Root is now nvme/ROOT/pve-1. The USB DOM keeps the ESP and /boot but is
out of the runtime I/O path, so a bus reset can no longer drop root from
under a running hypervisor. All five guests healthy, three pools ONLINE,
system running, ext4 pve-root intact and unmounted as the rollback with
its own kernel and initrd. zfs-import-cache is now the active import
path -- the all-three-pools cachefile fix doing its job.
The window cost an unplanned outage, and the cause was this repo's own
tooling rather than the migration.
The staging chroot ran `mount --rbind /dev` and /sys with no
--make-rslave. On systemd `/` has shared propagation, so the cutover's
`umount -R` propagated back into the live host and removed the real
/sys/fs/cgroup, /dev/pts and /dev/shm. With cgroup2 gone systemd-logind
could not create a session: ping fine, TCP fine, SSH authentication
succeeded, resident daemons kept serving -- and every new exec hung,
including /sbin/reboot, so the reboot never ran at all.
It impersonates failing root-disk I/O almost perfectly, and I called it
as the DOM dying. That was wrong. dmesg had the answer throughout: the
DOM attached cleanly with no errors, and the last log timestamp was
12114881s -- 140 days -- meaning this was still the original boot. A
down-detector had also never reported the host down, which I read as a
fast reboot rather than as no reboot.
Fixes and guards:
- --make-rslave after every rbind, plus a guard that refuses to proceed
while any chroot bind still reports shared propagation.
- Confirm a reboot by observing the host DOWN, not by watching for it to
come back. Those two states are indistinguishable otherwise.
- Blast radius now measured from the server: `ss` inside CT 103 found
five NFS clients, not the two documented. The new one that mattered is
esh-vm-db, hard-mounted and unreachable by ssh. Left mounted on
purpose and it came through read-write.
- grub-reboot's one-shot does NOT work here: grubenv sits on an LVM LV
which GRUB reads but cannot write, so next_entry survived the boot
that consumed it. Steady state is saved_entry=pve-zfs-root with no
next_entry. There is no auto-fallback on this host and no IPMI.
Recovery needed no console: an idempotent cgroup2/devpts/shm remount
landed in the brief windows where exec succeeded. No data was lost, and
neither the DOM nor any pool was ever at risk.
Everything but the reboot. Two rerunnable elway playbooks; the host is
still running from the ext4 root and its boot path is byte-identical to
the last 140 days, because grub-install is deliberately held back to the
cutover window.
Phase 1 (esh-pve-nas-stage-zfs-root.yaml): carve a 512 MB /boot LV out
of the 768 MB swap LV, populate it, rsync the 4.3 GB ext4 root into
nvme/ROOT/pve-1, write the copy's fstab.
Phase 2 (esh-pve-nas-stage-bootloader.yaml): ZFS initramfs, grub.cfg,
explicit pve-zfs-root and pve-ext4-rollback entries with stable ids,
grubenv pinned to the rollback so cutover's grub-reboot is a one-shot.
Three landmines the plan did not predict, all caught by verify steps
asserting effective state rather than by reading the plan:
- The /boot LV had nowhere to live. VG pve had 4 MB free and mounted
ext4 cannot shrink; freeing space from root needs a rescue boot, which
costs the one-reboot property. Space came from swap (768M -> 256M).
- The runbook's `zpool set cachefile=... nvme` would have broken the
NAS. Populating a cachefile flips the host from import-by-scan to
import-by-cache, so a one-pool cache leaves ssd and tank unimported --
and CT 103 esh-nas has twelve bind mounts spanning all three pools.
Set on all three instead, verified in the resulting cache.
- update-grub silently emitted a pool-less root=ZFS=/ROOT/pve-1, which
boots to an initramfs prompt. Debian's 10_linux builds ${rpool}${bootfs}
and rpool comes from grub-probe --target=fs_label, which returns empty
because GRUB's ZFS reader cannot open a pool with encryption,
large_dnode and zstd_compress -- the same feature set that forced /boot
to stay ext4. The probe failure is swallowed by `2>/dev/null || true`.
Fixed with a /etc/default/grub.d drop-in plus explicit menu entries.
The transferable lesson: the original verify grepped for the correct
root= string appearing somewhere in grub.cfg, which passes while every
menu entry is still broken. Assert the effective value, not the presence
of a substring.
