# nh3-svos: host for the NEW SVOS operating system (VM 111 on nh3-pve-2, NH3)

Built 2026-10-05 at svos-dev's request, relaying Prime ("stand up a dedicated VM for it on nh3-pve-2"). It runs the
new SVOS (repo `corviduo/svoperatingsystem`): a FastAPI/uvicorn kernel (SQLite WAL, synchronous FULL, one writer),
an interface connector, an optional voice adapter and a static phone/desktop UI.
**It is a separate instance.** The existing High Seat (`svos.service` on nh3-dev, `:8770`) and Miranda are NOT
migrated by this host.

**Ownership split:** infra-ops owns the VM, OS, access, backups and ingress. svos-dev owns the application: install,
configuration, enrollment and acceptance.

| | |
|---|---|
| Address | `10.100.50.43`, VLAN 50 (nh3-servers), static via cloud-init; `nh3-svos.nh3.internal` |
| Guest | VM **111** on **nh3-pve-2**, `onboot 1`, tag `svos` |
| Shape | 4 vCPU `x86-64-v3`, 8 GiB, 100 GB on `vmstore` (local NVMe LVM-thin, discard on). nh3-pve-2 had 47 GB RAM and 946 GB vmstore free at build |
| OS | Debian 13 genericcloud, Python 3.13 + venv, SQLite 3.46, systemd-timesyncd (synced), qemu-guest-agent |
| Identities | `vh` 1000 (operator keys + lkraven@nh3-dev, so svos-dev's session can ssh in; NOPASSWD sudo from cloud-init, plus `/etc/sudoers.d/91-vh-verifypw` so `sudo -v` agrees), `infra-ops` 850, **`svc-svos` 801** (nologin; the only writer of the data root) |
| Data root | `/var/lib/svos`, svc-svos 0700, on the local root ext4. Never NFS, never shared |
| Releases | `/opt/svos` root:svc-svos 2775, with `releases/` for svos-dev's layout. The git checkout is not a runtime dependency |
| Docker | none, by design |
| Backups | nh3-pve-2 vzdump job, nightly **21:30**, `all 1` → pbs-ana namespace `nh3-pve-2` (mirrored to pbs-nh3 at 06:30), snapshot mode with guest-agent fs-freeze |
| App-consistent hook | svos-dev's `/etc/qemu/fsfreeze-hook.d/50-svos` stops the SVOS services on freeze and restarts the ones that were running on thaw. ⚠ **Debian's qemu-ga does NOT run fsfreeze hooks unless configured** (no `-F` in the unit, no `qemu-ga.conf` by default). Here `/etc/qemu/qemu-ga.conf` points it at **`/usr/local/sbin/fsfreeze-dispatch`** (`configs/qemu-ga/fsfreeze-dispatch`), which unlike the stock `/etc/qemu/fsfreeze-hook` propagates failure: if a freeze hook fails, it thaws that hook and the completed ones and exits 1, so qemu-ga refuses the freeze. **Live drill 2026-10-05 1952–1953 (services running):** quiesced backup `vm/111/2026-10-06T02:52:11Z` → kernel+interface down ~1–2 s, back by themselves, health ok. Refused freeze (temporary `60-drill-refuse` after 50-svos, since removed) `vm/111/2026-10-06T02:53:03Z` → the dispatcher unwound and restarted the services, and then **⚠ vzdump did NOT abort: it logged `ERROR: unable to freeze guest fs`, backed up UNFROZEN (crash-consistent, app live), and reported `Backup job finished successfully`, rc 0.** Both images mapped from PBS and mounted read-only (`ro,noload`) on nh3-pve-2, never booted: `svos.db` integrity ok (each image still carries its ~0.9 MB WAL: keep `-wal` with the db when restoring), interface `pins.sqlite3` integrity ok, config/key/config-generation hashes equal live, table counts equal live except `events`. **Monitoring:** `scripts/check-backup-freshness.sh` now reads the LOG of every OK vzdump task and reports ERROR lines; a freeze/thaw error is an APPLICATION-CONSISTENCY FAILURE, verdict **DEGRADED, exit 4** (alerted by the daily wrapper to infra-hermes). nh3-pve-2 was not in the check's node lists at all before 2026-10-05; it is now. Drill B is acknowledged by UPID in the script |
| Monitoring | Beszel native agent 0.18.7 (`playbooks/beszel-native.yaml`, `configs/beszel-agent/hosts/nh3-svos.env`), hub system `t6y646ifa3x7xxv`, alerts CPU>95%/15m, Disk>85%/5m, Memory>90%/10m, offline/2m. Up 2026-10-05 |

