-owned Linux — in scope for
infra-opsmanagement (apt, systemctl, service lifecycle). Added to the fleet bootstrap's Tier 1. - OS: Debian 12 (bookworm). See
system-details.txtfor the latest snapshot (scripts/refresh-server-info.sh nh3-dev). - Not in the colo Docker-stack topology — no
/opt/docker/composedeploy target; workloads are systemd services + dev checkouts. - Retired (2026-06-08):
volva.service+heid.serviceuser systemd units removed. Heid/Volva were re-architected from Python systemd daemons (volva run/heid runpollers) into Claude Code session orchestrators (heid commit12aa5a9); the~/development/volvadir + venvs are gone.volva.servicehad been crash-looping203/EXEC. Cleanup done by infra-ops at heid's request.