The operator-visible symptom is that PVE cannot be updated on this box for lack
of room. Measured: 225 packages pending, 161 carrying deb12uN/Debian-Security
bumps including ssh, against esh-pve's 8.4.14 versus this host's 8.4.11 and 20
weeks of uptime.
Records the ordering explicitly -- migrate first, upgrade after. The pending set
includes proxmox-kernel-6.8.12-42-pve-signed, roughly 250 MB of kernel plus
initramfs landing in /boot which is on root with 1.3 GB free. Unpacking 225
packages including dpkg and perl into that headroom risks filling the disk
mid-transaction and wedging dpkg on a hypervisor running five guests.
Notes the apt archive-dir redirect as a partial escape hatch if patching cannot
wait, and that zfs-initramfs 2.2.8 is fully capable of root-on-ZFS so there is
no need to upgrade ZFS before migrating.
Operator's proposal, and it is strictly better than the reinstall plan.
Boot and root do not have to share a device. Keep the ESP and /boot on the DOM
as ext4 -- so GRUB never has to read ZFS, which matters because the nvme pool
has encryption, large_dnode and zstd_compress enabled and GRUB cannot read
those -- and move root to nvme/ROOT/pve-1. The initramfs imports the pool and
pivots.
What this buys over the reinstall: the nvme pool survives, so no guest
migration, no export/import of ssd and tank, no reinstall. Downtime is one
reboot rather than half a day. Rollback is a GRUB menu entry, because the ext4
root stays on the DOM untouched. And it retires the actual top risk -- with
root on NVMe, a USB bus reset mid-run no longer takes the running system down;
the DOM becomes read-mostly, written only on kernel updates.
Preconditions verified and already met: UEFI with grub-efi, zfs-initramfs
2.2.8-pve1 installed with 76 ZFS files already in the running initrd, root only
4.3 GB to copy, swap negligible against 125 GB RAM.
Two traps recorded: canmount=noauto on the root dataset or ZFS tries to mount
over the running root; and cachefile is currently none with a 0-byte
zpool.cache, so the pool imports by scan today and must be given a cachefile
before the initramfs is rebuilt.
The reinstall plan is retained as the fallback.
PVE root on esh-pve-nas is a USB Disk-on-Module: 6 GB ext4 with the host's only
ESP. A DOM is SLC/pSLC so wear is not the driver -- the problems are that it is
on the USB bus (a reset drops root under a running hypervisor), has no headroom,
and is unmirrored while 928 GB of mirrored NVMe sits 96% empty.
Runbook targets a fresh PVE install to ZFS RAID1 across both NVMes. In-place
conversion is unsupported, and adding an ESP to the existing NVMes is impossible
-- both are whole-disk ZFS members with 1.7 MiB free and proxmox-boot-tool
manages nothing today.
The headline risk is not on the host being rebuilt: CT 103 esh-nas IS the NAS
at 10.0.50.50, and both esh-docker-vm and esh-pve mount it hard. Taking this box
down stalls esh-pve's storage layer and wedges esh-docker-vm into the D-state
whose only remedy is a host reboot -- the incident shape already on record.
Quiescing those clients is step one of the window, and the README now warns
against casual reboots.
Config snapshot captured off-box to nh3-dev (0600) with /etc/pve, network and
fstab config plus zpool/zfs/disk-by-id/guest state; the newest on-disk copy
before this was June 2024.
Quants are hard-fought and we keep re-paying for the same lessons. A survey
found quant knowledge scattered across 18 files in four trees, with three
documents having independently discovered and recorded overlapping
"landmines" sections — and one of them now actively misleading.
Adds docs/pfi/model-quantization-playbook.md as the single home for the
TRANSFERABLE lessons, with per-model artifacts demoted to worked examples
that link up to it. Contents:
- scheme decision table, incl. that a literal "W4A8" NVFP4 checkpoint is
unservable on vLLM (two legal activation settings, FP8 is not one)
- the reference mixed-precision recipe and the three parts of it that are
load-bearing and easy to drop
- the recurring landmines, ordered by cost: the loader-class trap
(rediscovered THREE times), the three separate ways to lose the MTP head,
toolchain deadlocks, vision configs, memory/device placement
- pipeline shape: prove targets before spending GPU time; mandatory
post-steps that verify rather than assume
- the acceptance gate, and the three ways measurement has lied to us —
prefix caching faking both speed metrics, prompt_logprobs going uniform
under speculative decoding, and a 0600 .env making compose silently no-op
- hardware/co-residency, including that a SMALLER model can starve its
neighbour because gpu-memory-utilization is a fraction of the whole card
- a superseded-claims table, and measured negatives not to re-chase
The superseded table earns its place immediately: the heretic2 runbook tells
readers to use modelopt because "compressed-tensors can't load the BF16 MTP
head, 0% acceptance". That symptom was real but the cause was not the format
-- it was the missing re:^mtp.* ignore entry. compressed-tensors gives
47.7-83.2% acceptance in production. A fresh session following that doc would
be sent down the modelopt path that current memory calls dependency hell, so
the runbook now carries a stale-warning header pointing here.
