From 90941607e788c82120f7614b1a8b0938ee1e5825 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vuong Hoang Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 06:57:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] memory: gitea corviduo/ledger renamed to corviduo/svos; svos Heimdall mint now open MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Rename executed on the operator's direct authorization. Repo id 70 unchanged. Redirect verified by measurement rather than by citing upstream #807: web and API paths both 301, and `git ls-remote` against the old URL warns, follows, and returns HEAD b48a11ca5183. Existing clones keep working. Recorded as a standing hazard that the old path is now burned — a repo created at corviduo/ledger kills the redirect silently. Also opens the Heimdall item ledger-dev had been holding as "awaiting infra-ops" without ever having sent it, including the deletion-ordering trap that makes retiring the old key first unrecoverable. --- persistent-memory.md | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/persistent-memory.md b/persistent-memory.md index 26baae0..9f47f3b 100644 --- a/persistent-memory.md +++ b/persistent-memory.md @@ -170,9 +170,29 @@ below is a live commitment or a known-open risk._ their repo, their call; answered that 1.26.1 writes a `repo_redirect` on a same-org repo rename (upstream #807), that org/user renames do NOT redirect (#9531), that the redirect dies if anything re-creates the old path, and that the - repo and org both carry 0 webhooks. Handle `ledger-dev` → `svos-dev` is an + repo and org both carry 0 webhooks. **Gitea rename EXECUTED 2026-09-05** on the + operator's direct authorization: `corviduo/ledger` → `corviduo/svos`, repo id 70 + unchanged. Redirect verified by measurement — web and API both 301, and + `git ls-remote` on the old URL warns-and-follows to HEAD b48a11ca5183. ⚠ **The + name `corviduo/ledger` is now burned**: the redirect dies silently the moment + anything creates a repo at that path. Handle `ledger-dev` → `svos-dev` is an operator action at the post office. +- **OPEN, with ledger-dev: mint a `svos` Heimdall user + API key.** Never actually + asked of me until 2026-09-05 (it sat in their runbook as "awaiting infra-ops" + while addressed to worldtree-dev, who hold no key material). Constraints: string + `svos` verbatim (WT tier 3 admits only `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{2,63}$`, INV-181-15); + **keep the existing `ledger` key LIVE**, do not revoke. Ordering is load-bearing — + `DELETE /agents/{agent_id}` refuses any caller that is not the row's owner, so + `ledger:miranda` can ONLY be deleted with the `ledger` key; retire it first and + the stale row outlives the ability to remove it, holding a live + `agents.call:ledger:miranda` grant that nothing reaps (the 24h sweep only touches + soft-deleted rows, and soft-deletion comes from revocation, never disuse). So: + mint new → they cut over and verify → delete the agent with the OLD key → then + retire it. Precedent for who mints: msg 401, worldtree-dev routed the pewpewstudio + key request TO infra-ops. I hold only the PERSONAL admin token (:8081); which + deployment `ledger` lives on is not yet established. Surfaced to the operator. + - **Open commitment to vastblue-dev:** a dedicated CI runner, gated on their first client-premises release cut (U10, unscheduled). Ping expected when U10 is scheduled.