Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
vh c99aa49cad feat(corviduo): wire ratatoskr memory plane :8391 into personal Worldtree bifrost allowlist
Append 10.100.10.50:8391 to BIFROST_CLIENT_ALLOWED_HOSTS on the personal
Worldtree (.env) so the consumer may bind the memory provider at session-create
(affect :8390 was already listed; the url-guard 422s un-allowlisted endpoints).
Idempotent elway playbook; surgical worldtree-api recreate that auto-derives the
image pin from the matrix sibling to avoid the stale-:latest crash-block footgun.

Repoint servers/corviduo-dev/ssh-target to infra-ops (operator granted durable
NOPASSWD admin on corviduo-dev 2026-06-15).
2026-06-15 23:22:06 -07:00
vh d8d776c7a3 docs(corviduo-dev): Worldtree deploys (demo/pinned/personal) are CI/CD-only, not infra-ops
worldtree-dev sent infra-ops a manual deploy request for v0.30.6 to
personal:8081; operator confirmed all three corviduo-dev Worldtree
deployments go through the Worldtree team's CI/CD, never a manual
infra-ops deploy. The old 'personal — manually managed' line was wrong
and misleading. docker-as-root pattern is emergency-ops (key restore)
only.
2026-06-03 13:46:05 -07:00
vh 532356fcbe corviduo-dev: log Worldtree v0.25.2 config-as-bind-mount landing (#205) 2026-05-24 20:28:46 -07:00
vh 5528769211 dockge: parameterize stacks-root path + deploy on corviduo-dev
Made the host-stacks bind-mount path configurable via
DOCKGE_HOST_STACKS_ROOT (default /opt/docker, unchanged for the
existing five hosts). Override on corviduo-dev to /home/vh/docker
because that host's /opt/ is owned by deploy:deploy (Worldtree team)
and vh lacks passwordless sudo for the fleet-standard path — same
reasoning as the beszel + dozzle agent placement earlier today.

Deployed to corviduo-dev. Reachable at http://10.250.50.152:5001
(first probe 200 — Docker's port-mapping route through iptables
worked without firewall changes, unlike beszel's network_mode: host).

Scoped to PFI-managed stacks only (/home/vh/docker/compose/) — does
NOT see /opt/worldtree*/ deployments. Keeps the management boundary
clean: dockge can restart/recreate PFI's beszel+dozzle+itself but
not the Worldtree-team-owned containers.
2026-05-23 21:23:44 -07:00
vh 1cd79e8274 corviduo-dev: deploy beszel + dozzle monitoring agents
Operator-approved fleet monitoring extension. Both agents up + healthy:
- beszel-agent on host port 45876 (KEY-mode, hub at ana-docker:8090
  SSH-polls inbound; seeded with hub's ed25519 pubkey).
- dozzle-agent on host port 7007 (mTLS auto-generated; hub at
  ana-docker:8088 connects inbound).

Compose lives at /home/vh/docker/compose/{beszel,dozzle-agent}/ rather
than the fleet-standard /opt/docker/compose/{...}/ because corviduo-dev's
/opt/ is owned by deploy:deploy (Worldtree team) and vh lacks
passwordless sudo to create the fleet path. Functionally identical;
documented in servers/corviduo-dev/README.md so future infra-ops
sessions find them.

Created an empty traefik-net external docker network on corviduo-dev
as a side effect of dozzle-agent's compose (which declares it external).
Future PFI services landing here can reuse it.

Dozzle hub on ana-docker had 10.250.50.152:7007 appended to
DOZZLE_REMOTE_AGENT (a host-side change to a non-tracked .env, not
canonical). Beszel hub still needs corviduo-dev added via the UI's
"Add System" action — one-time operator step, flagged in the corviduo
README.
2026-05-23 18:13:59 -07:00
vh 9523343d3a servers/corviduo-dev: add Worldtree-team dev VM to inventory
Captures the access path + emergency-ops runbook surfaced during the
2026-05-12 demo outage (Z_AI_API_KEY / runtime validator / :latest tag
drift cascade).

- servers/corviduo-dev/{README.md,ssh-target,system-details.txt}
- CLAUDE.md servers table + placement-rules note

The "docker-as-root sudo bypass" pattern (vh's docker-group membership
→ effective root for any bind-mount-able operation) is the canonical
fix path when /opt/worldtree*/.env edits are needed and the deploy
user's sudo is out of reach. The README documents the pattern with
the appropriate "docker-group ≈ sudo" security warning so future
emergency-ops sessions don't have to re-derive it.

Ownership stance matches SF client hosts: PFI hosts + provides
emergency-ops backstop, Worldtree-team owns OS config / deploys /
backup decisions. Coordinate data-affecting work with the architect.
2026-05-12 23:36:11 -07:00