Audit finding on 0.1.1: a Jev client that always sends an images array with no
images was rejected for nothing. Only a non-empty value is 422 now. Also aligns
the contract's response example with the wire (model is the name@revision
string, not an object).
Re-accepted live: images []/null -> 200, ["a.png"] -> 422; JevBench all 202/231,
hard 83/111, 0 changed rows across the bench's r1..r4 (924).
Straight passthrough to the checkpoint's own DecisionEngine.predict — never the
semif mapping, whose different prompt would change the answers. Reuses the one
inference thread, bearer auth, MAX_QUEUE, VRAM cap and error envelope; no new
concurrency. 1..16 questions in ONE call (never chunked: Jev questions share a
prompt); images 422; over MAX_TOKENS 422 before the forward. /health advertises
the surface. Response 'model' is a string name@revision (JevBench's runner
hashes it; a dict broke its manifest step).
Acceptance on the live service (see acceptance/systemone-2026-09-30/): JevBench
v1.2.16 typesafe adapter over the 231 public items scores all 202/231, hard
83/111, with 0 changed answers across all 924 rows of the bench's own r1..r4;
controls 401/422x3 (token boundary proven at 7168 pass / 7169 refuse); GPU 1
per-process peak 9,866 MiB under the largest accepted request (budget 9,876);
/decide/shared positive control unchanged. 120 tests green.
Contract, service and tests (fake engine, no GPU). Scores through the checkpoint's own
inference.py (DecisionEngine.predict, sha256-pinned); maps semif decisions onto Jev choice
questions, packs /decide/shared into calls of at most 16, runs orderings in waves, and keeps
semif's error mapping, admission, body limit and hard VRAM cap. Deltas from semif-serve are
listed in the contract.
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