vh
39da1d4a97
The board mixed tools with endpoints. A vLLM seat whose href is a /docs page
sat in the same band as ComfyUI; the MQTT broker and the RustDesk relay, which
have no page at all, sat in Apps; and `Service Networking` was thirteen members
spanning three AdGuards, five Dockges, two Traefiks and four headless agents.
Every group is now one of two kinds and they never mix. TOOLS are expanded and
sit at the top of their tab. ENDPOINTS — an API, a broker, a background agent,
an href that is /docs or /ping or nothing — carry `initiallyCollapsed: true`
and sit at the bottom. Collapsed is not hidden: the eyebrow and its rule still
render, so the tab still says the thing exists and one click expands it.
A second rule fell out of the same pass and now shapes the group boundaries: a
group's members should all carry a widget or none should. A stat strip makes a
card ~50px taller, so one widget card in a row of plain ones opens a void under
the plain ones. That is why AdGuard and Traefik get their own groups rather
than sharing one with Dockge, and it is most of why the old Service Networking
band looked broken. AdGuard (ANA) was the last short card in its row and now
carries the same query/blocked/latency strip as its two siblings — one
infra-ops AdGuard login authenticates against all three instances, verified
against each; it lives in that stack's .env on the host and is vaulted.
The sixteen GPU-backed model seats were deliberately NOT relabelled.
`homepage.group` is read at container creation, so clearer names for
`AI - Inference` and friends would have cost a recreate on six vLLM seats, four
eval seats and four TTS engines — multi-minute model reloads on endpoints peers
reach through the gateway. Order plus `initiallyCollapsed` buys the same
separation for nothing, so those names stay as they are on purpose.
28 containers that ARE cheap to bounce were relabelled, across five hosts, via
rerunnable elway playbooks. Their label steps are gated on the old value still
being present, so a second run reports skipped rather than churning. Two verify
steps were wrong on first contact and are fixed with the reason recorded: the
traefik check raced its own recreate, and asserting a model seat is "running"
cannot answer "did I bounce it" when a seat may be legitimately stopped —
container age can, and now does.
The canonical stacks/ tree was synced to the deployed labels afterwards, so
intent and reality agree again on all fourteen tracked stacks.
Also documents the real nature of the post-recreate blank dashboard, which cost
~25 minutes here and an hour on 2026-08-19. `initialSettings":{}` in the served
HTML is the catch branch of the page's data loader, not a warm-up and not a
cache — and the error can vanish entirely, because the logger is assigned inside
the same try and the catch only logs if the logger exists. Ruled out by
measurement this time: all four API routes return 200 with correct content while
the page serves {}, and the previous known-good settings.yaml reproduces it
identically. The README now carries the one-command test and the next lead.
Before/after, all four tabs: http://10.100.10.50:8090/b/homepage-relayout/
zed-fim-proxy
A keyless /v1/completions front door on ana-docker for Zed's editor
edit-prediction (inline FIM completion) feature, which cannot send an
Authorization header. Runs on a separate port from LiteLLM and forwards to it
with an injected, model-scoped key.
- Host: ana-docker
10.250.50.70, port 4141 (network_mode: host). - Backs: the
coder-fastmodel (Qwen2.5-Coder-1.5B FIM seat,stacks/vllmvllm-coderon ana-ml2:8020) via LiteLLM:4000. - Zed config (
edit_predictions.open_ai_compatible_api):api_url: http://10.250.50.70:4141/v1,model: coder-fast,prompt_format: qwen,max_output_tokens: <n>. (The proxy also acceptshttp://10.250.50.70:4141— it matches both/v1/completionsand/completions.)
Security model (stdlib proxy in conf/proxy.py)
Four guards + a scoped key — a keyless route that injects a working key is only safe if it can't be pivoted:
- POST + path
/v1/completions(or/completions) only.GET /pingis an anonymous liveness ({"service":"ok"})./v1/chat/completionsis rejected. - Model allowlist — request body
modelmust equalZED_ALLOWED_MODEL(coder-fast); anything else → 403. - Injected scoped key — a LiteLLM virtual key scoped to
coder-fastONLY (POST /key/generate {"models":["coder-fast"]}). Even if guards 1–2 were bypassed, the key reaches nothing else (verified: 403 ongen). This is the real blast-radius bound. - Source-IP allowlist (
ZED_ALLOWED_IPS) — intentionally left OFF (operator direction 2026-07-27): Zed roams the operator's WireGuard10.0.0.0/8, so a single-IP pin would break it. Do NOT tighten. The keyless route is bounded by guards 1–3 (coder-fast-only,/v1/completions-only, scoped key) and is internal-network only. (The proxy matches exact IPs; a10.0.0.0/8CIDR would need CIDR support — deliberately not added.)
Deploy
# conf/proxy.py -> /opt/docker/conf/zed-fim-proxy/proxy.py
# compose.yaml -> /opt/docker/compose/zed-fim-proxy/compose.yaml
# .env (from .env.example, with ZED_SCOPED_KEY filled) -> same dir, mode 600
cd /opt/docker/compose/zed-fim-proxy && docker compose up -d
# verify keyless:
curl -s http://localhost:4141/v1/completions -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"model":"coder-fast","prompt":"def add(a,b):\n return","max_tokens":16,"temperature":0.2}'
Stdlib-only proxy (no pip) in a bare python:3.12-slim container — no build.