Wires discovery: an orientation.md "Where to look for what" row, pointers
from the gen-seat / heretic2 / mistral artifacts, and a CLAUDE.md maintenance
rule so the playbook gets fed instead of going stale -- model-agnostic
lessons land in the playbook, model-specific ones stay put, and a wrong
claim earns a dated superseded row rather than a silent edit.
Motivated by Qwen3.8 having just released: the next model swap will need a
requant, and this is what that session should read first.
The fast char-rp-reasoning seat works: ~77 tok/s (vs GGUF ~59.5, base NVFP4 ~53),
MTP draft-acceptance 32-40%, mean acceptance length 2.19. Same Heretic2/NEO-CODE
model, NVFP4 + native qwen3_5_mtp spec-decode.
Full end-to-end recipe + the four landmines in docs/runbooks/heretic2-nvfp4-mtp-seat.md:
(1) load as AutoModelForImageTextToText not AutoModelForCausalLM (namespace/gibberish);
(2) modelopt format not compressed-tensors (compressed-tensors MTP = 0% accept);
(3) modelopt 0.45 <-> transformers 5.12.1 FusedMoE crash (guarded in quant_modelopt.py);
(4) vLLM 0.24.0 does NOT propagate modelopt exclude_modules to the spec-decode draft
model -> BF16 mtp head gets quantized -> shape crash; no checkpoint config fixes it
(is_layer_skipped is exact-membership not glob) -> fix is a mounted sitecustomize that
force-skips mtp.* in is_layer_skipped (upstream vLLM bug to report).
Scripts: quant_modelopt.py (FusedMoE guard + single-shard export + multimodal load),
finalize_modelopt_mtp.py (splice bf16 mtp), serve_modelopt_mtp.sh, run_quant_modelopt.sh,
sitecustomize-mtp-workaround.py.
The ufw fix (prior commit) was necessary but insufficient. The DECISIVE blocker
was gitea webhook.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = 'external, 10.100.0.0/16' (NH3 only) —
corviduo-dev is 10.250.50.152 (Anaheim), so gitea refused to deliver ('deny
10.250.50.152') and never opened the TCP connection. Fixed to 'external,
10.0.0.0/8' (whole fleet, matches the ufw choice) + gitea restart.
Listener now logs every delivery (source-IP/hmac_ok/ref/action) — the old
log_message=pass silence hid the whole failure. Proven end-to-end: real gitea
delivery -> hmac_ok=True, ref=main, 202 deploying -> green deploy.
The auto-deploy silently never worked: corviduo-dev's ufw is default-deny and
port 9010 was never allowed, so gitea's webhook deliveries timed out (DROP).
v0.3.6 was a manual deploy; v0.3.7-v0.3.13 never auto-deployed. The setup-time
'test-delivery 204' was gitea queuing, not the listener receiving. Fixed by
'ufw allow from 10.0.0.0/8' (operator-directed). Confirmed end-to-end.
soong-dev found the studio serving a stale web/ (52015 vs 55025 bytes — missing the
01-Role section, favicon, thinking-status): the deploy rsynced backend/ but never web/,
so SOONG_LAB_WEB_DIR stayed pinned to the initial manual copy while the backend updated.
Deploy now rsyncs BOTH backend/->studio AND web/->SOONG_LAB_WEB_DIR (read from the env)
on every green run. Verified: served frontend now 55025 bytes, current.
Per operator call (no gitea write token on the Worldtree-team VM): a 2-min systemd
--user timer on nh3-dev polls corviduo's last-deploy.json and pings soong-dev via
althing on a NEW red deploy (green stays silent). Delivers soong-dev's red-run
visibility without a credential on corviduo. Tested (red detect+format DRY, green quiet).
Adds the rsync --link-dest hourly snapshot job (nh3-dev:~/development ->
nh3-nas, 48-snapshot retention, secrets/build-dirs excluded) that closes the
no-off-box-backup gap exposed by the 2026-07-12 working-dir clobber. Script
mirrors the live ~/.config/dev-backup/dev-backup.sh; runbook covers restore.
