# esh-pve

Proxmox VE hypervisor for the ESH home lab (`pve.esteban.net`). Non-PFI scope.

## Network

- **LAN IP:** 10.0.250.35
- **FQDN:** `pve.esteban.net`
- **Web UI:** `https://10.0.250.35:8006`
- **SSH:** `root@esh-pve` (key auth)

## Hardware

- **CPU:** 13th Gen Intel Core i9-13900H
- **RAM:** 62.5 GB
- **Kernel:** `6.8.12-16-pve` (Proxmox 8.x)
- **Storage:** local `pve-root` at 94G (21% used) + two large NFS mounts from `10.0.50.50`:
  - `/mnt/pve/esh-nas` — 92 TB available on `/mnt/pvestore`
  - `/mnt/pve/tank-vmbu` — 93 TB, VM backup target (~1.4 TB used)

## What it runs

`esh-docker-vm` (`10.0.50.45`) is a VM here. Other home-lab VMs are not yet catalogued in this workspace — run `qm list` on the host for the live inventory.

VM **102 `esh-vm-workstation` is RETIRED (2026-09-24, Prime: "not the machine I
want running a virtual Windows machine").** `qm destroy 102 --purge` removed its
config and EFI disk. Its final backup, `pbs-ana:backup/vm/102/2026-09-10T10:32:20Z`
(verification ok), is **protected** against prune, so the retirement is
restorable. It had full GPU passthrough (`hostpci0: 0000:01:00,pcie=1,x-vga=1`)
and was the prime suspect in the 2026-08-19 freeze below.

⚠ **Found while retiring it: a hung VM-102 process since 2026-09-10 0332.** That
night's vzdump started the stopped VM with the T400 passed through to read its
disks, and the `kvm -id 102` process never exited. It is in **D state** (stuck in
`blkdev` teardown) together with its `swtpm` and a udev worker, so it cannot be
killed. It holds **16 GB of locked RAM**, the T400, and the two LVs `qm destroy`
could not remove (`pve/vm-102-disk-1` 256G, `pve/vm-102-disk-2` TPM). `qm status
102` said `stopped` the whole time. **Only a host reboot clears it.** It is the
same class of fault as the August freeze: VFIO plus this T400.

**Reboot planned for the evening of 2026-09-24 with Prime on site.** Checklist:
1. Cluster: rebooting makes esh-pve-nas's `/etc/pve` read-only until this node is
   back (guests keep running). Accept that, or run `pvecm expected 1` there first.
2. After boot, `lvremove pve/vm-102-disk-1 pve/vm-102-disk-2`, then confirm
   ~16 GB RAM is freed and nothing holds `01:00.0`. The T400 stays bound to
   vfio-pci, unassigned.
3. esh-docker-vm: watch the known NFS boot race and the traefik restart and
   crowdsec fail-closed recovery (auto-memory incident notes). DNS for
   esh-userland comes back with this host.
4. If Prime cables an onboard RJ45 (the **I226-LM** at `59:00.0` is the AMT port),
   provision AMT in MEBx during the same window. See the vPro section.

## Watchdog — hardware, not software

This host runs the **PCH hardware watchdog** (`iTCO_wdt`, 60 s, owned by
systemd via `RuntimeWatchdogSec`). `softdog` is blacklisted and Proxmox's
`watchdog-mux` is **masked**.

That is deliberate. On 2026-08-19 esh-pve hard-froze at 03:34 and stayed frozen
for ~4.5 hours until someone power-cycled it by hand — taking the only DNS
resolver the `esh-userland` VLAN is handed down with it. It was running
`softdog` at the time, which cannot rescue a hard freeze because the frozen
kernel is what would have to fire the timer; and `watchdog-mux` held the device
without ever arming it, because it only pets while an HA client is connected
and this cluster has no HA resources.

Applied and re-runnable via
[`playbooks/esh-pve-hardware-watchdog.yaml`](../../playbooks/esh-pve-hardware-watchdog.yaml).

⚠️ **Reverse this before configuring Proxmox HA on esh-pve** — HA fencing needs
`watchdog-mux` to own `/dev/watchdog`. Not a near-term concern: this is a
two-node cluster with no qdevice, so losing one node already costs quorum.

⚠️ The watchdog is armed but **has not been observed firing**. Confirming it
means deliberately wedging the host.

## vPro / AMT — not currently usable

The board is vPro-capable, but AMT needs the chipset-integrated Intel PHY (one
of the two i226 **RJ45** ports) and this host reaches the network only over
**SFP+** (Intel X710 → port 27 on the Garage switch), presenting a single MAC.
AMT cannot ride a discrete/SFP+ NIC. Cable an onboard RJ45 and provision AMT in
MEBx to get out-of-band power control; until then, recovery is the hardware
watchdog above or a physical trip.

## Refresh state

```bash
scripts/refresh-server-info.sh esh-pve
```

Same Proxmox-inspect caveat as `pfi-pve`.

## Placement rule

Hypervisor for ESH home-lab VMs. Not part of the PFI colo topology.

## ⚠ Cluster membership and the dark-tile gotcha

This node (`pve`) is half of the 2-node **`esh-pve-cluster`** with `esh-nas-pve`
(esh-pve-nas, 10.0.50.55). `Expected votes: 2`, `Quorum: 2`, no qdevice — so
**rebooting either node makes the survivor's `/etc/pve` read-only** until the
partner is back. Guests keep running; config changes do not. Plan reboots of
either node accordingly (`pvecm expected 1` on the survivor, or accept the
read-only window).

⚠ **A dark/greyed node tile usually means `pvestatd`, not a dead node.**
`pvestatd` SEGV'd here on **2026-05-28 and stayed dead for 82 days** — the node
was quorate and healthy the entire time, with `pve-cluster`, `corosync`,
`pvedaemon`, `pveproxy` and both HA services active and all three guests running.
It is only the *reporting* daemon, so its death is invisible except that the UI
has nothing to render. It has SEGV'd four times (2025-08-18, 2025-09-04,
2025-09-15, 2026-05-28) — treat a recurrence as expected, not novel.

    systemctl reset-failed pvestatd && systemctl restart pvestatd

Restarted 2026-08-18. Worth a watchdog: nothing alerts when it dies, and the only
symptom is a cosmetic one nobody looks at for months.