## Build (reproducible)

```bash
scripts/elway infra-ops@10.100.250.62 --playbook playbooks/nh3-pve-2-cloudinit-vm.yaml --var vmid=111 \
  --var name=nh3-svos --var ip=10.100.50.43/24 --var cores=4 --var memory=8192 --var disk=100G --var tags=svos \
  --var "description=..."
scripts/elway vh@10.100.50.43        --playbook playbooks/bootstrap-infra-ops-user.yaml
scripts/elway infra-ops@10.100.50.43 --playbook playbooks/nh3-svos-host.yaml
```

## Front door: mesh-only `https://svos.phasefinal.com`, HTTP Basic auth (Prime, 2026-10-05)

- **Mesh:** tailscaled joined headscale as `nh3-svos`, **100.64.0.9**, `--accept-dns=false --accept-routes=false`.
- **Name:** `svos.phasefinal.com` exists ONLY as a headscale MagicDNS extra record (`/var/lib/headscale/extra-records.json`
  on nh3-headscale, hot-reloaded) → 100.64.0.9. There is no public record and no internal AdGuard record.
- **TLS:** Caddy 2.11.4 (the fleet `caddy-cf` build with the Cloudflare DNS module) at `/usr/local/bin/caddy`, unit
  `caddy-svos.service`, config `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` (canonical `configs/svos-front/Caddyfile`). It listens **only on
  100.64.0.9:443**, with no `:80`. The LE cert for `svos.phasefinal.com` comes via DNS-01, token `nh3-svos-caddy-dns01`
  (phasefinal.com only), in `/etc/caddy/env` (root:caddy 0640), vaulted `nh3-svos/cloudflare-caddy-dns01-token`.
- **Identity: HTTP Basic auth, one account `Vuong`** (Prime: "Basic auth is fine, saved in browser is fine. Access is
  via mesh because we don't host externally." SVOS addresses him as Prime; the login is `Vuong`). The argon2id hash is in
  **`/etc/caddy/svos-basic-auth.accounts`** (root:caddy 0640, not in git), imported into `basic_auth argon2id SVOS`.
  The plaintext is vaulted at **`nh3-svos/basic-auth-vuong`**. To rotate: pipe the new password to
  `caddy hash-password --algorithm argon2id` on stdin (never `--plaintext`), rewrite the accounts file, `secret put`,
  then `systemctl reload caddy-svos`.
- **Credential-free offline shell (svos-dev, 2026-10-05):** the service worker fetches its hash-pinned INVENTORY with `credentials:'omit'`, so exactly those files plus `/sw.js` are served BEFORE Basic auth (GET/HEAD, exact files, no fallback). Public build bytes only; `/`, `/status`, `/api/*`, the connector and everything else stay gated. The path list is **generated** into `/etc/caddy/svos-public-inventory` by **`/usr/local/sbin/svos-front-inventory`** (`configs/svos-front/`): it hash-checks every file against INVENTORY, validates, then reloads. ⚠ **Run it as root after every SVOS release**, or the next build's hashed asset names stay gated and worker install fails. `--check` changes nothing.
- **Previous release's assets across a rollout:** the same tool writes `/etc/caddy/svos-public-previous`: when `/opt/svos/current` has moved, the release named in the old inventory header becomes "previous", and its hashed `/assets/*` files that the new build lacks are served credential-free from **that release's own static dir** (hash-checked). One previous release at most; comments only when there is none (true at 2026-10-05, one release). Replica-tested: old asset 200 with the old INVENTORY hash, new asset with the new hash, POST to the old asset 401, unknown asset 401/404; tampered files and an unsafe path make the tool refuse.
- **Hosting bounds (svos-dev, per the web contract):** request bodies capped at exactly **1 MiB** on every route (413 over); **headers within 5 s, whole body within 15 s** (Caddy `read_header` / `read_body`); **no** write, response or idle deadline, so `/api/stream` (SSE) stays open. Live 2026-10-05 2014–2021 from fv-ml1: 1 MiB+1 → 413 on `/api/verbs` and `/verbs/pin`; exactly 1 MiB passes Caddy (kernel then answers); unfinished headers closed at 5.0 s; stalled body cut at 15.0 s; a signed `app-interface` ping returned pong before and DURING a stalled body; an SSE stream stayed open 41–45 s (client hung up) alongside all of it. ⚠ **A stalled body over HTTP/1.1 can come back as Caddy's empty `200 OK` (Content-Length 0)** instead of 504: replica 3/3 buffered, 2/3 unbuffered; live 2 of 3. Over h2, which browsers use, it is 502 (3/3 replica, 2/2 live). The app never gets a complete request either way; an empty 200 is not success. `handle_errors 499` and `request_buffers` do not change it (tested).