Auto-deploy on push to main: gitea webhook → HMAC-validated listener on irv-ml1:9008
→ git fetch/reset + docker compose up -d --build. Documents the gitea-server
ALLOWED_HOST_LIST anti-SSRF relaxation (scoped to the WG net), the irv-ml1 components
(deploy key, git-clone deploy dir preserving the proxy override/secrets, listener +
user service), and verify/debug steps.
YouTube (and a growing set of services) hard-flag datacenter IPs, bot-gating
even public content regardless of cookies/PO-tokens. Origin case: yt-voice-clipper
on irv-ml1 (Irvine colo) — every yt-dlp fetch returned LOGIN_REQUIRED. Confirmed
pure IP reputation: the same public video fetches cleanly (no cookies) once routed
through nh3-dev's residential egress (70.230.226.88).
- scripts/setup-nh3-egress-proxy.sh: idempotent dante (SOCKS5) install + config.
Internal-only ACL (10.100.0.0/16), bound to the WG interface, systemd-managed.
- docs/runbooks/nh3-egress-proxy.md: purpose, usage, security model, caveats.
Reusable fleet egress, not yt-voice-clipper-specific.
Two related changes shipped together. The stack rename is independent
but adding `vllm-reward` to the existing `vllm-qwen3` would have made
that name actively misleading.
**Rename:** `stacks/vllm-qwen3/ → stacks/vllm/`. Updated all in-repo
references (README.md root, servers/ana-ml2/, stacks/llama-swap/,
configs/restic/ana-ml2/, docs/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md). Two
intentional history mentions retained (servers/ana-ml2 + stacks/vllm
README).
**Add `vllm-reward` service:** serves Skywork-Reward-V2-Llama-3.1-8B-AWQ
on port 8003. The AWQ output is a locally-quantized model (not from HF),
so bind-mounts `/tank/aimodels/llm:/local-models:ro` rather than the
shared HF cache. Model config.json declares LlamaForSequenceClassification
which vLLM's pooling runner picks up automatically — produces a single
reward score per input via /classify.
**Flag note:** the user's spec listed `--task classify`, but vLLM 0.19.1
deprecated --task in favor of --runner pooling (model architecture in
config.json drives the classification head). Compose uses --runner
pooling with a comment explaining the substitution.
**GPU memory:** no rebalance needed — production had already tuned
EMBED/RERANK down from 0.40 to 0.20 each (canonical .env.example now
matches reality). Adding REWARD at 0.30 totals 0.70, leaving ~14 GB
headroom on the 48 GB Ada.
**Server-side:** brought existing vllm-qwen3 down, mv'd
/opt/docker/compose/vllm-qwen3 → /opt/docker/compose/vllm, appended
REWARD_* lines to existing .env (preserving API_KEY/HF_TOKEN), deployed
new compose via scripts/deploy-stack.sh, brought all 3 services up.
**Smoke tests:**
- /health on 8001/8002/8003 → 200
- /v1/models on 8003 → lists Skywork/Skywork-Reward-V2-Llama-3.1-8B-AWQ
with max_model_len 16384
- /classify with a sample conversation → returns LABEL_0 with prob 0.9999
(single-output regression-style reward score, expected shape for a
reward model)
New runbook captures the three-phase process:
Phase 1 — Drop --append-only via DSM Container Manager web UI
Phase 2 — sudo resticprofile forget --prune --verbose on each of
nh3-docker, nh3-dev, irv-ml1 (interactive sudo per host)
Phase 3 — Restore --append-only via DSM
Why each phase looks the way it does, what to expect (largely no-op
runs for the first 6 months while no snapshots have aged out of the
keep window), how to verify each phase non-destructively (curl 401
on the rest-server root proves the container's up + serving), what
to do if Phase 2 fails with `repository is configured as append-only`
(skipped Phase 1 / DSM didn't apply), and the path to future
automation (find docker bin path on DSM, NOPASSWD-lock syncuser to
the specific recreate command).
Includes a "last run history" table seeded with today's first
post-pipeline run (no-op, irv-ml1 only had 3 snapshots due to the
04-25→27 CUDA stall).
Cross-referenced from docs/README.md (runbook tree), docs/
orientation.md (where-to-look table), and STATUS.md item 9 (which
now points at the runbook + records the next-round date 2026-07-27).
