feat(fv): invert the watchdog to break-glass; fv-ml1 off the mesh
Operator's design, and a better one. Once the FV SNAT rules landed, fv-ml1's mesh membership was redundant for routing and its only remaining value was as a second way in. Keeping it enrolled bought a standing second door; joining on demand buys the same recovery path without one. normal tailscaled stopped + disabled; fleet reached via the gateway SNAT fault nh3-dev / nh3-docker unreachable while the WAN is up action start tailscaled + tailscale up -> reachable at its 100.64.x address fv-ml1 is now off the mesh and its node record deleted. Verified it still reaches NH3, ESH, Anaheim, Irvine and the internet on the SNAT path alone, then the break-glass fired on cue (counted 1..4, joined at 5 as 100.64.0.10), answered ping and ssh from nh3-dev, and was closed again cleanly. No auto-leave, deliberately: once open the door stays open until a human runs systemctl disable --now tailscaled. A watchdog that re-closes on recovery flaps, and a flapping recovery path is down exactly when someone finally looks. It also skips entirely when already on the mesh, which is what makes it idempotent after firing. The question exposed a hole worth more than the redesign. The stored rejoin key was one of the 2026-09-12 FV cutover keys, expiring 2026-09-19 -- a break-glass credential that dies in four days and fails silently at the only moment it matters. Replaced with a dedicated 1-year reusable key (headscale ID 8, expires 2027-09-15), vaulted as fv-ml1/headscale-breakglass-key, root:600 on the host. That also closes the standing self-join risk rather than trading it: the two stale reusable keys (IDs 5, 6) are expired, so the mesh now has exactly one live reusable key -- purpose-built, on a host we control -- instead of two orphans nobody owned. Rejoin uses --accept-routes=false and the reason is in the script: on 2026-09-14 tailscale up --accept-routes on this box accepted its OWN subnet from the gateway and black-holed it. That happened with a human watching; here it runs unattended, during an incident, on a box already in trouble.
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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# `[2026-09-15]` Dead man's switch on fv-ml1 — mesh watchdog
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# `[2026-09-15]` Break-glass mesh path on fv-ml1 (inverted from a restore-watchdog)
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Every path into Fountain Valley runs through equipment at FV. When fv-ml1 loses
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its way back to the fleet there is no console, no local hands, and the BMC sits
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@@ -40,3 +40,42 @@ it from its own LAN: it accepted `10.251.0.0/16` from the gateway — **its own
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subnet** — and routed the local network through the tunnel. Recovery only worked
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because its mesh address happened to still answer. Same family as the
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2026-09-06 nh3-dev incident; see [[2026-09-15-fv-cross-site-snat]].
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## ⭐ INVERTED the same night, on the operator's suggestion
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The first version kept fv-ml1 permanently on the mesh and restored its Tailscale
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state when it broke. Once the FV SNAT rules landed
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([[2026-09-15-fv-cross-site-snat]]) that membership became **redundant for
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routing** — its only remaining value was as a second way in. The operator's
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question was the better design: *keep the box OFF the mesh and have the watchdog
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JOIN when it loses the fleet.* Same recovery path, no standing second door.
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normal tailscaled stopped + disabled; fleet reached via the gateway SNAT
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fault FLEET_ANCHORS (nh3-dev, nh3-docker) unreachable while the WAN is up
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action start tailscaled + `tailscale up` -> reachable at its 100.64.x address
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**Verified end to end, off-mesh:** fv-ml1 removed from headscale entirely, then
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confirmed it still reaches NH3/ESH/ANA/IRV/internet on the SNAT path alone; then
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the break-glass fired on cue (counted 1..4, joined at 5 as `100.64.0.10`),
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answered ping **and ssh** from nh3-dev, and was closed again cleanly.
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⚠ **No auto-leave, deliberately.** Once open the door stays open until a human
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runs `systemctl disable --now tailscaled`. A watchdog that re-closes on recovery
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flaps, and a flapping recovery path is down exactly when someone finally looks.
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⚠ **Skipped if already on the mesh** — that is what makes it idempotent after
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firing, rather than re-running `tailscale up` every minute.
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### The hole the operator's question exposed
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The stored rejoin key was `hskey-auth-g8_iQtwSHntv`, one of the 2026-09-12 FV
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cutover keys — **expiring 2026-09-19**. A break-glass credential that dies in
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four days and fails silently at the only moment it matters. Replaced with a
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dedicated **1-year reusable** key (headscale ID 8, expires 2027-09-15), vaulted
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as `fv-ml1/headscale-breakglass-key`, stored `root:600` at
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`/var/lib/fv-mesh-watchdog/authkey`.
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⭐ That also **closes** the standing self-join risk rather than trading it: the
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two stale reusable keys (IDs 5, 6) were expired, so the mesh now has exactly one
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live reusable key, purpose-built, on a host we control — instead of two orphans
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nobody owned.
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