ops(ana-gw): port 80 on the WAN address is the FortiOS ACME listener
The previous note attributed the open port to an ISP transparent proxy. That was wrong. It terminates on the FortiGate: system acme is bound to wan1, and FortiOS opens port 80 there to answer HTTP-01 challenges regardless of what allowaccess permits, which is why the port stays open with the interface set to ping only. Every non-challenge request returns a fixed 403 whose body reads ACME Access Only. No DNAT is involved; of the fourteen virtual IPs only two land on that address, neither on port 80. The wrong conclusion came from a sniffer filtered on dst host, which matches inbound packets alone and so excluded the replies being looked for. Filtered bidirectionally the box is plainly seen emitting SYN-ACK on port 80. The note records the rule. Two consequences follow. The earlier warning that certificate renewal would fail without http in allowaccess is retracted, since FortiOS opens the challenge port itself. And the listener is not an administrative surface, though its value is now marginal with WAN administration closed, so the note records how to remove it and leaves that decision open. Also captured: four virtual IPs are all-port static NAT and map every port of their external address.
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@@ -566,3 +566,51 @@ If both tunnels drop it is console-only until someone is on site.
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**The ESH key's first-ever confirmed WRITE happened here** (auto-memory recorded
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it as read-verified only): a control PUT of the unchanged object returned
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`rc:ok`, then the real change did too. That key has a full read+write admin role.
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---
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## CORRECTION (2026-08-23): port 80 on the WAN IP is the FortiOS ACME listener
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The claim in the previous section that `.42:80` was an **ISP transparent proxy**
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was **WRONG**, and so was the earlier warning that ACME renewal would fail with
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port 80 absent from `allowaccess`. Operator pushed back asking where the port-80
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map terminated. It terminates **on the FortiGate itself**.
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**What it is:** the FortiOS **ACME HTTP-01 challenge listener**. `config system
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acme` has `set interface "wan1"`, and FortiOS opens port 80 on that interface to
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answer Let's Encrypt challenges **independently of `allowaccess`** — `wan1
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allowaccess` reads `ping` only and the port is still open. Every non-challenge
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request returns a fixed 403 whose body is literally:
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```
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<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>ACME Access Only</title></head><body>ACME Access Only</body></html>
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```
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**Not a DNAT.** The full VIP table has 14 entries; only two land on `.42` —
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`Kokoro-In` (:8880 → 10.250.50.51) and `wg-to-ana-wg` (:31337 → 10.250.50.252).
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Worth noting separately: **four VIPs are all-port static NAT** (no `portforward`),
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so they map *every* port of their external IP — `Rustdesk` (.44 → 10.250.50.70),
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`https-to-tacticalrmm` (.46 → .57), `web-to-webhost` (.45 → .52),
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`web-to-sfcontainer` (.43 → 10.250.150.100).
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### The methodology error that produced the wrong answer — worth not repeating
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The sniffer filter used was `dst host 38.120.12.42 and tcp port 80`. **`dst host`
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matches only inbound packets**, so outbound SYN-ACKs were excluded *by
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construction*; concluding "the box sends no SYN-ACK" from that capture was
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unsound. Re-run with the bidirectional `host 38.120.12.42 and tcp port 80` it
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immediately shows `wan1 out 38.120.12.42.80 -> <scanner>: syn ack`.
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**Rule: when testing whether a box *answers*, the sniffer filter must be
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bidirectional. `dst host` silently answers a different question.**
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### Consequences
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- **ACME renewal will work** with `allowaccess ping`. The earlier "add `http`
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back or the cert expires" warning is retracted — FortiOS opens the challenge
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port itself. Cert valid to 2026-10-27, renewal attempt ~2026-09-27.
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- **It is not an admin surface** — static 403, no auth, no GUI.
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- Its practical value is now low: WAN admin is closed, so the cert only serves
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the internal GUI at 10.250.0.1, where the name would not match anyway. Killing
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it (`config system acme` → unset interface) would close the last WAN listener
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at the cost of cert renewal. Operator's call; **not done**.
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