Bundles the post-2026-04-21 work that built out the two-layer backup
architecture (PBS for VM images + restic for file/DB), plus the cross-
site mirror and the disaster-recovery runbook.
- configs/restic/esh-docker-vm/profiles.yaml: drop the obsolete
*_offen_backup_data exclude (offen sidecars retired fleet-wide
2026-04-23; restic now covers the equivalent scope directly).
- configs/restic/esh-vm-db/: new profile for the dedicated DB VM
(10.0.50.60), with pre-backup pg_dumpall + mongodump hooks.
- configs/rsync/: ana-nas → nh3-nas (04:00 daily, runs as lkraven)
and nh3-nas → ana-nas (05:00 daily, runs as root because DSM
rest-server-nh3 writes mode-400 files only root can read).
- docs/runbooks/pbs-deployment.md: 9-phase PBS rollout runbook,
refined during the 2026-04-22 deployment with per-hypervisor
namespaces, NFSv3 + ZFS-case-insensitivity workaround, and the
Synology syno_acl flatten step.
- docs/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md: blast-radius runbook ordered
Tier 0 → 5 (ana-nas → hypervisors → Docker hosts → VMs → specialty);
references incident memory + recovery-step playbooks per consumer.
VMIDs aren't globally unique across PVE hosts (esh-pve and sfsrv-ana
both have VM 100, etc.). Without namespaces, per-hypervisor backups
collide under the same /vm/<vmid>/ path in the shared datastore.
Changes:
- New Phase 1.4b: create one namespace per hypervisor up front
(pfi-pve, nh3-pve, esh-pve, esh-pve-nas, sfsrv-ana).
- Phase 2.1 storage-entry template now lists Namespace as a required
field, set to the hypervisor's own name.
- Critical-note explaining the collision risk so future deployers
don't skip this step.
ACL grants remain at the datastore level; they apply across all child
namespaces so the existing fleet-vzdump token continues to work. Sync
job (Phase 6) preserves namespace tree to PBS-NH3 automatically.
Discovered during Phase 1.3 (mount NAS datastore). The Debian NAS's
/mnt/backup is on ZFS with casesensitivity=insensitive; NFSv4 writes
fail with EACCES even for root with no_root_squash. Known-bad
combination at the ZFS-on-Linux + NFSv4 layer.
Workaround: mount the NFS share with vers=3. PBS's chunk-based
access pattern works fine over NFSv3.
Added a section 0.5 to Phase 0 documenting the issue + both fixes
(quick: use NFSv3; cleaner: create case-sensitive child dataset).
Future deployments against this NAS won't rediscover the same wall.
Current NFS exports on the Debian NAS (10.250.50.50) use root_squash,
which blocks PBS from writing its datastore metadata (chunks, locks,
GC state — all root-owned operations). Rest-server-ana worked around
this by running its container as UID 1000, but PBS's service model
doesn't accommodate that pattern cleanly.
Solution baked into Phase 0: create a dedicated NFS export for the
PBS-ANA datastore subtree, scoped to only the PBS-ANA VM's IP, with
no_root_squash. Bounded exposure (single client), kept in a separate
.exports file so Cockpit's File Sharing module doesn't clobber it.
Flag world-scoped export on /mnt/pve-VMStorage as a non-blocking
hygiene item for a later Cockpit pass.
End-to-end runbook for standing up Proxmox Backup Server across the
fleet. Path A architecture: single primary at ANA, one-way sync to NH3
for disaster recovery. All 5 hypervisors (pfi-pve, nh3-pve, esh-pve,
esh-pve-nas, sfsrv-ana) migrate from local-dump vzdump to PBS-ANA.
Key decisions captured in the runbook:
- PBS in a Debian VM (not LXC) for clean capability model.
- PBS-ANA on pfi-pve, datastore via NFS from 10.250.50.50 —
separates backup data from hypervisor boot disk.
- PBS-NH3 on nh3-pve with local storage (independent failure
domain from ANA).
- Dedicated fleet-vzdump API token; read-only sync token for
PBS-NH3's pull job.
- sfsrv-ana specifically goes from zero backup coverage to full
vzdump coverage in Phase 3.
9 phases, each self-contained with a done-state and rollback
posture. User can stop between phases without leaving the fleet in a
bad state.
STATUS.md: added item 6b tracking this deployment. Original item 6
(cross-site rsync) now scoped to restic-only since PBS handles the
VM-image cross-site redundancy directly.
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