- **Static routes (gated), per svoperatingsystem `web/README.md` Hosting contract:** `/` and `/status` → index.html; `/assets/*`, `/icons/*`, `/favicon.svg`, `/manifest.webmanifest`, `/index.html`, `/sw.js` → exact file, missing → 404; other HTML document requests (`Sec-Fetch-Dest: document` or `Accept: text/html`) → index.html; anything else → 404. Unversioned files get `Cache-Control: no-cache`.
- **Acceptance matrix:** `configs/svos-front/acceptance-matrix.sh` (35 checks; usage in its header). 35/35 pass live at 1957 2026-10-05 from fv-ml1; against the previous config it reports 16 FAIL (positive control).
- **Headers:** client copies of `Tailscale-User-*`, `X-Forwarded-*`, `Tailscale-Headers-Info`, `X-Real-IP`, `Forwarded`
  and `X-SVOS-Peer` are deleted before auth. After auth, `Tailscale-User-Login` is SET to the authenticated user, and
  **`Authorization` is deleted**. That deletion is load-bearing: the kernel's human path (svoperatingsystem
  `u1-principals` INV-U1-06) refuses any request carrying `Authorization`. As a result the front door is human-only; a
  bearer client cannot come through it.
- **Retired 2026-10-05:** the WhoIs `forward_auth` gate (`svos-whois-auth`, 127.0.0.1:8405). Every mesh node has WhoIs
  login `pfi`, so it could not tell Prime's devices from the servers without restructuring the mesh, and Prime declined
  that. The unit, script, `/etc/svos-front/` and the repo files are removed; git history has them.
- **Config changes:** validate WITHOUT putting the token on a command line, then reload:
  `sudo systemd-run --wait --pipe --collect -p User=caddy -p Group=caddy -p EnvironmentFile=/etc/caddy/env
  -p "Environment=XDG_DATA_HOME=/var/lib/caddy XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/var/lib/caddy" /usr/local/bin/caddy validate --config
  <file> --adapter caddyfile`, then `systemctl reload caddy-svos`. (`env $(cat /etc/caddy/env) caddy …` leaked the first
  token into sudo's argv log on 2026-10-05; it was revoked.)
- **Tested 2026-10-05 ~1940–1946, from mesh peer fv-ml1, against a temporary header echo on 127.0.0.1:8400 (removed after):**
  - no credentials → 401 `Basic realm="SVOS"`; wrong password → 401; username `vuong` (wrong case) → 401;
  - right credentials with forged `Tailscale-User-Login`/`-Whatever`, `X-Forwarded-For/Proto/Zzz`, `Forwarded` and
    `X-Real-IP` → 200. Upstream saw exactly one `Tailscale-User-Login: Vuong`, no `Authorization`, none of the forged
    headers, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, `Host: svos.phasefinal.com`, and path `/health` (the `/api` prefix stripped);
  - connector route with right credentials → 502 (auth passed; the connector was not running); cert verifies; LAN
    10.100.50.43:443 → connection refused.

### Original requirements (svos-dev)

App side, per svos-dev 2026-10-05: kernel on `127.0.0.1:8400 --trust-loopback` (its Unix-socket mode needs a 0700
kernel-owned dir and creates a 0666 socket, so no shared-group socket in this build), interface connector on
`127.0.0.1:8403`. Static UI at `/opt/svos/current/static`. `/api/*` → kernel with the prefix stripped (`/api/health` is
the kernel's); `/health`, `/verbs/ping|pins|pin|unpin`, `/openapi.json` → connector unchanged. ⚠ With
`--trust-loopback`, every local process is inside the identity trust boundary, so run no untrusted workloads here.
Agreed design (option A): Caddy on the tailnet address only, `forward_auth` to a loopback WhoIs responder fed the real
socket peer (`{http.request.remote.host}:{port}`), fail closed, allow-list of logins, client identity/forwarding headers
stripped, Origin passed through untouched.

App listeners stay private (loopback or a Unix socket). The front door has to give the browser **HTTPS**: the UI and the
voice adapter need a secure context for the microphone. It also has to give the kernel's adapter a **verified identity**
in `Tailscale-User-Login`, with any browser-supplied copy stripped. See the svos-dev thread of 2026-10-05.